The concept of human nature in Wei-Jin Chinese philosophy by WANG JINYI
 THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN NATURE  
IN WEI-JIN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY: 











A THESIS SUBMITTED  





DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 






I remember the days when I began to study Chinese philosophy in early 
2000.  They are as vivid as just yesterday.  How little I knew then!  Now, looking 
back the past five years, I conclude this period in my course of learning with this 
thesis.  It is a work, though imperfect due to the limits of my own capacity, that 
would never have been done without the advice and encouragement I have 
received gratefully during this period. 
Professor Alan K. L. Chan directed me to this interesting field and has 
guided me patiently yet strictly throughout my Ph.D. candidature at the National 
University of Singapore, to whom I owe more than I can ever repay.  His guidance, 
in a classic way that I admire but may not achieve, does not end with the 
completion of this thesis.  It exerts an enduring influence on me both as a 
prospective teacher and a scholar in the future. 
I have benefited a lot from the lectures and seminars held by the 
Department of Philosophy of NUS.  I am impressed by the teachers’ academic 
ability, and their kindness, which, I think, is more valuable. I wish to thank 
especially Associate Professor Tan Sor hoon and Dr. Heng Hock Jiuan for their 
comments on this thesis and help at critical moments. 
It is my luck to be the classmate of a group of friendly and bright Ph.D 
students.  Michael Fitzgerald carefully corrected two chapters of an earlier draft.  
My friend Dr. Sun Wenmin managed to squeeze time to read part of the thesis 
when he himself was terribly busy.  My discussions with Kim Hak Ze, Olalekan 
Rafiu, Raphael Funwa, and other students are inspiring and pleasant. They made 
the days right before the submission of this thesis, normally stressful and hectic, 
enjoyable. 
 ii
The financial support from the National University of Singapore enables 
me to concentrate on the research.  I also want to extend my thanks to the library 
of NUS for its five star services.  This thesis is materially based on it. 
My husband has borne the painful burden of my study emotionally.  I 
thank his understanding and support especially when I stayed overseas.  I also 
wish to thank my mother.  She always pushes her daughters to forge ahead.  I was 
once seriously suspicious of her life philosophy.  But now I know that I need to be 
pushed. 
This thesis is dedicated to my father.  
 iii
Table of Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................... i 
Summary ..................................................................................................... iv 
Introduction.................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 1 Conceptions of Human Nature in Warring States and Han 
China........................................................................................................... 23 
1.1. Early Confucian Ideas of Human Nature........................................... 26 
1.2. Human Nature in Han Confucian Synthesis ...................................... 30 
1.3. New Developments in Han Confucian Views of Human Nature...... 43 
1.4. Human Nature in Early Daoist Philosophy........................................ 55 
1.5 Two Perspectives of Human Nature: Principle vs. Substance........... 65 
Chapter 2 Wang Bi: NatureDao and Natureqi........................................... 69 
2.1. NatureDao: Human Authenticity and Natureqi: Human Substance .. 71 
2.2. The Relationship between Nature and Feeling: NatureDao Guides 
Natureqi ......................................................................................................... 89 
2.3. The Ideal Sage: His feelings and Spirituality ................................... 103 
Chapter 3 The Limits of Nature and Self-Knowledge ......................... 125 
3.1. A Comprehensive View of Nature..................................................... 128 
3.2. The Limits of Nature and Self-knowledge........................................ 141 
3.3. The Sociopolitical Implications of Guo Xiang’s View of Human 
Nature ......................................................................................................... 170 
Chapter 4 Wang Bi and Guo Xiang Compared: Inheriting from and 
Going beyond Han Confucianism .......................................................... 189 
4.1. Similarities between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang................................. 192 
4.2. Differences between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang ................................. 195 
4.3. Inheritance from and Development to Han Confucianism............. 201 





Falling between the great unified empires of the Han and Tang, the Wei-
Jin Period of Division (A.D. 220-420) may be one of the most overlooked and 
least understood eras to the English world.  Compared with the large number of 
publications on the philosophical currents in the pre-Qin period, Wei Jin 
philosophy, normally known as xuanxue (玄学 Learning of the Profound), is still 
an under-developed field in the English-speaking world.  The concept of human 
nature in it, in particular, has not been addressed in detail and systematically.  This 
thesis tries to make contribution in this respect. 
The concept of human nature is generally considered to be a dominant 
theme of Confucianism.  It seems not to enjoy a privileged position in Daoism and 
xuanxue that mainly built on the commentaries on Daoist classics and the Yijing.  
However, as the examination of this thesis shows, the philosophical understanding 
of human nature actually serves as the basis for both Daoist and Wei-Jin 
philosophers’ socio-political thoughts.  To be specific, Wei-Jin philosophers’ 
views of the socio-political issues, for example, the principle of non-action (wuwei 
无为), the method of restoring social order, and the role of the sage, derive 
logically from their views of human nature. 
This thesis examines two representative philosophers in the Wei-Jin period, 
i.e., Wang Bi and Guo Xiang’s views of human nature.  It begins with a review of 
the influential views of human nature developed before the Wei-Jin period, then 
gives a detailed analysis of Wang Bi and Guo Xiang’s thoughts, and concludes the 
examination with a comparison between the two philosophers.  It is the 
submission of this thesis that Wang Bi understood human nature as consisting of 
two parts, i.e., natureDao and natureqi.  The former is the differentiation of the Dao 
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in each human being, which is neither good nor evil.  The latter is the material 
constituent of human nature, whose contact with external things is subject to 
moral judgment.  Wang Bi’s view may anticipate the dichotomy that Neo-
Confucian Zhu Xi made between tianli zhi xing (nature of Heavenly principle天
理之性) and qizhi zhi xing (nature of qi endowment 气质之性), which indicates 
the bearing of Wei-Jin philosophy on Neo-Confucianism.  As for Guo Xiang, he 
adopted a comprehensive view of human nature, i.e., to refer human nature to the 
concrete phenomena of life, physical features, capacity, and feeling principally.  
The most distinctive of his view of human nature, as the thesis observes, is that the 
nature of each human being has its limits.  So the urgent thing for people is to 
develop self-knowledge of their respective limits.  This mode of self-knowledge 
guarantees that one fully utilizes one’s nature, but not admires or envies others, 
which forms the resource of one’s happiness.  
The thesis situates Wang Bi and Guo Xiang in a tradition that took shape 
in the Warring States period and developed in the Han dynasty.  As opposed to a 
popular yet sectarian view that Wei-Jin philosophy is a revival of early Daoism, 
the thesis suggests that Wei-Jin philosophy represents a distinctive development to 
the tradition.  A comparison between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang shows not only the 
dynamic change of the tradition within the Wei-Jin period, but also the connection 
of the two philosophers to the previous tradition.  While both inherited certain 
basic ideas from the tradition, they also contributed to its renewal by solving the 
problems that Han Confucians failed to address, i.e., the origin of goodness and 





Irene Bloom says, “In virtually every culture, there is reflection about how 
human beings are alike and how they differ”.1  As far as Chinese philosophy is 
concerned, the concept of human nature enjoys a privileged position.  It is widely 
accepted that Chinese philosophy has strong ethical and political dimensions.  
From one perspective, the understanding of human nature serves as the theoretical 
basis for ethical and political thought.  It determines the kind of life that one ought 
to live and the socio-political policies to be implemented.  Also, it is generally 
agreed that Chinese philosophy aims to pursue a harmonious unity between 
Heaven and human beings (tianren heyi 天人合一).  In this context, the concept 
of human nature functions as a bridge between Heaven and human beings, as 
human nature is understood to be endowed by Heaven.  Confucianism and Daoism 
may debate with each other on many issues, but both agree that only by realizing 
one’s nature can one achieve the harmony between oneself and Heaven.  
Ever since Confucius proposed that “by nature men are alike, through 
practice they have become far apart,”2 the question of human nature has come to 
be an enduring concern for generations of Chinese philosophers.  Their insights 
into this question have formed a unique tradition of philosophical thought of 
human nature.  This tradition has attracted a great deal of research attention.  
However, in comparison with the large quantity of studies on the theories of 
human nature in pre-Qin times and the Song-Ming dynasties, less attention has 
been paid to those developed in the Wei-Jin period.  
                                                 
1 Irene Bloom, “Human nature and biological nature in Mencius,” Philosophy East and 
West 47.1 (January 1997): 21. 
 
2 The Analects, 17:2; Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1973), 45. 
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Falling between the great unified empires of Han and Tang, the period of 
division during the Wei and Jin dynasties (A.D. 220-420) may be one of the most 
overlooked and least understood eras to the English world.  However, it is a 
distinctive period in Chinese history.  It is often claimed that Confucianism with 
its emphasis on moral rites dominates the development of the Chinese society; yet, 
the Wei-Jin period is a subtle exception, during which such Daoist classics as the 
Laozi and the Zhuangzi gained great popularity among intellectuals.  The concepts 
of the Dao, Nonbeing and Being, and other philosophical issues were hotly 
debated.  Wei-Jin philosophy is sometimes praised for having reached 
unparalleled metaphysical heights in the history of Chinese philosophy;3  but it has 
also been fiercely criticized for having indulged in “empty” discussions that 
resulted in the division of the country.4   
Of special interest to this thesis, the period abounds with the unorthodox 
words and behaviour of “famous men of letters” (mingshi名士), which have been 
either fervently admired or fiercely attacked by the later generations.  To take a 
few examples, Xun Can (荀粲 ca. 212-240) remarked that a woman’s virtue is not 
worth praising; her beauty is the most important thing.5  Ruan Ji (阮籍 A.D.210-
                                                 
3 Tang Yongtong  湯用彤 , Wei Jin xuanxue lungao 魏晉玄學論稿 (Shanghai: Shanghai 
guji chubanshe上海:上海古籍出版社, 2001). 
 
4 For example, Fan Ning (范寧 339-401) held He Yan (何晏 ca 190-249) and Wang Bi 
responsible for the superficial state of the Jin intellectual scene, because the two initiated the 
“empty” discussions of the abstract topics.  In his view, the devastation that He Yan and Wang Bi 
caused is worse than the wicked kings Jie and Zhou.  See Jinshu晉書, biography of Fan Ning, 
75:1984. 
 
    5 For more details, see Liu Yiqing 劉義慶 , Shishuoxinyu  世說新語 edited by Xu Zhene 
徐震堮 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 北京:中華書局, 1984), 489-490.  An English translation is 
available. Richard B. Mather, Shih-shuo Hsin-yü: A New Account of Tales of the World (Ann 
Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 2002), 522. I use my translations 
throughout the thesis.  
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263) claimed that rites are not applicable to him.6  At the funeral of Wang Can (王
粲 A.D.177-217), Emperor Wen of Wei (魏文帝 r.220-226) demanded his 
companions to mimic a donkey’s call, for the deceased enjoyed that sound when 
alive.7  An extreme yet well-known instance involves Liu Ling (劉伶?–265). He 
was seriously addicted to alcohol and went about naked in his house.  He 
recriminated against others’ rebuke, “I take heaven and earth as my house and the 
room of my house as my underwear. Why do you enter into my underwear?”8 
These stories initially aroused my interest in the Wei-Jin period.  This 
interest became a research project, as I discovered that this type of behaviour was 
not simply the eccentricities of certain individuals, but rather constituted the trend 
of that time.  Then questions arise as to how to explain these unconventional 
words and behaviour, and why they emerged to such a degree only in the Wei-Jin 
period.  How did these famous men view the earlier tradition?  Did they break 
completely with tradition?  Ultimately, the question is what did the thinkers of this 
period construe to be the defining characteristic of human existence, if morality, 
the most valuable asset that distinguishes human beings from animals in 
Confucian view, was called into question?  Is it the case that their understanding 
of human beings was based on a complete denial of Confucianism?  To answer 
these questions, I need to examine the theories of human nature and other related 
issues in the Wei-Jin period.  This examination is useful for a deeper 
understanding of the unorthodox phenomena in Wei-Jin China. 
 
                                                 
6 Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 393; A New Account of Tales of the World, 402. 
 
7 Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 347-348; A New Account of Tales of the World, 346. 
 
       8 Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 392; A New Account of Tales of the World, 402. 
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The social and intellectual context of Han-Wei 
 
The last years of the Han dynasty and the subsequent Wei-Jin period were 
eras of great instability.  Struggle and chaos ensued relentlessly in the political 
arena.  The Yellow Turban Rebellion (A.D.184) fatally shook the centralized state 
power of the Han court, and as a result, local military groups emerged and fought 
for power. After the collapse of the Han dynasty, three kingdoms co-existed, the 
strongest of which was the kingdom of Wei (魏).  The Wei dynasty continued wars 
with the other two kingdoms.  Meanwhile, it witnessed a long factional strife 
between two powerful families, Cao (曹) and Sima (司馬), at home.  The Sima 
family finally won and established the new dynasty of Jin.  The Jin dynasty failed 
to restore order either.  Soon after the establishment, it was caught in the rebellion 
of the eight princes (八王之亂 A.D. 291-306) for as long as sixteen years.  During 
the same period its northern border was invaded unremittingly by nomadic tribes 
living in the north of China.  This forced the Jin dynasty to retreat southward and 
make Nanjing (南京 ) the new capital.  Consequently, sixteen kingdoms held 
northern China successively, each a constant threat to the Jin dynasty. 
Political instability deeply affected the lives of Wei-Jin intellectuals, as 
most of them came from noble families and held high positions in the government.  
Inevitably, they were drawn into the whirlpool of political strife.  In A.D. 249 the 
Sima family staged a coup and took control of the Wei court.  Many intellectuals 
and officials including Xiahou Xuan (夏侯玄 209-254) and He Yan (何晏), who 
were close to the Cao family, were executed, either immediately after the coup of 
249 or shortly thereafter.  With the establishment of the new dynasty of Jin, 
politics became highly sensitive and dangerous.  Ruan Ji, for example, would 
rather find solace in wine than navigating the treacherous waters of political 
 5
intrigues.9  Xi Kang (嵇康 A.D. 223-262) was executed for irreverence towards the 
authority and radical criticism of Confucian rites.10  Under the shadow of his close 
friend Xi Kang’s death, Xiang Xiu (向秀 A.D.227-280) received the government 
assignment to show his loyalty to the Jin emperor.11  Given these conditions, the 
intellectuals’ enthusiasm for abstract discussions is often construed as a way of 
escaping from the cruel political reality.  There is some truth to this view.  But, as I 
will show in this thesis, I would understand Wei-Jin philosophy, usually known as 
“Learning of the Profound” (xuanxue玄學), as an active response to the political 
instability at that time, with the view of eliminating disorder and restore harmony. 
Coinciding with the decline of the Han court, Confucianism, which 
dominated the Han dynasty, also underwent a severe crisis.  Confucian norms, i.e., 
the “Three Bonds” (san gang 三綱) that regulate the relationships between ruler 
and subject, father and child, and husband and wife, were sharply called into 
question and shown open contempt.  In his famous Biography of the Great Man 
(Daren xianshengzhuan 大人先生傳), Ruan Ji stated explicitly that rulers and 
officials cause oppression and robbery.12  Later, Bao Jingyan (fourth century A.D. 
鮑敬言 ) even proposed a kind of anarchism by challenging the “Heavenly 
Mandate (tianming天命)” that had served as the religious or metaphysical basis 
                                                 
9 Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 390-394; A New Account of Tales of the World, 399-404. 
 
10 Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 194-195;  A New Account of Tales of the World, 190. 
 
11 Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 43; A New Account of Tales of the World, 41. 
 
12 Chen Bojun 陳伯君, Ruan Ji ji jiaozhu 阮籍集校注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 北京:中
華書局, 1987), 170.  Donald Holzman, Poetry and Politics, The Life and Works of Juan Chi, A.D. 
210-263 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 195-196. 
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for the ruler.13  With regard to the parent-child relationship, a similar crisis was 
also evident in the fact that some officials who had been recommended to the 
government on the merit of filial piety turned out to live separately from their 
parents.14  The husband-wife relationship also underwent a fundamental change 
during this period.  Xun Can, as cited earlier, stated that woman virtues are 
negligible.  In fact, elite women during this period generally disregarded the 
Confucian rules of propriety.  As recorded in the official history of the Jin dynasty, 
elite women took part in social activities instead of doing housework, and they 
openly expressed their feelings of jealousy rather than hiding them.  Their fathers 
and older brothers did not reproach them, nor did the world condemn them.15 
In addition, the mourning rites, the most fundamental part of Confucian 
rites characterised by a large number of formalities, was not observed strictly.  
The atmosphere at the funeral was not as solemn as before, as one might imitate a 
donkey’s cries or do other unconventional things to extend one’s condolence.  
Some famous men of letters sang, ate meat and drank wine while observing the 
mourning period.  On hearing the death of his mother, Ruan Ji did not stop 
playing chess, though after that, he became “wasted” over his grief.16   This 
reminds one of Zhuangzi, who sang along to the rhythm of a drum instead of 
                                                 
13 Ge Hong 葛洪, Baopuzi 抱樸子 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 北京：中華書局, 1993), 
4:773-74. 
 
       14 Ge Hong 葛洪, Baopuzi抱樸子, 3:509. 
 
15 For more details, see Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 362-379; also see Fang Xuanling 房玄齡, 
Jinshu 晉書 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 北京: 中華書局, 1974), 1:136; A New Account of Tales of 
the World, 363-381. 
 
16 Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 390-410; Jinshu: Biography of Ruan Ji 晉書·阮籍傳, 5:1360; 
A New Account of Tales of the World, 399-422. 
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crying at the death of his wife.17  Apparently, Daoism had a bearing on the life-
style of the famous men in the Wei-Jin period. 
There were also serious problems with Han Confucianism in both content 
and methodology.  The most distinctive part of Han Confucianism is its cosmology, 
whose origin can be dated back to Zou Yan’s (鄒衍 c. 350-270 B.C) theory of 
yinyang wuxing (the positive and negative vital energy and the five phases of metal, 
wood, water, fire and earth 陰陽五行 ). 18   Han Confucians formulated their 
cosmological arguments and used them to support their views of society and 
human beings.   
Dong Zhongshu is the best representative of Han Confucians.  He 
formulated a theory of Heaven resonating with human beings and combined it with 
that of yinyang wuxing (陰陽五行 ).  The former theory involves a mystical 
resonance or match between Heaven and human beings.  The resonance exists, 
because Heaven fashions human beings after itself.  For example, Heaven has four 
seasons of spring, summer, autumn, and winter; therefore man has four kinds of 
feelings, i.e., pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy.  Under the theory of yinyang wuxing, 
the positive and negative qi and the five phases of metal, wood, water, fire, and 
earth not only constitute the cosmos, but also account for all physical phenomena 
within the cosmos.  For example, human beings and things arise out of the 
interaction between the positive and negative qi.  Each dynasty is characterised by 
one of the five phases, which determines state affairs such as the national colour, 
                                                 
17 The Zhuangzi  莊子, 73. 
 
18 For the philosophy of Zou Yan and its development, see Joseph Needham, Science and 
Civilization in China （Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956）, 232-244; Xu Fuguan徐
複觀，Liang Han sixiang shi 兩漢思想史 (History of thought during the two eras of the Han 
(Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe 上海: 華東師範大學出版社, 2001), 3-8. 
 
 8
the royal calendar system, and even the succession of one dynasty by another.  It 
was believed that fire characterises the Zhou (周 B.C.1066-256) dynasty and metal, 
the Shang (商 c.a.17th-11th century).  Since fire normally conquers metal, as the 
theory goes, it is unsurprising that Zhou succeeded Shang.19   
Evidently, Han cosmology takes on a superstitious dimension.  Towards the 
end of Han it degenerated into prophecies and divinations.  Convinced by the 
resonating theory between Heaven and human beings, a steady stream of Han 
Confucians devoted their attention to natural phenomena, calamities in particular.  
They believed that Heaven knows what people, the rulers in particular, do and 
Heaven shows its approval or disapproval through natural phenomena.  It was also 
popular practice to interpret socio-political phenomena in terms of the five phases.  
Han Confucians debated on whether earth or water characterises the Han dynasty 
and on the policies that should follow accordingly.  For example, if earth 
represents the major virtue of the Han dynasty, state affairs should be arranged in 
accordance to the properties of earth.  As earth is yellow, the royal colour of the 
Han court should be yellow; as earth is still and plain, the ruler should implement 
light taxation, to reduce the burden on peasants and give them and their farm land 
enough time to recover.  There is some value to these explanations.  For example, 
they reflect an attempt to set constraints on the ruler.  However, they failed to 
reveal the true reasons for socio-political problems.  Worse, people might be 
misdirected to focus entirely on natural phenomena and neglect the real problems.  
Towards the end of Han, Han Confucianism was dominated with these mysterious 
prophecies and divinations, and it began to lose its appeal for serious thinkers. 
                                                 
19 Xu Fuguan徐複觀，Liang Han sixiang shi 兩漢思想史, 215-216. 
 
 9
Exegesis, the traditional method of Confucian scholarship, also degenerated 
into fragmented textual analysis in late Han.  This methodology refers to the way 
of defining, comparing, analysing, and explaining the classical texts, through 
which a new understanding of the texts is systematically built up.  At the end of the 
Han dynasty students of the Confucian school concentrated solely on explaining 
certain individual words and sentences, paying little attention to the context and 
the main themes of the texts.  An extreme case is that five textual characters were 
given an explanation of twenty to thirty thousand words.20  To make it worse, a 
student might be required to devote a whole lifetime to only one text.  The result of 
such training, to be sure, was a narrow-minded student. 21   He would not be 
competent to produce a comprehensive interpretation of the classics. 
Disappointed at Han Confucianism, Wei-Jin thinkers shifted to three 
classical texts, i.e., the Laozi, the Zhuangzi and Yijing that were collectively called 
sanxuan (the three profound texts三玄).22  The reinterpretations of the three texts 
constitute the main body of what was lately called Learning of the Profound 
(xuanxue 玄學).23  Learning of the Profound is a direct response to the socio-
                                                 
20 Ban Gu 班固, Houhanshu yiwenzhi  後漢書·藝文志 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 北京: 中
華書局, 1962), 30:1723. 
 
21 For relevant arguments, see Zhou Shaoxian 周紹賢, WeiJin qingtan shulun  魏晉清談
述論 (Taipei: shangwu yinshuguan 臺北: 商務印書館, 1966), 1-9. 
 
22 The earliest extant reference to the three texts collectively as the sanxuan is probably in 
the 6th-century work Yan shi jiaxun (Family Instructions of the Yan Clan顔氏家訓 ), which was 
composed by Yan Zhitui (顔之推 531-595).  See Wang Liqi王利器, Yangshi jiaxun jijie 顔氏家訓
集解  (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社 ,1980), 179; Teng, Ssu-yü, trans. 
Family Instructions for the Yen Clan: Yen-Shih Chia-Hsün (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968),70. 
 
23 Wang Baoxuan 王葆玹 thinks that the term Xuanxue 玄學 began to be used to refer 
retrospectively to the thought prevalent in the Wei-Jin period in 5th –6th centuries.  See his book, 
Zhengshi xuanxue正始玄學 (Jinan: Qilu shushe 濟南：齊魯書社, 1987),  2-7. 
 
Xuanxue 玄學  is translated variously as Neo-Daoism, Learning of the mysterious, 
Mysterious Learning, Abstruse Learning, and scholarly investigation of that which is dark.  As 
Livia Kohn points out in her review of Brook Ziporyn’s book The Penumbra Unbound (available at 
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political failure at the end of the Han period.  Wei-Jin thinkers sought to find 
effective ways of restoring social order by looking into the three classics.  They 
debated on topics such as the relationships between Being and Nonbeing (youwu 
有無 ), naturalness and “orthodox” teachings characterized by the rites (ziran 
mingjiao 自然名教), nature and feeling (xingqing 性情), word and meaning (yanyi 
言意), capacity and nature (caixing 才性) and other socio-political issues. 
Learning of the Profound is primarily an objection to the Han cosmology.  
Wei-Jin thinkers wiped out the teleological indications and superstitious contents 
that abound in Han cosmology, and proposed a completely different ontology.  
                                                                                                                                      
http://rels.queensu.ca/dao/ under book review), the different translations indicate the extent to 
which the translators emphasize the Daoist dimension of xuanxue 玄學.  Scholars who translate 
xuanxue 玄學 as Neo-Daoism, Yu Yingshi for example, construe Wei-Jin thought primarily as a 
revival of early Daoism.  In contrast, other scholars, who prefer the translations of Learning of the 
mysterious or Abstruse Learning, for example, do not consider xuanxue 玄學 to be a sectarian 
movement.  Rather, they understand  xuanxue 玄學  as a reconciliation of Daoism and 
Confucianism or a “broad philosophical front (Alan Chan).”   
 
The various translations also reflect the different understanding as to the word class of 
xuan玄, i. e., whether it is a noun or an adjective.  If 玄 is used as a noun, the term xuanxue 玄學 
means learning of the Profound, the mysterious, or the metaphysical (xuan 玄); if 玄 is taken as an 
adjective to qualify xue 學 , the term xuanxue 玄學  indicates that the leaning is profound or 
mysterious.  
 
In my understanding, the character xuan玄 can be used as a synonym of the Dao, and it 
also refers to the ancient wisdom hidden in the classics.  Wei-Jin philosophers sought to uncover 
this profound wisdom and appealled to it to restore order in society.  In light of this, I would use 
xuan 玄 as a noun, and translate xuanxue玄學 as Learning of the Profound.  I would not interpret 
Learning of the Profound in a sectarian way.  Rather, I situate it into the tradition that took shape in 
the Warring States period and developed in the Han dynasty and understand it as representing a 
unique development to the tradition.  
 
See Alan K.L. Chan, Two Visions of the Way: A Study of the Wang Pi and the Ho-Shang 
Kung Commentaries on the Lao-Tzu (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 25; 
“Zhong Hui’s Laozi Commentary and the Debate on Capacity and Nature in Third-Century 
China,” Early China 28(2003): 102.  Brook Ziporyn, The Penumbra Unbound, The Neo-Taoist 
Philosophy of Guo Xiang (State university of New York Press, 2003), 17-18.  Rudolf G. Wagner, 
Language, Ontology, and Political Philosophy in China, Wang Bi’s Scholarly Exploration of the 
Dark (Xuanxue) (State University of New York Press, 2003), 2; A Chinese Reading of the 
Daodejing: Wang Bi’s Commentary on the Laozi with Critical Text and Translation (State 
University of New York Press, 2003), 1. Yu Yingshi, “Individualism and the Neo-Taoist 
Movement in Wei-Chin Chin,” in Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist 
Values edited by Donald J. Munro (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of 




Wang Bi is the representative in this respect.  He realized that it is impossible to 
trace the ultimate creator within the physical world, which leads to infinite digress.  
The ultimate creator must be beyond the physical world, which is the Dao, the 
formless and nameless Nonbeing (wu 無).   He made lengthy interpretations on the 
metaphysical features of the Dao and highlighted its overwhelming importance to 
nature and the human world.  
However, Learning of the Profound should not be understood as purely 
metaphysical exploration of the Dao, Nonbeing, and Being.  It also involves 
sustained discussions of socio-political topics, which I will turn to later in this 
thesis.   The metaphysical discussions in fact serve as the theoretical basis for the 
discussions of practical issues.  For example, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang shared that 
the original nature of human beings is in order naturally.  Human nature conceived 
in this way makes possible the Daoist principle of non-action (wuwei 無爲),24 
which was strongly advocated in the Wei-Jin period.  The sage, for his thorough 
comprehension of the Dao, qualified to implement this principle.  Clearly, the 
philosophical discussions of human nature and the ideal personality of the sage 
serve as the premise of a certain political policy.  Similarly, underneath the debate 
on the relationship between nature and capacity is the practical concern with 
official appointment.  With the corruption of the Han system of local 
recommendation, and with the growing need for capable people to enhance the 
new dynasty, Wei-Jin thinkers needed to re-examine the standards of official 
                                                 
24 The concept of wuwei opens to different interpretations, which results in different 
translations of it.  Since one specific translation hardly exhausts its richness, I simply utilize the 
literal “non-action” and explain further my understanding of the concept in the thesis.  As one will 
see later, wuwei can mean that one refrains from some specific action, or one stays free of 
deliberate action, or it may refer to a mindset of spontaneity, depending on the context. 
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appointment. Their discussions of the relationship between nature and capacity 
reflect a pragmatic attempt to find an effective way of recruiting able people.25 
The method prevalent in Han scholarship was replaced by a new method of 
interpretation.  The new method placed special emphasis on the fundamental 
meaning of a classical text as a whole and sought to uncover the universal truth 
hidden behind the written words.  Consequently, in dramatic contrast to the Han 
scholars, who had immersed themselves in a sea of trivial fragments of textual 
exegesis, thinkers of Learning of the Profound interpreted the texts in a more 
philosophical way.  The new approach to interpretation made them competent in 
grasping the main themes of the texts.  Wang Bi’s commentaries on the Laozi, 
Yijing, and Guo Xiang’s commentary on the Zhuangzi have survived generations 
of careful scrutiny, which suggests the appeal of their interpretive method for later 
scholars.  Keeping the contrast in methodology in mind, we can explain the 
debates on the relationship between words and meaning (yanyi 言意). In general, 
Wei-Jin philosophers maintained that in order to grasp the true meaning of a text, 
one should not stick to the surface meaning of the words.  This position may be 
taken as the principle of the new method of interpretation adopted by Wei-Jin 
philosophers.  I will return to this point in detail later. 
Literature review 
 
Wei-Jin thought is not as popular as pre-Qin thought in Western 
scholarship. Fortunately, the situation has improved in recent years, with the 
                                                 
25 Alan Chan produces a fresh interpretation as to the four views of the relationship 
between nature and capacity (Sibenlun 四本論) from within a historical context that official 
appointment turned to be a crucial part of the socio-political reform.  See Alan K. L. Chan, “What 
are the Four Roots of Capacity and Nature?” in Wisdom in China and the West, edited by Vincent 




appearance of a number of studies and translations.26  Richard J. Lynn has made 
accurate and fluent translations of Wang Bi’s Laozi commentary and Guo Xiang’s 
commentary on the Zhuangzi, 27  on which this thesis is mainly built.  I have 
referred to them frequently when I made my own translations.  Regarding general 
research on this period, Charles Holcombe situates Wei-Jin thought within the 
transitional context from the Han period to the Wei-Jin period, and reveals the 
interplay between the new intellectual trends and the economic and cultural 
background.28 Yu Yingshi suggests that the Western concepts of individualism and 
holism are applicable to the study of early Chinese thought: the Neo-Taoist 
movement in the Wei-Jin period, in his view, celebrates the appearance of Chinese 
individualism.29   
Besides general research, examinations of particular philosophers have 
been fruitful.   Both Rudolf G. Wagner and Alan K. L. Chan explore Wang Bi as 
not only a commentator but also a philosopher in his own right.  Wagner 
demonstrates that Wang Bi used the analytical style that was already implied in the 
                                                 
26 Some examples are (in chronological order) J. K. Shryock, trans. The Study of Human 
Abilities: The Jen Wu Chih of Liu Shao. American Oriental Series, vol. 11 (New Haven: American 
Oriental Society, 1937; reprint, New York, 1966); Richard B. Mather, trans. Shih-shuo Hsin-yu: A 
New Account of Tales of the World, by Liu I-ch’ing; Paul J. Lin, A Translation of Lao Tzu’s Tao Te 
Ching and Wang Pi’s Commentary (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of 
Michigan, 1977); Ariane Rump and Wing-tsit Chan, trans. Commentary on the Lao-Tzu by Wang Bi 
(Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979); Robert G. Henricks, trans. Philosophy and 
Argumentation in Third-Century China: The Essays of Hsi K’ ang (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1983); Richard J. Lynn, The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I 
Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Rudolf G. 
Wagner, The Chinese Reading of the Daodejing: Wang Bi’s commentary on the Laozi with critical 
text and translation.  Others will be cited in subsequent notes. 
 
27 Richard J. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-te 
ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Zhuangzi: 
A New Translation of The Sayings of Master Zhuang As Interpreted by Guo Xiang (Columbia 
University Press, forthcoming)  
 
28 Charles Holcombe, In the Shadow of the Han: Literati Thought and Society at the 
Beginning of the Southern Dynasty (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
 




Laozi, what Wanger calls the “interlocking parallel style,” to interpret the Laozi. 
This strategy of using the Laozi to explain the Laozi makes Wang Bi stands out 
among his competitors.30  Chan compares the two commentaries by Wang Bi and 
the legendary Heshang gong, and demonstrates how the Laozi was approached in 
different ways.  Wang Bi dedicated himself to uncovering the true meaning, or the 
principle of the Dao, that he read between the lines and which was hard to be 
discerned by a common reader.  In contrast, Heshang gong took pains to explain 
what individual words or sentences mean, referring them to specific or concrete 
things.  Wang Bi was more concerned with philosophical issues than Heshang 
gong, which explains the central place attributed to him as an interpreter of the 
Laozi in the history of Chinese philosophy.31  Brook Ziporyn is the first to produce 
a book-length study of Guo Xiang in English, leaving aside Fung Yu-lan’s selected 
translation.32  In his book The Penumbra Unbound, Ziporyn presents a compelling 
analysis of the three key concepts in Guo Xiang’s thought, i. e., the concepts of 
“traces” (ji迹) and “what leaves traces” (suoyiji 所以迹), “vanishing into things” 
(ming 冥), and “self-transformation” (duhua 獨化).  Based on this analysis, he 
goes on to show how Guo Xiang successfully unified independence and 
interdependence, activity and nonactivity, and finally Daoism and Confucianism.  
Ziporyn also formulates an interesting explanation of Guo Xiang’s conception of 
nature, and suggests a solution to the related question of whether Guo Xiang is a 
fatalist.  I will discuss his interpretation later in chapter 3 on Guo Xiang.    
                                                 
30 Rudolf G. Wagner, The Craft of A Chinese Commentator. 
 
31 Alan K.L. Chan, Two Visions of the Way.  
 
32 Brook Ziporyn, The Penumbra Unbound; Fung Yu-lan, Chuang Tzu: a new selected 




A number of papers on some important topics of Learning of the Profound 
are also noteworthy.  Regarding the relationship between ziran (naturalness 自然) 
and mingjiao (Names and teachings 名教 ), Richard B. Mather produces an 
informative analysis of the different views of this topic during the Wei-Jin 
period.33  As for another hotly debated topic, i. e., the relationship between nature 
and capacity, Alan Chan formulates a historical interpretation by relating this 
debate with the issue of official appointment that became urgently meaningful for 
the newly established Wei and Jin dynasties.34  
In Chinese scholarship, Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 is of great importance. 
Thanks to his pioneering research, the significance of Wei-Jin thought in the 
history of Chinese philosophy has been widely recognized.  He introduces a 
metaphysical approach to Wei-Jin thought and this approach has remained 
influential.  Besides his general research on Wei-Jin thought as a whole, Tang also 
contributes his insights into particular topics of Wei-Jin thought.  In his Wei-Jin 
xuanxue lungao 魏晉玄學論稿 , 35  Tang discusses topics as broad as the 
relationship between nature and feeling, that between nature and capacity, and that 
between language and meaning; he also examines the questions of whether the 
sage has feelings, and Wang Bi’s commentaries on the Analects and the Yi jing.  
However, due to his emphasis on metaphysics, Tang may have neglected 
the socio-political dimension of Wei-Jin thought.  He is keen to draw a clear line 
between the two.  As he suggests, Wei-Jin thinkers who discussed the relationship 
                                                 
33 Richard B. Mather, “The Controversy over Conformity and Naturalness during the Six 
Dynasties,” History of Religions 9.2-3 (1969-1970): 160-80. 
 
34 Alan K.L. Chan, “Zhong Hui’ Laozi Commentary and the Debate on Capacity and 
Nature in Third-Century China,” Early China 28-29 (2003-2004): 101-160. 
 
35 Tang Yongtong  湯用彤, Wei Jin xuanxue lungao魏晉玄學論稿 , Shanghai: Shanghai 
guji chubanshe 上海：上海古籍出版社, 2001. 
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between nature and capacity were more practically oriented, while those who 
discussed the relationship between nature and feeling showed more interest in 
philosophical or metaphysical enquiry. 36   
I am afraid there is not such a clear distinction between practical concern 
and philosophical concern in Wei-Jin thought.  In fact, as the analysis in the thesis 
will show, it is hard to find a Wei-Jin thinker who had purely philosophical 
interests.  It is not the case that the practical issues are clearly separated from the 
philosophical ones.  Rather, they are two sides of the same coin.  As shown before, 
the discussions of the relationship between nature and feeling and that between 
nature and capacity reflect both philosophical and political concerns.  
Tang Yijie 湯一介 needs to be mentioned here.  He is a worthy successor 
to his father, Tang Yongtong regarding this kind of scholarship.  He constructs a 
comprehensive philosophy of Guo Xiang.37  His discussions on self-transformation 
(duhua 獨化) and the limits of nature (xingfen 性分) are especially instructive, to 
which I can add my own observations later. 
Tang Changru’s 唐長孺 contribution also deserves to be noted.  His 
research mainly concentrates on the Wei-Jin political and economic systems.38  
Given the strong socio-political concern of Learning of the Profound, and the 
noble family background of many Wei-Jin thinkers, Tang’s research deepens one’s 
knowledge of the historical context from which Learning of the Profound arose 
                                                 
36 Tang Yongtong  湯用彤, Tang Yongtong xueshu lunwenji 湯用彤學術論文集 (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju 北京：中華書局 , 1983), 260-261. 
 
37 Tang Yijie湯一介, Guo Xiang yu Wei-Jin xuanxue郭象與魏晉玄學 (Peking 
University Press北京大學出版社，2000). 
 
38 Tang Changru 唐長孺， WeiJin NanBei chao shi luncong 魏晉南北朝史論叢 (Beijing: 
Sanlian shudian 北京：三聯書店, 1955, 1978). 
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and against which it developed.  For example, he suggests that Cao Cao (曹操 A.D. 
155-220) intended to build a centralized state power like the Han dynasty.  To do 
that, Cao had to weaken the power possessed by the local noble families.  At that 
time, besides other political and economic privileges, the local noble families 
controlled Pure Criticism (qingyi 清議) whose main function was to recommend 
virtuous people to the government.  Cao’s policy of promoting capable people 
regardless of their moral cultivation was one measure to curb their power.  This 
may have initiated the debate on the relationship between nature and capacity.  In 
this regard, Tang produces a helpful political account for the debate on nature and 
capacity.39 
Mou Zongsan’s 牟宗三 research on Wei-Jin thought is also noteworthy.  In 
his Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理 , Mou states that the concept of nature is 
generally defined in terms of qi (vital energy) in the Wei-Jin period, and this 
definition is different from the moral definition in Confucianism.40  According to 
Mou, the definition of nature as qi is liable to fatalistic or deterministic 
interpretation, for it admits to different endowments of qi from one person to 
another.  In contrast, the moral understanding of nature entails an egalitarian view, 
i.e., everyone has equal possibility of becoming a sage.41  
Although Mou’s arguments are plausible to some extent, I am afraid that 
his conclusion is too strong.  Confucius mentioned nature only twice in the 
Analects.  More important, it is hard to discern any moral implication in these 
                                                 
39Tang Changru 唐長孺, “Jiupin zhongzheng zhidu shishi” 九品中正制度試釋, in Wei-
Jin Nanbei chaoshi luncong  魏晉南北朝史論叢, 85-99. 
 
40 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理  (Taibei: xuesheng shuju 臺北：
學生書局, 1978), 1-8. 
 
41 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理, 35-42, 56-62. 
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mentions.  As Chen Lai 陳來 observes in his paper on one recently excavated 
Guodian bamboo script, Xingzimingchu 性自命出, some disciples of Confucius 
conceived nature as the qi of pleasure, anger, sorrow and grief, and the view that 
human nature is good was actually not central in the Pre-Qin Confucian school.42   
A number of hypotheses have been made about the issue of the relationship 
between capacity and nature, which is one of the most important topics of Wei-Jin 
thought, since the critical text on it Sibenlun (Four Fundamental Views 四本論) 
was lost.43  Among them, Chen Yinque 陳寅恪 suggests a direct relation between 
the views of the proponents in this debate and their political commitments.  Those 
who hold that capacity is identical or coincides with nature are members of the 
Sima faction, whereas the others claiming that capacity is different or diverges 
from nature are followers of the Cao family.44  However, despite the instructive 
interpreting perspective, Chen’s conclusion is less convincing.  It might be rigid to 
try to ascribe the four thinkers into the two competing political camps.  In fact, 
evidence has shown that Zhong Hui, who held that capacity coincides with nature, 
is also a member of the Cao camp.45  Evidence also suggests that the participants in 
                                                 
42 See Chen Lai 陳來, “Guodian chujian zhi xingzimingchupian chutan” 郭店楚簡之性自
命出篇初探, Kongzi yanjiu  孔子研究 3 (1998): 52-60. 
 
43 The issue of the relationship between capacity and nature attracted a great deal of 
philosophical attention in the Wei-Jin period.  Zhong Hui (鍾會 225–264) collected the various 
views of this issue and edited them under the title Caixing sibenlun (The Four Fundamental Views 
of Capacity and Nature 才性四本論).  But the text is not extant.  What we know today is only that 
the four views are that nature is  identical (同) or coincides with (合) capacity, and nature is 
different (異) or diverges from (離) capacity,  which were held respectively by Fu Gu (傅 嘏 209–
255), Zhong Hui, Li Feng 李豐 (d. 254) and Wang Guang 王廣 (d. 251).  
 
44  Chen Yinque 陳寅恪 , “Shu shishuoxinyu wenxuelei Zhong Hui zhuan sibenlun 
shibitiaohou” 書世說新語文學類鍾會傳四本論始畢條後, Chen Yinque xiansheng lunwenji  陳寅
恪先生論文集, vol. 2 ( Taibei: Sanrenxing chubanshe 臺北：三人行出版社 , 1974) 601-7. 
 
45 Wang Xiaoyi 王曉毅, “Zhong Hui yu zaoqi zhexue” 鍾會與早期玄學, Zhongguo 
zhexueshi yanjiu中國哲學史研究 2 (1987): 28-32. 
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this debate were unlikely to be able to maintain a firm political stand in the fierce 
political struggle of Wei-Jin.46 
In recent Chinese scholarship, two books merit attention. One is Zhengshi 
xuanxue正始玄學 by Wang Baoxuan 王葆玹, the other is Zhongguo wenhua de 
qingliu中國文化的清流 by Wang Xiaoyi 王曉毅.  Wang Baoxuan understands 
Learning of the Profound in the early Wei period as theoretical support for the 
political reforms that took place during the Zhengshi正始 era.  This understanding 
highlights the socio-political dimension of Learning of the Profound.  With this 
basic understanding, he also examines the issue of the relationship between nature 
and capacity and that between nature and feeling.  He reconstructs the 
chronological sequence of the four views on the relationship between nature and 
capacity.  He also explores the original meaning of cai (capacity才) in the context 
of the wuxing theory, which is wood or substance in his view. 47  
As for the debate on the relationship between nature and feeling, Wang 
Baoxuan traces it back to the beginning of the Han dynasty.  He suggests that 
Wang Bi integrated both Han Confucian and Han Daoist views of this issue and 
arrived at a comprehensive theory of nature and feeling.  However, Wang thinks 
that Wang Bi was inconsistent in his views on whether the sage has feelings.  
Wang Bi implied that the sage does not have feelings when interpreting the Laozi, 
but claimed that the sage does have feelings when interpreting the Yijing.48  I will 
                                                 
46 Wang Xiaoyi 王曉毅, Zhongguo wenhua de qingliu 中國文化的清流 (Zhongguo 
shehui kexue chubanshe中國社會科學出版社, 1991), 65. 
 
47 Wang Baoxuan 王葆玹 , Zhengshi xuanxue 正始玄學, 389-392, 401-403. 
 
48 Wang Baoxuan 王葆玹 , Zhengshi xuanxue 正始玄學, 375-389. 
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respond to Wang Baoxuan’s position and show that Wang Bi was consistent in the 
second part of chapter 2. 
Wang Xiaoyi contributes to the scholarship of the period with his 
panoramic portrait of Learning of the Profound.  His clarification of the concept of 
nature is especially helpful.  According to him, in the debate on the relationship 
between nature and capacity, capacity is generally taken to refer to political 
abilities, but the meaning of nature varies from one thinker to another.  Nature may 
mean essence, moral asset, character, or disposition, which lead to respectively the 
four views of the relationship between nature and capacity. 49  Wang’s argument is 
fresh and instructive, but, it seems to me that nature conceived as character 
overlaps with nature as disposition. 
There are other studies on Wei-Jin history and literature, but the works 
reviewed above are the more representative modern research on Learning of the 
Profound.  Their achievements are impressive and noteworthy.  However, 
compared with the large number of publications on the philosophical currents in 
the Pre-Qin period, Wei-Jin philosophy is still an under-developed field in the 
English-speaking world.  This should be remedied, especially when we realize that 
Wei-Jin philosophy has exerted a deep and direct influence on Neo-Confucianism 
later in the Song-Ming dynasties.  
Thesis Structure 
 
Methodologically, this thesis is both historical and analytical, and also 
comparative.  Learning of the Profound can be understood against its historical 
context, given its socio-political orientation.  However, an analytical approach to 
each particular question is more basic, as it provides a clearer account of what the 
                                                 
49 Wang Xiaoyi 王曉毅, Zhongguo wenhuade qingliu 中國文化的清流, 173-180. 
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question is about rather than its relationship with certain historical circumstances.  
A comparison between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang attempts to demonstrate a 
dynamic tradition, i.e., the change and continuity of this tradition not only from 
Han to Wei-Jin but also within the period of Wei-Jin.  This thesis consists of four 
chapters.  It begins with a review of the influential views of human nature 
developed before the Wei-Jin period, then gives a detailed analysis of Wang Bi’s 
and Guo Xiang’s understanding of human nature, and concludes the examination 
with a comparison between the two philosophers.    
The review of the pre-Qin and Han views of human nature in Chapter 1 is 
necessary, as these theories form a tradition against which the accounts of both 
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang can be better understood.  The two philosophers 
formulated their arguments by both inheriting from and interrogating this tradition.  
The chapter begins with a brief review of early Confucian views of human nature.  
Following that is a detailed examination of Han Confucian thought of human 
nature.  The third part is an analysis of early Daoist views of human nature, mainly 
built on the Laozi and the Zhuangzi.  Based on this review, the last part concludes 
that there was a contrast between two understandings of human nature as principle 
and as substance, which would become sharper in Wang Bi’s and Guo Xiang’s 
thought respectively.   
Chapter 2 examines Wang Bi’s view of human nature, which centres on, 
as I propose, his understanding of human nature as consisting of two parts, 
natureDao, the share of the Dao in human beings and natureqi, the material 
constituent of human nature.  The first part of this chapter examines how Wang 
Bi’s conception of Nonbeing has decisive bearing on his conception of human 
nature and the role of qi in his thought.  The second part is devoted to an analysis 
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of the relationship between nature and feeling, i.e., that between natureDao and 
natureqi, as feeling generates from the contact of qi with things.  The third part 
revolves around the debate between He Yan and Wang Bi on whether the sage has 
feelings or not.  It addresses questions like the ideal nature of the sage, the 
personality of the sage, the commonality and the difference between the sage and 
the common people, and whether sagehood is inborn or attainable in Wang Bi’s 
view. 
Chapter 3 explores Guo Xiang’s view of human nature.  It addresses three 
main questions: what does human nature refer to concretely in Guo Xiang’s 
commentary on the Zhuangzi, how to understand his distinctive conception of 
xingfen (the limits of nature 性分), and what is the socio-political implication of 
Guo Xiang’s view of human nature?  Some related questions will also be examined.  
For example, is Guo Xiang a fatalist? What is his conception of non-action--does it 
refer to a set of behavioural codes or a special mindset?  Does the natural order in 
society based on a rediscovery of one’s true nature make the role of a ruler 
unnecessary?  Is Guo Xiang an anarchist?   
Chapter 4 is an attempt to link the previous three chapters.  It situates both 
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang in a tradition that took shape in the Warring States period 
and developed in the Han dynasty and tries to show their relation with that 
tradition.  The first part of this chapter is devoted to a comparison between Wang 
Bi’s and Guo Xiang’s views of human nature.  The second and third parts give an 
account of the similarities and differences between the two philosophers by 
looking to the tradition.  It is my submission that the similarities and differences 
between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang arise from their inheritance from and 
interrogation of the tradition respectively. 
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 Ideas do not arise out of a historical vacuum; and thinkers of the Wei-Jin 
period are no exception.  They were heirs to a tradition that took shape during the 
Warring States period and developed in the Han dynasty.  This tradition was 
transmitted through the classics such as the Analects, the Xiaojing (Book of Filial 
Piety孝經), the Laozi, the Zhuangzi, and the Yijing (Book of Change易經).  Most 
Wei-Jin thinkers came from powerful families and had received a good family 
education, the most crucial part of which was to learn the classics.50  Given this, it 
is reasonable to assume that when Wei-Jin thinkers formulated their ideas of 
human nature, they were already well-informed of the influential views proposed 
by previous thinkers on this topic.  These views form the background against 
which we can come to a better understanding of the ideas of human nature during 
the Wei-Jin period.  On the one hand, Wei-Jin thinkers utilized these past views of 
human nature as their theoretical resources; on the other hand, they sought to go 
beyond them, as some of them were believed to be responsible for the upheaval of 
                                                 
50 Evidence shows that the family education that Zhong Hui 鍾會(225-264 A.D.) received 
centered on reading the classical texts, which is thought to reflect the general situation of family 
education in the aristocratic clans, such as the Wang clan (into which Wang Bi was born), the Wei 
clan (Wei Guan 衛瓘 220-291), the Pei clan (Pei Xiu 裴秀 224-271), etc.  It reads, 
 
[Zhong Hui] learned the Xiaojing when he was four years old, learned the 
Analects at seven, the Shi at eight, the Shangshu at ten, the Yijing at eleven, the 
Chunqiu zuoshi zhuan and the Guoyu at twelve, the Zhouli and the Liji at thirteen, 
the Yiji by Chen Hou at fourteen, and at fifteen he was admitted to the Imperial 
College to study remarkable books and unusual exegetical works from all parts 
of the empire….  [Zhong Hui’s] mother was well learned and read various kinds 
of books, of which she was especially fond of the Yijing and the Laozi. 
年四歲授《孝經》, 七歲誦《論語》, 八歲誦《詩》, 十歲誦《尚書》, 十一
誦《易》, 十二誦《春秋左氏傳》, 《國語》, 十三誦《周禮》、 《禮記》, 
十四誦成侯《易記》, 十五使入太學問四方奇文異訓……(其母) 雅好書籍, 
涉曆衆書, 特好《易》、《老》。 
 
For the Chinese text see Yan Kejun嚴可均, Quanshanggu sandai qinhan sanguo liuchao 
wen, series of Wei 全上古三代秦汗三國六朝文 之 全三國文魏 (Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書
館，1999)，vol.25: 250.  
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the late Han and unhelpful to restoring order in society.  Consequently, as we will 
see later in this thesis, Wei-Jin theories of human nature are both indebted to and 
distinct from the views of human nature established previously.   
 This chapter is a review of these previous views.  First, I give a brief 
outline of Confucian ideas of human nature in the Warring States period, brief 
because the topic has been well researched by scholars.  After that, I concentrate 
on the Han period, dealing with two questions.  (1) How Han Confucians 
synthesized the early Confucian ideas and built a comprehensive framework of 
human nature.  (2) Is there any innovation in this framework?  I propose that 
besides producing some fresh ideas on the relationship between nature and feeling, 
Han Confucians formulated a theory of qi endowment, which exerted a deep and 
enduring influence on later views of human nature.  My analysis of Han 
Confucian views is much more detailed, as these views have received less 
philosophical attention than those of the Warring States period.  Moreover, Wei-
Jin philosophy is generally seen as a direct response to the collapse of the unified 
Han Empire and the decline of Han Confucianism.  To better understand Wei-Jin 
philosophy, it is necessary to review carefully Han Confucian thought.   
The fourth part of this chapter involves an examination of the early Daoist 
views of human nature.  It is mainly built on two well-known Daoist classics, the 
Laozi and the Zhuangzi.  Of course, the full scope of Daoist philosophy is much 
broader than these two texts.  But the Laozi and the Zhuangzi have long been 
considered to be the most fundamental classics of Daoist philosophy.  More 
importantly, they dominated the Wei-Jin intellectual scene.  Wang Bi’s 
commentary on the Laozi and Guo Xiang’s on the Zhuangzi occupy central place 
in Learning of the Profound.  An examination of the two texts exemplifies how a 
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Chinese thinker built his own systematic thought through the medium of 
commentary.  Moreover, it helps to show how Wang Bi and Guo Xiang 
reinterpreted the Daoist classics by both inheriting from and interrogating Han 
Confucianism.   
In this part, I focus on early Daoist philosophy, without mentioning its 
development in the Han dynasty, as I do with Confucianism.  This imbalance is 
simply because Daoist philosophy did not thrive in the Han dynasty, at least not 
after the reign of the Han Emperor Wu (r. 140-86 B.C.), when Confucianism 
triumphed over the other schools.  Daoism did flourish during the early Han, 
although it was mixed with the teachings of other schools, in particular Mingjia 
(the school of Names 名家), Fajia (the school of Legalism 法家), Nongjia (the 
school of Agriculture農家), and Bingjia (the school of Military Strategists 兵家).  
For example, the so-called Daoist text Huannanzi (淮南子 compiled by Liu An劉
安 ca. 179-122 B.C.) is in fact a syncretic work.  Most of the discussions of human 
nature in that text can be traced back to the Zhuangzi, the Laozi, and Confucians in 
the Warring States period.51  As such, to understand the Daoist thought of human 
nature before the Wei-Jin period, it is enough to look into the Laozi and the 
Zhuangzi. 
Based on the analysis in the previous parts, I propose in the last part of this 
chapter that there is a contrast in understanding human nature as “principle” and as 
“substance,” which is applicable to the development of Chinese philosophical 
tradition of human nature before the Wei-Jin period.  I will return to this later.  
Inherited from this tradition, Wei-Jin philosophers Wang Bi and Guo Xiang would 
                                                 
51  Jan Yun-hua, “Human Nature and its Cosmic Roots in the Huang-Lao Taoism,” 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17(1990): 215-234.  
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make this contrast more evident in their commentaries on the Laozi and the 
Zhuangzi respectively.   
1.1. Early Confucian Ideas of Human Nature 
Reference to the concept of human nature occurs only twice in the 
Analects.  One is from Confucius himself, pointing out the similarity and 
difference of human beings.  The other comes from his disciple, Zi Gong, who 
wondered why Confucius’ views on human nature and the way of Heaven could 
not be heard (The Analects, 5:12).  Confucius’ words on human nature are concise 
yet ambiguous; this opens the possibility of various interpretations of human 
nature in Chinese philosophy.  In saying that human beings are alike by nature, 
Confucius is thought to be concerned with the commonality of human beings.  
This position has inspired a comparative approach to human nature, i.e., the 
commonality of human nature vs. the individuality or diversity of human nature.52   
In saying that through practice human beings are apart, Confucius seems to 
concentrate on human effort, which, together with the first half of his observation, 
introduces a contrast between a potential nature and a realized nature.53  Besides, a 
reader may wonder whether human beings are similar in their biological features 
or spiritual aspects.   
Especially important to my study, it is not clear whether Confucius 
understood human nature as principle or as substance.  In my view, the former 
understanding answers questions such as “what is the origin of nature,” “what 
decides nature,” or “where does the base of nature lie”?  In contrast, the latter 
                                                 
52 Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun 中國哲學原論, yuanxing pian 原性篇 
(xinyashuyuan yanjiusuo 新亞書院研究所，1968), 2; Mou Zongsan 牟宗三，Caixing yu xuanli
才性與玄理 (Taibei: xuesheng shuju臺北：學生書局, 1978), 1-8. 
 
53 Tang Junyi唐君毅, Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun中國哲學原論, yuanxing pian 原性篇, 2;  
Mou Zongsan牟宗三，Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理, 1-8. 
 27
answers the questions “what forms nature,” “what is the content of nature,” or 
“what constitutes nature”?  While in the former understanding nature is associated 
with a transcendental principle or the way of Heaven, in the latter it refers to 
concrete things, such as physical body, life, feelings, qi and capacity.54  As for 
Confucius, one has no sufficient evidence to say whether he considered human 
nature to be a principle or a substantive concept.  This is also a question with 
Daoism, which I will examine later.  In conclusion, the conceptual ambiguity of 
human nature in the Analects makes it possible for very different interpretations.  
Zi Gong did not hear Confucius’s views on human nature, probably 
because Confucius placed less emphasis on human nature and the Way of Heaven 
than he did on practice, i.e., education; or, the relationship between human nature 
and the way of Heaven was too profound to be comprehended by most people and 
therefore Confucius kept silent about it.55   In the case of the first possibility, later 
Confucians would visit what Confucius had neglected or had not taken seriously; 
believing in the second possibility, they would assume the responsibility of 
uncovering the profound wisdom that Confucius had comprehended. 
If the problem of nature did not yet enjoy a central position in the Analects, 
with Mencius it became an enduring concern.  According to Mencius, human 
nature is inherently good.  That is, human beings are born with four sprouts, i.e., 
hearts of compassion, shame, courtesy and modesty, and right and wrong.56   If 
they are carefully attended to, they will grow into the four virtues of benevolence, 
                                                 
54 Irene Bloom, “Human nature and biological nature in Mencius,” Philosophy East and 
West 47: 1(January 1997): 21-32; Fu Sinian傅斯年，“Xingming guxun bianzheng” 性命古訓辯
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55 Wing-tsit Chan holds such a position.  See his translation of the Analects 5:12, A Source 
Book in Chinese Philosophy, 28. 
 
56 D.C. Lau, trans., the Mencius (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1970), 82-83. 
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righteousness, propriety and wisdom.  The core of Mencius’ thought is to base 
morality and the rites on the inner nature of human beings.  In his view, morality 
and rites are natural derivatives of the fulfillment of human nature.  Man’s moral 
nature, in othe words, justifies morality and the rites.  Mencius’ view of human 
nature became influential since the Han dynasty.  Coupled with Xunzi’s views of 
human nature, which I will turn to next, it had deep bearings on later philosophers, 
Han Confucians in particular.  However, especially of interest to me, the question 
remains whether human nature is a principle or a substance in Mencius’ view, to 
which I will return in the last part of this chapter. 
One interesting view concerns Gaozi.  Mencius developed a certain part of 
his argument through refuting Gaozi’s position of human nature.  Judging from 
Mencius’ serious response to Gaozi, it is highly possible that Gaozi’s view had a 
fair amount of support in Mencius’ day.  Gaozi’s view can be summarized as 
follows: (1) nature is what is innate; (2) nature is the craving for food and sex; (3) 
nature is neither good nor evil, just as water goes neither eastward nor westward; 
(4) righteousness is external to human beings, as it is not intrinsic to human nature.  
Except for point (1), Mencius strongly objected to the other three.  Chinese 
philosophers generally agreed on the “formal” concept of human nature as 
communicated in point (1), but they disagreed on the substantive content of the 
innate nature.  Both points (2) and (3) look similar to the views of the Yang Zhu 
and the Daoist schools.  Xunzi held a view similar to point (4), though his 
approach is different from that of Gaozi. 
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Opposing Mencius, Xunzi maintained that the nature of man is evil; his 
goodness is the result of education.57   Human nature is a set of desires that seek to 
be satisfied.  If everyone indulges in his/her desires, strife and chaos will result.  
Here the significance of the teachings of the sage is highlighted.  The sage invents 
morality and the rites, whose function is to transform the evil nature of human 
beings.  With moral education, the barbarian will become the cultivated, and 
society will attain harmony.  Xunzi strongly denied that human nature is good, 
because such a position would undermine the teachings of the sage.  As he 
inquired, were man good by nature, what then would be the relevance of the 
sage’s teachings? 
Comparing Xunzi with Mencius, it is noteworthy that they maintained 
different views as to the origin of morality, which stems from their different views 
of human nature.  For Mencius, morality is the natural flow of one’s inborn nature 
that is inherently good; for Xunzi, morality is an external imposition that the sage 
placed on the common people.  In this light, the disagreement between Xunxi and 
Mencius anticipated the distinction between virtue morality and normative 
morality.  As A. S. Cua points out, both notions of morality, the internal and the 
external, or virtue morality and normative morality, have their own value.58  As 
the words “internal” and “external” indicate, the two understandings of morality 
by Mencius and Xunzi, far from being mutually exclusive, turn out to be 
                                                 
57 Xunzi jijie荀子集解, vol. 17, on the evil of nature 性惡篇，in zhuzi jicheng 諸子集成 
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58 A. S. Cua, “Morality and human nature,” Philosophy East and West, 31:2 (1981): 280. 
 30
complementary, and equally necessary for a full comprehension of morality, if one 
takes into consideration both the psychological and social aspects of morality.  
1.2. Human Nature in Han Confucian Synthesis 
The issue of human nature remained a major philosophical topic during the 
Han dynasty.  It attracted the attention of many influential thinkers of that time, 
such as the orthodox Confucian Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒 c. 179-c. 104 B.C.), the 
“Daoistic Confucian” 59 Yang Xiong (楊雄 53 B.C.-18 A.D.), the unorthodox 
thinker Wang Chong (王充 27-100?), and the high official Liu Xiang (劉向 77 
B.C.-6 A.D.).  Their accounts on human nature represent a synthesis of the views 
of human nature developed in the Warring States period.  However, this does not 
mean that these Han thinkers simply combined the previous views mechanically; 
rather, they made their own contributions.  For example, they developed the ideas 
incipient in the Warring States period, one of which is the theory of “three grades” 
of human nature implied by Confucius.60  They also formulated a theory of qi 
endowment, which turned out to be a most important theory in Chinese 
philosophy.  
Since the Wei-Jin period comes immediately after the Han dynasty, it is 
not surprising that Wei-Jin thinkers were influenced by Han ideas of human nature.  
For example, He Yan (何晏 ca. 190-249), a prestigious official and thinker of the 
Wei dynasty, is said to follow the view of the three grades of human nature, and 
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traces of this view are also discernable in Wang Bi’s thought.61   The debate 
between He Yan and Wang Bi on whether the sage has feelings is believed to 
originate from a popular view that is generally attributed to Dong Zhongshu: 
namely, that nature is good while feeling is evil.62   It is also evident that many 
Wei-Jin thinkers including Wang Bi and Guo Xiang were influenced by the theory 
of qi endowment on account of its intrinsic merit and explanatory power.  We will 
see the indebtedness of Wei-Jin thinkers to Han Confucianism later in this thesis. 
In this part, I first focus on the syncretic aspect of the views of human 
nature in Han Confucianism.  Following that I explore its innovative aspect.   
Methodologically, I will not present selected Han thinkers one after another in the 
same way as I did with the thinkers of the Warring States.  Rather, my discussion 
will be thematic—focusing on what they as a whole have inherited from the 
tradition and the innovations they have brought to that tradition.   
The tradition of Chinese philosophy, of human nature in particular, took 
shape in the Warring States period and developed in the Han dynasty.  The 
development of this tradition is characterized by both continuity and change.  The 
issues addressed in the early classics, for example, the issues of morality, the Dao, 
human nature, and the harmony of society, turn out to hold great interest for later 
thinkers.  Each of them tried to put forth what he considered to be the most 
convincing interpretation.  In so doing, he had to show the inaccuracy or even 
falsity of the previous views and to prove the strength of his own view.  However, 
this does not mean that a thinker cuts himself off completely from past tradition.  
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On the contrary, he had to rely on it to formulate new ideas.  In light of this, it is 
worthwhile to show what Han Confucians as a whole inherited from and went 
beyond the tradition.  As one will see later, in my discussion of Wang Bi and Guo 
Xiang, their relationship with the same tradition will also be highlighted.  
In addition, Confucianism had come to be accepted as the state ideology of 
Han, which contributed significantly to the development of a distinctive 
Confucian school with a canonical curriculum and ideological focus.  In this 
regard, Han Confucianism is different from early Confucianism in the Warring 
States period.  The latter exists only as a label applied by later historians 
retrospectively to certain Warring States thinkers.  Mencius and Xunzi were 
individual thinkers who had different philosophical concerns, and they were not 
associated with each other under one and the same school.  However, when 
Confucianism came to be a well-defined school fully supported by the Han court 
and enrolled most of the prominent scholars of the period, it began to establish 
common interests and similar positions shared by its subscribers.  For example, 
many Han scholars shared the view that human nature is a mixture of good and 
evil.  Considering this, it is more effective to concentrate on the main points 
shared by Han Confucians than to present them one after another.  No doubt, a 
detailed study of Han philosophy would show that each thinker had come to 
reinterpret the classical heritage in his own way—that is, a syncretistic intellectual 
orientation does not entail identity of positions; nevertheless, to understand the 
development of Wei-Jin philosophy, it is sufficient to highlight the main thematic 
issues. 
1.2.1. Nature as a mixture of good and evil 
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The position that nature is a mixture of good and evil dominated the Han 
dynasty.  Its prevalence was largely due to the influence of Dong Zhongshu.  He 
says, 
The fact of the human being is that he or she has both humanity 
(ren 仁) and greed (tan 貪).  Both the qi of humanity and the qi of 
greed reside in the human person.  The human person is formed 
after Heaven.  Heaven has dual operation of yin and yang (passive 
and active cosmic forces), and the human person also has dual 
nature of humanity and greed. 
人之誠有貪有仁，仁貪之氣兩在於身。身之名取諸天，天兩，
有陰陽之施；身亦兩，有貪仁之性。63 
Many other thinkers held a view similar to that of Dong Zhongshu.  For 
example, Liu Xiang says, 
Nature resonates with feeling; nature is not completely good, and 
feeling is not completely evil. 
性情相應，性不獨善，情不獨惡。64 
Yang Xiong is more straightforward in saying: 
Man’s nature is a mixture of good and evil.  He who cultivates the 
good part will become a good man and he who cultivates the evil 
part will become an evil man. 
人之性也善惡混。修其善則爲善人，修其惡則爲惡人。65 
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These Han thinkers followed the early Confucians in approaching human 
nature in terms of good and evil.  Meanwhile they realized the difficulty previous 
views had in explaining certain phenomena in real life.  As noticed by Wang 
Chong and Xun Yue (荀悅 A.D. 148-209), if Mencius’ view of human nature is 
right, how can one explain the wicked kings of Jie (桀) and Zhou (紂)? Similarly, 
if man is evil by nature, where should the three sages of Yao (堯), Shun (舜) and 
Yu (禹) be placed?66  I will explain in detail later the sense in which human nature 
can be said to be a “mixture” of good and evil, as Han Confucians maintained.  At 
this point, suffice it to say that no matter which view one holds, there are always 
counter examples.  Consequently, any new theory of human nature would have to 
take into account both the paragons of virtue and examples of evil in the Chinese 
past.  It is thus understandable that Han thinkers would combine Mencius’ and 
Xunzi’s views.  Moreover, considering that they were discussing the nature of the 
common people, who stand somewhere between the sage and the wicked, a 
combined version of Mencius’ and Xunzi’s views would hold greater explanatory 
power in accounting for the variety of man’s good and bad.   
However, this version is apparently unsuitable for the sage and the wicked.  
The sage, who is admired as the shining example of human morality, shows a 
good moral sprout even as a little baby; while the wicked, who is admonished as 
the example of human corruption, communicates something evil even in his infant 
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cry.67   Therefore, it is just as unimaginable to say there is something evil in the 
nature of the sage as to say there is something good in the nature of the wicked.  
For this reason, no Han thinkers proposed implicitly or explicitly that the nature of 
the sage, as well as that of the wicked, is a mixture of good and evil.  But the sage 
and the wicked are human beings too, Han thinkers needed to give an account of 
their nature.  
1.2.2. The three grades of human nature 
 Han thinkers developed the theory of the three grades of human nature to 
explain the difference of human beings. 
 The term “three grades of human nature” is often ascribed to Han Yu 韓愈 
(A.D.768-824), a Tang Confucian famous for his vitriolic attacks against 
Buddhism and Daoism.  He says: 
Human nature can be divided into three grades: the upper, the 
medium, and the lower.  The upper is good and good only.  The 
medium may be led to be either upper or lower.  The lower is evil 
and evil only. 
性之品有上中下三。上焉者，善焉而已矣；中焉者，可導而上
下也；下焉者，惡焉而已矣。68 
Although Han Yu is well known for his theory of the three grades of 
human nature, a similar theory was already proposed and became prevalent in the 
Han dynasty.  The seeds of this theory may be planted much earlier by 
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Confucius.69  Even the term “three grades (san pin三品)” is not the invention of 
Han Yu.  Wing-tsit Chan points out that the term is found in several classics and 
Xun Yue’s works.  But he thinks that Xun Yue used the term to refer to the three 
grades of human fate (命 ming) rather than human nature,70 with which I disagree.  
The frequent use of the compound 性命 xingming indicates that nature and fate are 
closely associated with each other.  In many cases, they are interchangeable.  Xun 
Yue’s words read, 
Someone asks about Heaven’s mandate and human effort.  The 
answer is that there are three grades involved.  The upper and the 
lower are unmovable.  In between them human effort lies [i.e. what 
is between them is changeable through human effort].  People are 
alike in what they are destined, but through effort they become far 
apart.  Therefore they either have good fortune or bad fortune, 
completely different from one another. 
或問天命人事，曰，有三品焉。上下不移，其中則人事存焉
爾。命相近也，事相遠也，則吉凶殊也。71 
This passage occurs in the context of a discussion of human nature. 
Preceding it, Xun Yue talked about how one’s nature relates to one’s ming.  
Immediately after it, he reviewed previous views of human nature and pointed out 
that neither Mencius’ nor Xunzi’s view is perfect, for they fail to account for the 
extremely wicked and the sages respectively.  However, a combined version of 
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Mencius and Xunzi is only applicable to the common people.  Consequently, 
human beings can be divided into three groups: the sages, the most vicious people, 
and the common people between them.  They are divided in terms of nature.  The 
upper grade and the lower grade are respectively good and evil by nature, and their 
good and evil nature remain forever so.  The middle grade is changeable through 
human effort.  As Dong Zhongshu, Yang Xiong, and Liu Xiang indicated, whether 
a man comes to be good or evil depends on his own effort.  In view that nature is a 
mixture of good and evil, the common people in the middle grade are alike (命相
近也); but the different effort they devote to moral cultivation makes them apart 
(事相遠也). 
Xun Yue was not the only proponent of the theory of the three grades of 
human nature in the Han dynasty.  Before him, there was Wang Chong; long 
before Wang Chong, there was Dong Zhongshu.  Both contributed to the 
development of this theory.   
Pointing out the strength and weakness of each previous position of human 
nature, Wang Chong put forwards his own synthetic conclusion.  It reads: 
I therefore consider Mencius’ view of good nature as referring to 
people above average and Xunzi’s view of evil nature as referring 
to those below average; and Yang Xiong’s view of mixed nature of 
good and evil as referring to ordinary people. 
余固以孟軻言人性善者，中人以上者也；孫卿言人性惡者，中
人以下者也；楊雄言人性善惡混者，中人也。72 
Although each of these views has its own merit, Wang Chong thought that 
they fail to reach the ultimate principle of nature.  He agreed with Shi Shuo (世
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碩?-249 B.C.) that the nature of some people is good and the nature of others is 
evil.  Prima facie, it seems that Wang Chong proposed a theory of two grades of 
human beings.  But he actually remains consistent.  Good nature and bad nature 
refer respectively to people above and below average.  As for ordinary people, in 
light of Wang’s theory of qi endowment (氣稟), which I will examine later, those 
endowed with sufficient qi have a larger “good” part in their nature while those 
endowed with meager qi have a larger “bad” part in theirs, but both are changeable 
through education.  In view of this, if A is said to have a good nature and B a bad 
nature, this simply means that A has a larger good part than B.  This does not 
affect the fact that both A and B have a mixed nature of good and evil. 
Dong Zhongshu maintained that man has a dual nature of humanity and 
greed.  Conceived in this way, nature refers only to the nature of the common 
people. 
Nature is named not to refer to the upper and the lower, but to the 
average.  
名性不以上，不以下，以其中名之。73 
 Clearly, Dong also classified human beings into three grades.  But he was entirely 
concerned with the medium grade.  The other two grades do not hold interest for 
him, for they have nothing to do with, or even undermine the significant role of 
education.     
The theory of the three grades of human nature is not a sudden product.  
An early source can be found in the Analects 17:3, where Confucius observed that 
only the most intelligent and the most stupid do not change.  Confucius divided 
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human beings by intelligence, but in Han Confucians’ understanding intelligence 
and capacity are part of nature.  As such, the difference in intelligence changes 
smoothly into a difference in nature.  
Confucius indicates that ordinary people can become more intelligent 
through learning.  Since ordinary people constitute the majority of human beings 
at any place and time, this lays a solid foundation for Confucius’ theory of 
education.  Education is an overriding concern of Han Confucianism, as it was of 
Mencius and Xunzi.  Even Wang Chong, famous for his critique of certain aspects 
of Han Confucianism, presented himself as a staunch Confucian for his emphasis 
on education. It is interesting to notice that despite the disagreement in 
understanding human nature by Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi and Han Confucians, 
they all arrived at a conclusion that education is necessary.  
1.2.3. The Significance of Education    
Han Confucians generally agreed that to an ordinary person, having a good 
nature does not mean that he/she is actually completely good.  Both the good and 
bad elements in nature are just potential.  Education is needed for transforming the 
good potential into reality and extinguishing the bad seeds at their earliest stage.  
Dong Zhongshu employed an analogy to demonstrate the relationship 
between good nature and realized goodness.  
Man’s nature is comparable to the rice stalk and good to rice.  Rice 
comes out of the rice stalks but not all rice stalk turns rice.  
Similarly, good comes out of nature but not all nature turns good.  
Both goodness and rice are based on what is endowed by Heaven 
and completed by human effort.  They are not the within the realm 





It is important to point out that “human effort” here does not refer to a 
common person’s effort.  Rather, it refers, specifically, to the ruler’s activity.  
People receive from Heaven a nature that cannot turn good [by 
itself].  And they turn to the ruler for education that will complete 
their nature.  It is the duty of the ruler to obey the will of Heaven to 
complete the nature of people. 
民受未能善之性於天，而退受成性之教于王，王承天意以成民
之性爲任者也。75 
This quotation is reminiscent of Xunzi’s view that the sage transforms the 
nature of the people, since ideally, the ruler should be virtuous and the sage is the 
one who is mostl qualified to become a ruler.  Although Dong acknowledged the 
good elements in the nature of ordinary people, he did not seem confident of their 
self-cultivation.  He defined “people” (min 民) as those in sleep (ming 瞑, literally 
meaning closing one’s eyes) who wait for others [the ruler] to awaken them.  
Consequently, in the educational system Dong pictured, the common people are 
only passive receivers.  If the good elements in their nature have any value, they 
only make possible the ruler’s educative mission and testify to the indispensable 
role of the ruler. 
                                                 
74 Chunqiufanlu jinzhu jinyi 春秋繁露今注今譯, vol. 10，Shencha minghao深察名號,  
267; A Source Book, 274-275. 
 
75 Chunqiufanlu jinzhu jinyi 春秋繁露今注今譯, vol. 10，Shencha minghao深察名號,  
267; A Source Book, 274-275. 
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It is said that some democratic germ is discernable in Dong’s thought, for 
he formulated a resonating theory between Heaven and man, which places 
restrictions on the ruler.  Under this theory, Heaven oversees the ruler and 
communicates its approval or disapproval through natural (in some cases 
supernatural) phenomena.  With the supervision of Heaven, the ruler would be 
more careful and responsible.  However, looking at Dong’s theory from another 
angle, one gets a quite contrary conclusion.  If the ruler is the only medium 
connecting Heaven and ordinary people, if he is the only man appointed by 
Heaven to educate ordinary people, isn’t Dong in fact elevating the position of the 
ruler and strengthening his power?  This remains a controversial question beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
Human nature is a mixture of good and evil.  The character 混 (mixture) 
conveys a meaning of uncertainty and indeterminacy.  This also makes education 
necessary.  If human nature is entirely good, there is no need for education; if it is 
completely bad, education hardly works.  Education is meaningful only to the 
common people, who have a mixed nature of good and evil.  Wang Chong says: 
The ruler and the father observe the nature of the minister and the 
son.  If their nature is good, the ruler and the father will nurture and 
guide them, keeping them far away from the bad.  If their nature is 
bad, the ruler and the father will assist them and help them stay 
clear of the bad, making them approach gradually the good.  
Consequently, the good exerts a continued influence on the bad, 
and the bad is transformed into the good, which becomes a part of 




Here the unorthodox thinker Wang Chong looked quite “Confucian” in 
emphasizing education.  He held a view similar to that of Dong Zhongshu, i.e., it 
is the superior’s responsibility to teach the inferior.  This view presupposes that 
the superior is virtuous.  But the question is whether this presupposition itself is 
reasonable.  Ideally, in Confucianism (1) only virtuous men should be credited 
with high official positions; only the sage is qualified to be ruler.  If point (1) is 
strictly observed, then point (2) follows that those in high positions must be 
virtuous.  But the question is that point (1) is an ideal statement, which is hardly 
realized in real life.  Confucius has been esteemed as the highest sage by later 
generations; but the powerful men in his time seemed uninterested in his ideas, let 
alone handing over the throne to him.  Clearly, point (1) legitimates point (2).  If 
(1) cannot be proven, then (2) is questionable.  But many Han thinkers, Wang 
Chong for example, paid little attention to the qualification of (1), and started their 
discussions directly with (2).  Yet, (2) alone is a very weak statement. 
At this point, it is necessary to revisit the view that human nature is a 
mixture of good and evil in light of the above discussion on education.  The word 
“mixture” tells nothing about the proportion of good to evil in one’s nature.  One’s 
nature might be a mixture of 90% good and 10% bad, which is apparently 
different from another’s nature of 10% good and 90% bad.  Now the question is 
whether the ratio of good to bad in nature is different from one person to another, 
or each ordinary person is simply half good and half bad in his/her nature.   
                                                 
76Huang Hui黃暉, Lunheng jiaoshi論衡校釋, vol.1: 63. 
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The theory of qi endowment, which will be examined later, does indicate a 
variety of proportions of good to bad in nature.  For example, a person may be 
said to have been endowed with more benevolent qi than others.  Then the 
question that arises is: whether this fortunate person, whose nature is 90% good 
and 10% bad for example, is more (or more likely to be) benevolent than another 
one, whose nature is 10% good and 90% bad?    
A possible explanation involves an understanding of education.  Only the 
sage and the most vicious are definitely 100% good and 100% bad.  In contrast, it 
is uncertain whether ordinary people actually become good or bad.  Even if one’s 
nature is 99% good, it is still possible that the remaining 1% bad may ruin one’s 
well-being, if one just indulges in this slightest part of bad.  Similarly, even if one 
has only 1% of good elements in one’s nature, one may become virtuous through 
sustained cultivation.  In a word, both the good part and bad part in one’s nature 
are simply potentials.  It is at this point that education comes into play.  Through 
education one turns potential into reality.  Consequently, it does not matter 
whether a man’s nature is a mixture of 90% good and 10% bad or a mixture of 
10% good and 90% bad, since both ratios do not necessarily entail actual good or 
bad.  But it does matter that through education a man having only 10% good in his 
nature becomes virtuous, while without cultivation a man having 90% good in his 
nature degenerates into viciousness.  This may explain why Han Confucian 
thinkers simply put forth that human nature is a mixture of good and evil, paying 
no attention to the variety of the mixture among ordinary people.   
1.3. New Developments in Han Confucian Views of Human Nature 
So far I have focused on the syncretic aspect of Han Confucian views of 
human nature.  In this part I explore the innovations Han Confucians brought to 
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the tradition.  Firstly, I examine their fresh explanations of the relationship 
between nature and feeling, which exert a deep influence on later thinkers.  Then I 
explore the theory of qi endowment, which turned out to be one of the most 
important theories in the history of Chinese philosophy. 
1.3.1. On the relationship between nature and feeling 
 The problem of the relationship between nature and feeling did not attract 
philosophical attention until the Han dynasty.  The main reason, I think, is that 
Han thinkers began to make a clear distinction between nature and feeling.  In the 
Warring States period nature and feeling often referred to one and the same thing.  
Human nature, i.e., the four moral sprouts, looks similar to moral feelings under 
Mencius’ interpretation (Mencius 6A: 6).  In Xunzi’s view, man’s evil nature 
consists of feelings and desires such as hatred, jealousy and arrogance.  Although 
Xunzi made a distinction among nature, feeling, and desire, the three actually refer 
to one thing.77  Similar evidence is found in a passage from the text entitled 
                                                 
77 Xunzi says, 
What is natural without any effort effecting it is called the ‘nature.’  When the 
nature feels fondness or hate, pleasure or anger, sadness or joy, these are 
referred to as the ‘emotions’. 
不事而自然謂之性，性之好惡喜怒哀樂謂之情。 
Human nature is the product of Heaven; feeling is the substance of nature; desire 
is the response of feeling  
性者，天之就也；情者，性之質也；欲者，情之應也。 
 
Xunzi agreed with most Chinese philosophers in that nature is what is innate to human 
beings, but went on to give a substantive definition of nature.  That is, feelings, for example, like, 
dislike, joy, anger, sadness, and pleasure, constitute nature.  Without feeling, nature is only a 
purely formal concept.  Desire stems from feeling.  Human nature or feeling tends towards contact 
with external things.  If this contact becomes uncontrollable, say, one is entirely distracted by 
things, desire results.  To give an example, by nature man likes (feeling) good food; when he sees 
(contact) fresh tuna, he is eager (desire) to get it.     
 
However, nature, feeling and desire, in Xunzi’s interpretation, should not be understood 
as separate from one another.  Both feeling and desire are external expressions of nature.  To 
summarize their relationships, feeling is the content of nature, and desire is the excessive or 
deviant feeling.  And, nature refers to one’s original and internal state, feeling points to one’s 
response to external things, and desire pertains to one’s obsession with these external things.  Since 
human nature is evi   l, and since feeling constitutes nature, feeling is prone to degenerate into 
desire, which is evil.  Xunzi often put the characters 性 and 情 together as the compound 性情.  As 
human nature is evil for its insatiability, the word xingqing 性情 actually pertains to desire.  In this 
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“Human Nature Comes out of Life” (xing zi ming chu 性自命出), one of the 
recently discovered bamboo texts in Guodian, China which are believed to be 
composed as early as around 300 B.C.78  It reads: “the qi of joy, anger, sadness, 
and sorrow is nature” (喜怒哀悲之氣，性也).  Obviously, nature covers feeling 
in the thought of Warring States philosophers. 
In the Han dynasty, however, the distinction between nature and feeling 
became evident.  Dong Zhongshu held that man has a dual nature of humanity (仁
ren) and greed (貪 tan), for Heaven has its dual operation of yang (active) and yin 
(passive).  Heaven restricts the yin function, for example, in Autumn and Winter 
(corresponding to yin) plants wither.  So human beings should reduce their 
feelings and desires.  Apparently, Dong thought that feelings and desires are yin 
and bad.  As Wing-tsit Chan rightly points out, Dong Zhongshu initiated the view 
that human nature is good whereas feeling is evil, which became a prevalent view 
in the Han dynasty.   
Liu Xiang’s view of the relationship between nature and feeling is also 
noteworthy.  He says, 
                                                                                                                                      
respect, as Xu Fuguan points out, although Xunzi conceptually distinguishes nature, feeling, and 
desire, they are in fact three different descriptions of one thing. 
 
For Chinese texts, see Xunzi jijie荀子集解, vol. 16, on rectifying names正名篇，335, 
337.  Xu Fuguan 徐複觀，History of the Chinese Philosophy of Human Nature: the pre-Qin 
Period 中國人性論史（先秦篇）(Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館，1969，1990), 
387. 
 
78 Jingmen Museum, Hubei Province, “The Chu tomb #1 in Guodian, Jingmen,” 湖北省
荊門市博物館《荊門郭店一號楚墓》，in Wenwu文物 (July 1997): 35-46; Other related papers: 
Peng Hao彭浩, “The times of Chu tomb #1 in Guodian and the structure of the abbreviated Laozi 
text”郭店一號墓的年代與簡本<老子>的結構 , 13-15；Qiu Xigui 裘錫圭 , “A preliminary 
exploration of the Laozi bamboo scripts in Guodian” 郭店<老子>簡初探, 25-26；and Li Xueqin
李學勤 , “An interpretation of the ultimate One engendering water in terms of mathematical 
tactics” 太一生水的數術解釋, 299，all in Chen Guying 陳鼓應, ed., Research on Daoist Culture
道家文化研究, vol. 17 (Joint Publishing company三聯書店，1999). 
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Man’s nature is as it is because it is inborn; it remains within his 
person and is not expressed.  His feelings are as they are because 
they result from contact with things; they take form externally.  
What is revealed externally is called yang and what is not 
expressed is called yin. 
性，生而然者也，在於身而不發；情，接於物而然者也，形出
於外。形外，則謂之陽；不發者，則謂之陰。79 
Nature resonates with feeling; nature is not completely good, and 
feeling is not completely evil.80 
性情相應，性不獨善，情不獨惡。 
Both Dong Zhongshu and Liu Xiang approached nature and feeling in 
terms of yin and yang, which I will discuss more below.  This indicates the 
popularity of the theory of yinyang wuxing (陰陽五行) in the Han dynasty.  The 
difference between the two thinkers is also noteworthy.  Unlike Dong Zhongshu, 
who approached nature and feeling in terms of good and evil, Liu Xiang explained 
nature and feelings in terms of “the internal” (nei 內) and “the external” (wai 外).  
Nature is what is within man and latent, and feelings are what is expressed 
externally.  The two correspond to each other.  As man’s nature is a mixture of 
good and evil, his feelings cannot but be a mixture of good and evil too.   
Another important point is that in Liu Xiang’s case, the terms of yin and 
yang involve no evaluative connotation, which is contrary to a popular 
misconception that yang is superior to yin.  Nature is yin and feeling is yang.  
                                                 
79 Huang Hui黃暉, Lunheng jiaoshi論衡校釋, vol.1: 133; A Source Book,  295.  I thank 
Richard Lynn for his advice on the translation. 
 
80 Xun Yue 荀悅, Shenjian申鑒, 25; Hsun Yueh and The Mind of Late Han China, 187. 
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Since both nature and feelings are mixture of good and evil, obviously, there is no 
way that yin is less valuable than yang, or yang is better than yin.    
Han thinkers generally considered the conceptions of yin and yang to 
complement one another.  According to Dong Zhongshu, yin and yang are the dual 
operating patterns of Heaven.  All natural phenomena can be classified as either 
yang or yin.  For example, spring and summer are yang, when trees grow and 
flowers blossom; autumn and winter are yin, when trees and flowers wither.  The 
succession of the four seasons is a natural and ever-lasting process, in which no 
season can be omitted.  The sun (yang) alternates with the moon (yin), so people 
work in the day and rest at night.  The process of alternation goes on smoothly, 
indicative of the perfect operation of Heaven.  All of these suggest that Dong 
treated the yin and the yang operations of Heaven equally.   
However, Dong Zhongshu contradicts himself when discussing human 
nature.  He clearly remarked that people should reduce or get rid of their feelings 
that correspond to the yin of Heaven.  Here the inconsistency is evident: since yin 
of Heaven is indispensable, why should one condemn the yin of human nature, i.e., 
feelings?  Dong thought that qi is responsible for both the humanity and greed in 
human nature. 81  Combining this view with the one that man’s dual nature 
corresponds to Heaven’s dual operation, it looks like that man only inherits the 
neutrally dual structure of yin and yang from Heaven, and it is qi that fills this 
structure with good and evil assets.  Nonetheless, Dong did not give any further 
explanation on the relationship between qi and human nature.  It is Wang Chong 
                                                 
81 Dong says, “if the qi that human beings are endowed with is completely free of evil, 
why does the heart have deviant tendencies.” (人之受氣苟無惡者，心何栣哉？)   See 
Chunqiufanlu jinzhu jinyi春秋繁露今注今譯，vol. 10, Shencha minghao深察名號, 266; A 
Source Book, 274. 
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who formulated a theory of qi endowment to account for the variety of human 
nature, human fate, and human life.   
1.3.2. The theory of qi endowment 
The concept of qi can be traced back to Zou Yan (鄒衍 c. 350-270 B.C.).82  
Broadly speaking, this concept was usually employed to explain the origin, the 
composition, and the operation of the cosmos, to which Han thinkers made 
significant contributions.  As far as the relationship between qi and human beings 
is concerned, although the notion that human beings come out of qi had already 
occurred in the Warring States period, the question of the relationship between qi 
and human nature was not addressed at great length until Wang Chong. 
Wang Chong followed the general view that human beings are composed 
of qi.83  But he went further to state that qi endowment is different from one 
person to another, from which all other differences of human beings, for example, 
in nature, fate, health, life span, character, and intelligence, stem.  He says,  
The endowment of qi can be thick or thin, so nature can be good or 
evil.  A person is cruel, as he is endowed with a meager portion of 
the qi of benevolence; a person is foul-tempered, for he is endowed 
with a full dose of qi of boldness….  Man’s good and bad depend 
on the original qi; qi can be more or less in man, so man’s nature 
can be worthy or stupid. 
                                                 
82 For the philosophy of Zou Yan and its development, see Joseph Needham, Science and 
Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), vol.2: 232-244. 
 





 Mou Zongsan points out that the term qixing (qi nature 氣性) occurred 
frequently in Wang Chong’s time.85  This does not necessarily entail that Wang 
Chong invented the term; however, at least it shows that the term is generally 
associated with Wang Chong.  No doubt, due to the influence of Wang Chong’s 
thought, qixing had become a crucial concept in Chinese philosophy.   
Out of the above quotation two questions arise: (1) whether the difference 
of qi endowment is in degree or in kind; and (2) does qi itself have some good or 
evil aspects?  At first sight, Wang Chong seemed to indicate a difference in degree.  
He frequently used characters such as “duoshao” (more or less 多少) and “houbo” 
(thick or thin 厚薄) to qualify qi, which indicates that qi endowment can be 
measured.  Consequently, the theory of qi endowment is often formulated to mean 
that greater or lesser endowment of qi determines the good and bad in human 
nature.   
However, a careful examination of Wang Chong reveals that the difference 
of qi endowment is also a difference in kind.  Although the original qi (yuanqi 元
氣) is the basic substance forming the cosmos and human beings, it differentiates 
into various kinds of qi when filling each person, for example, qi of benevolence 
and that of boldness.  Since there is qi of benevolence, one may wonder if there is 
qi of evil.  Wang Chong’s answer is affirmative.  As he explained, if the union of 
husband and wife is invaded by the qi of deviance, or if the pregnant woman is 
                                                 
84 Huang Hui黃暉，Lunheng jiaoshi論衡校釋, vol.1: 75  
 
85 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三，Caixing yu xuanli才性與玄理, 1. 
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affected by it, the baby born to them will be deviant.86  Clearly, qi of benevolence 
is different in kind from that of deviance.  To combine the above discussion, the 
nature of a person is decided by both the kind and the volume of his endowed qi. 
Turning to the question whether qi itself has some good or evil assets, the 
answer seems simple.  As Wang Chong’s expressions of benevolent qi, deviant qi, 
and bold qi suggest, qi does have some good or bad aspects within itself.  As such, 
if qi can determine whether human nature is good or evil, that is just because qi 
itself has good or evil assets within it.  In other words, the nature of endowed qi 
determines the nature of human beings.  However, the theory of qi endowment 
cannot do more than trace the abstract concept of human nature to a more 
substantive material qi.  Obviously, one’s nature is good or bad, as one is endowed 
with good qi or bad qi; this is a circular argument.  We will see later that both 
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang would not be bothered by this problem, as they produced 
fresh interpretations of the good and bad of human beings    
Besides nature, qi endowment also determines human fate.  Wang Chong 
says, 
When being endowed with qi from one’s parents, one receives 
one’s fate: whether one has fortune or misfortune has been 
determined. 
凡人受命，在父母施氣之時，已得吉凶矣。87 
Wang Chong reiterated that once determined by qi, one’s fate can never 
change.  He says, 
                                                 
86 Huang Hui黃暉，Lunheng jiaoshi論衡校釋, vol.1: 47 
 
87 Huang Hui黃暉，Lunheng jiaoshi論衡校釋, vol.1: 47. 
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Being wealthy and noble or being poor and humble, all are 
determined when one is initially endowed with qi.  They are not the 
results of one’s cultivation after having become an adult. 
則富貴貧賤皆在初稟之時，不在長大之後隨操行而至也。88 
Relating the above quotations to Wang Chong’s emphasis on education, 
one notices two interesting questions: (1) Human nature is changeable whereas 
human fate is not; (2) One’s fate does not necessarily correspond to one’s nature, 
or worse, it rarely corresponds to the latter. 
Wang Chong attached great significance to education, as most Han 
thinkers did.  Even a man is born with a large proportion of evil in his nature, he 
still has the promise to become good through sedulous cultivation.  Now the 
question is: why is a man’s nature changeable whilst his fate is not, since both are 
determined by his endowed qi?  Another question is: if a once bad man becomes 
good through education, will this affect his originally endowed qi?  Or is a man’s 
qi changeable throughout his life?  These questions remain unclear in Wang 
Chong’s thought. 
As for the relationship between one’s nature and fate, Confucian thinkers 
normally based the latter on the former explicitly or implicitly.  If a man cultivates 
his nature and become virtuous, he will live a happy life.  Wang Chong, however, 
refuted this notion.  For him, man’s fate does not correspond to his nature and on 
many occasions the two run in opposite directions. 
One’s nature is different from one’s fate.  Either a person having 
good nature meets with ill luck, or a person having evil nature 
meets with good luck.  Being good or bad, this is called nature; 
                                                 
88 Huang Hui黃暉，Lunheng jiaoshi論衡校釋, vol.1: 49. 
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fortune or misfortune, good luck or ill luck, they are named fate.  
One does good things but gets misfortune; this happens when 
nature is good while fate is bad.  One does bad things but gets 
fortune; this is when nature is evil while fate is good.  Nature is 
either good or evil in itself, and fate is either lucky or unlucky in 
itself.  If one has a lucky fate, even if one does not conduct good, 
one may get fortune.  If one has bad fate, even if one cultivates 






Although Wang Chong aligned himself with a threefold classification of 
human fate--namely, zhengming (正命) suiming (隨命), and zaoming (遭命)90-- 
he was largely concerned with the third kind, i.e., one’s fate runs counter to one’s 
nature.91  I will revisit this question in chapter 3.  Now the question is if one’s fate 
                                                 
89 Huang Hui黃暉，Lunheng jiaoshi論衡校釋, vol.1: 47. 
 
90  This is a dominant view of human fate in the Han dynasty.  For its origin and 
development, see Chen Ning陳寧, Zhongguo gudai mingyunguan de xiandai quanshi 中國古代命
運觀的現代詮釋(Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe 瀋陽: 遼寧教育出版社, 1999), 146-172. 
 
91 Wang Chong made an explanation of the three kinds of human fate.  He says, 
 
Zhengming means that one receives good luck by what one is endowed with 
naturally.  One’s nature and physiognomy are naturally good, so one need not to 
seek fortunate by resorting to moral cultivation, and fortune comes to one.  That 
is why it is called zhengming.  Suiming means that one receives good luck if one 
cultivates oneself sedulously and one meets bad luck if one just indulges oneself 
in desire.  That is why it is called suiming.  Zaoming means that one devotes 
oneself to moral cultivation but receives bad luck anyway.  What one meets has 
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does not match one’s nature, one may lack motivation for moral cultivation.  
Although moral cultivation is primarily for one’s inner well-being, it often brings 
material achievement.  For example, a virtuous man could be recommended to the 
government and appointed to a high position.  This builds a necessary association 
of moral cultivation with material achievement, even though on many occasions 
the latter is only a by-product of the former.  Even Confucianism, which is 
overwhelmingly concerned with the inner good, accepts this association by 
insisting that only the sage qualifies as a ruler and only the virtuous qualifies for 
high position.   
A rational person would agree that a good man deserves a materially and 
spiritually happy life, and this happy life serves as one important motivation for 
moral cultivation.  This is also implicit in Confucianism, as the stories of virtuous 
men suggest.92   Now that the association between one’s nature and one’s fate is 
broken, and the unpredictability of one’s fate is highlighted, one may lack 
motivation to cultivate oneself.  If moral cultivation does not guarantee one a 
                                                                                                                                      






jiaoshi論衡校釋, vol.1: 49-50) 
 
Although Wang Chong classified human fate into three kinds, he was largely concerned 
with Zaoming.  As a matter of fact, Wang Chong is remembered in the history of Chinese 
philosophy for his argument on the ill match between nature and fate, in addition to his theory of qi 
endowment.  He did not address zhengming much.  As for suiming, he simply excluded it from his 
worldview, for he thought there is no way to verify it in real life (隨命之說，安所驗乎？). (Ibid., 
51) 
92  These stories normally tell how a virtuous man is eventually recognized by the 
community or government and is appointed to high position.  Besides a successful career, he also 
has a happy family, virtuous wives and filial children.  Of these stories the most wide spread 
involves the sage-king Shun (舜).  Shun requited his brother’s malevolence with kindness, and was 
recommended to King Yao (堯).  Thinking highly of Shun, Yao not only handed over the crown to 
him, but also married his two daughters to him.  Shun had remarkable achievements in governing 
the nation; he lived a happy life with his two wives and died at 100.  See Sima Qian司馬遷, Shiji
史記, Hong Kong:  Zhonghua shuju香港:中華書局, 1969, vol. 1: 32-44. 
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happy life; even worse, a good man may suffer more than a bad man, and if one’s 
good effort has nothing to do with one’s predetermined fate, how can one be 
expected to cultivate oneself enthusiastically? 
To summarize, the theory of qi endowment has become an influential 
theory from the Han dynasty onward, to which Han Confucians, Wang Chong in 
particular, made remarkable contributions.  After the Han dynasty, the two 
approaches to human nature become distinct; one is from moral principle and the 
other from qi endowment.  We will see that in the Wei-Jin period, Wang Bi and 
Guo Xiang reinterpreted these two approaches in their own ways.  These two 
approaches anticipate the distinction between 天理之性  (nature of Heavenly 
principle) and 氣質之性 (nature of qi endowment) made most prominent by the 
Song philosopher Zhu Xi (朱熹 ).  They also enabled thinkers to interpret, 
comparatively, the issue of human nature in terms of potential vs. reality, 
commonality vs. individuality, equality vs. inequality, and mind/spirit vs. 
life/body.   
However, the theory of qi endowment does have some problems.  To take 
Wang Chong for example, since both human nature and human fate are 
determined by qi endowment, why is the former changeable but the latter is not?  
And, since human fate is predetermined and unchangeable, what is the point of 
moral cultivation?  Sometimes Wang Chong was optimistic about the strength of 
education in shaping one’s nature; but in most cases he remained pessimistic about 
the fact that one could do nothing about one’s fate.  As such, his position on 
education and fate actually undermine each other.  As a matter of fact, Wang 
Chong’s discussion of the unchangeableness of human fate is so impressive that it 
is generally conceived of as the key theme in his thought.  The theory of qi 
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endowment is thus associated with fatalism, and education, despite the 
significance attached to it, actually does not count too much. 
1.4. Human Nature in Early Daoist Philosophy 
The issue of human nature is more intriguing in Daoism than in 
Confucianism, because the way Daoists approached the issue is much more 
complicated.  Confucian thinkers have shown an enduring concern with human 
nature and have normally approached it from a moral perspective.  However, the 
situation is quite different in Daoism.  The Laozi and the inner chapters of the 
Zhuangzi contain no reference to the terms “human nature” and “nature”.93  But 
the terms occur frequently in the outer and miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi 
and other Daoist texts, such as the Guanzi and the Huainanzi.  This imbalance 
may invite questions such as whether the early Daoists were not interested in the 
issue of human nature or if it was simply beyond their horizon?  Was it due to the 
influence of the Confucian doctrine of human nature that later Daoists had to 
                                                 
93 One explanation for this absence is that the term de 德 conveys a meaning similar to 
that of xing 性 .  As de is the differentiation of the Dao into human beings and things, it actually 
seems to play the same role as xing.  
 
An alternative explanation involves a contrast between Daoism and Confucianism.  While 
Confucians were concerned with the Way of human beings (rendao 人道), Daoists were more 
interested in the Way of Heaven (tiandao 天道).  Thus they paid little attention to the nature of 
human beings.   
 
The latter explanation is less convincing, for the distinction between the Way of Heaven 
and the Way of human beings, in my understanding, is not sufficient to characterize the 
fundamental difference between the two schools.  Confucianism and Daoism actually share the 
same ideal, i.e., a harmonious relationship between Heaven and human beings.  In Daoist language, 
this harmony comes if one fully comprehends and spontaneously follows the Dao so that the two 
seem identical.  The basic divergence between the two schools lies in their understanding of the 
Dao: a moral principle or a principle of naturalness and non-action?  This difference results in 
other debates between the two schools on education, rituals, human nature, and the happy life.  
  
For two explanations, see Xu Fuguan 徐複觀, History of the Chinese Philosophy of 
Human Nature: the pre-Qin Period 中國人性論史, 先秦篇, 338, 369; Zhou Shaoxian 周紹賢, 
Weijin qingtan shulun 魏晉清談述論 (Taibei: shangwu yinshuguan臺北：商務書局, 1966), 58-
61.   
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address this issue?  It is difficult to answer these questions without looking at the 
etymology of the character 性 (nature), which needs another examination.   
Besides the total absence of the term “nature” in the Laozi and the inner 
chapters of the Zhuangzi, the lack of a clear definition of “nature” in other Daoist 
texts also contributes to the complexity.  A fundamental theme running through 
Daoist texts is to deny the Confucian conception of human nature.  Laozi says, 
“get rid of benevolence and discard righteousness, and people will return to filial 
piety and kindness” (The Laozi 19:1).  The author of the Zhuangzi thought that 
man’s true nature had been distorted by benevolence and righteousness (The 
Zhuangzi, 8/22/28).  Daoists sought to prove that human nature is not at all what 
Confucianism had conceived in moral terms.  But the question remains: after 
deconstructing the Confucian conception of human nature, what did Daoists 
construct in its place?   
This is a difficult question, since we find no clear definition as to what 
nature is in the texts containing this term.  Daoists also agreed that nature means 
what a person (thing) is endowed with naturally.  But this meaning is very broad, 
as feeling, capacity, characteristics, physical features, and intelligence, all can be 
said to be naturally endowed.  Even benevolence and righteousness, which were 
refuted by Daoists for being artificial, is just what the human being is naturally 
endowed with in the Confucian worldview.  Given this broadness, in Daoism the 
meaning of nature is completely dependent on the context.  For example, in the 
eleventh chapter of the Zhuangzi, nature means natural life (11/26/17, 11/26/21, 
11/26/25, 11/27/7), but in the eighth chapter it means the basic function of sense 
organs (8/23/7-9).  Elsewhere it either conveys the meaning of capacity (19/51/30, 
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19/52/1), or that of a constant life course (9/23/24), or the essence of life itself 
(23/67/12). 
Despite this complexity, there have been remarkable achievements in 
research on this issue.  Harold D.  Roth outlines the development of the concept of 
nature in Daoism, which, according to him, is characterized by three kinds of 
theories.94  The first, the Yangist theory, holds that nature is an innate tendency for 
longevity, the second, the Primitivist theory, conceives nature to be simple (素 su) 
and unhewn (樸 pu).  Incorporating the previous two, the third Syncretist theory 
proposes that human nature is an innate tranquil essence that is ultimately based in 
the Dao.   
This classification is valuable; however, there are still some problems with 
it.  Roth stresses that the Daoist theory of human nature is derived primarily from 
the Yangists.  But we know that in the Zhuangzi Yang Zhu and Mozi are criticized 
by name for misunderstanding human nature.95   
Another problem concerns the Syncretist theory.  According to Roth, the 
Syncretist theory, which was developed in the Huainanzi and the miscellaneous 
chapters of the Zhuangzi, bases one’s tranquil essence in the Dao.  Obviously, 
                                                 
94 Harold D. Roth, “An Outline of the Concept of Innate Nature in Early Daoism,” in 
Contacts between Cultures edited by Bernard Hung-Kay Luk (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1992), 
37-41. 
 
95 Roth’s view implies that Yangist views or texts come earlier than the Laozi and the 
Zhuangzi.  But the fact is that Yang Zhu’s date remains undetermined.  No complete work by Yang 
Zhu is extant.  Only citations and paraphrases of his words are available in texts such as the 
Lüshichunqiu 呂氏春秋 (ch.1, 2, 21) and the Liezi 列子, both of which are works of the Han-Wei 
period.  Of course this is insufficient to prove that Yang Zhu’s life is closer to the Han, but it is 
also insufficient to date him to an earlier period.  Benjamin I. Schwartz influences Roth here.  He 
thinks that Yang Zhu’s view of human nature emerges out of his dialectic encounters with the 
Mohist school, and Yang may have influenced both Laozi and Zhuangzi.  Again, Schwartz implies 
that Yang Zhu’s view was available to Laozi.  However, as Xu Fuguan proposes, Yangist theory is 
a branch of Daoism, deriving from Lao-Zhuang thought.  See Benjamin I.Schwartz, The World of 
Thought in Ancient China, 191; Xu Fuguan徐複觀，History of the Chinese Philosophy of Human 
Nature: the pre-Qin Period 中國人性論史（先秦篇）, 415-418. 
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Roth implies that this idea is a quite late development.  However, as I will show 
later, this idea was addressed as early as in the Laozi and had been shared by 
various Daoist proponents of human nature.  For example, in the outer and 
miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi and in the Huainanzi, it is said that 
feelings and senses are part of nature, and they should not be rejected for they 
have their origin in the Dao.96 
 Some misconceptions make the issue of human nature in Daoism even 
more intriguing.  For example, it is widely accepted that Daoists adopted a 
naturalistic approach to human nature, i.e., they construed human nature as 
equivalent to life and were overwhelmingly concerned with self-preservation.  
However, one must be cautious to apply the term “naturalism” to Daoist 
philosophy.  One needs consider at least two points when grappling with this 
comparative perspective.  (1) What are the core meanings of “naturalism” and its 
Chinese equivalent ziran 自然?  Is there any difference between the two? (2) 
What is the ultimate goal of Daoist philosophy: a spiritual enlightenment, or only 
the preservation of the physical body?  I will return to these questions in chapter 3.   
So far I have introduced the complexity of Daoist thought on nature.  In 
this part I present my examination of the topic, which is mainly built on two 
Daoist classics, the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, for the reason that I stated at the 
beginning of this chapter.  I hope to answer the following questions: whether there 
is any idea of (human) nature in the Laozi and the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi 
despite the absence of the word “nature” in them?  What is the main feature of this 
idea?  How is human nature understood in later Daoist texts?  And, what makes 
this understanding distinct from earlier ideas?  I propose there is a change in the 
                                                 
96 Zhang Shuangdi 張雙棣, Huainanzi jiaoshi 淮南子校釋 (Peking University Press北京
大學出版社,1997), vol.1: 722. 
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development of Daoist philosophy concerning the issue of human nature.  The 
ideas of human nature in the Laozi and the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi focus 
primarily on the origin of human nature and its relation to the Dao, while in the 
outer and miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi, human nature refers to a life of 
health and longevity.  In other words, whereas in the former nature is understood 
as a principle, in the latter it refers to something that is substantive. 
1.4.1. The idea of nature in the Laozi and the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi 
  Although the terms “nature” and “human nature” do not occur in the 
Laozi and the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi, this does not mean that the texts do 
not convey any idea or view of human nature.  Laozi stressed that the myriad 
things originate from the Dao.  He employed the mother-child analogy to 
illustrate the relation between the Dao and the myriad things.  But one should not 
thus consider the Dao apart from its creations.  The Dao is internal to things.  The 
Dao is both transcendental and immanent.  Thus, each human being has the Dao 
in him/herself, which forms his/her nature.  Human nature conceived in this way 
is the root to which human beings should return.  Laozi says, “things are 
numerous and various, but each returns to its root (The Laozi 16).”  The Chinese 
equivalent of “root”, gen 根, means the fundamental, the core, and the focal point 
of a thing, and can be used as a substitute for the word “nature”.      
 Laozi employed another term, de 德, to convey what is meant by the word 
“nature”.  The Dao is intrinsic to each human being.  The Dao in this form is 
called de. 97  The subtle distinction between the two is: the Dao refers to the 
                                                 
97 Given its importance in Daoist philosophy, it is necessary to give a clarification as to 
the translations of the concept of de.  In the Laozi, 德 and 得, both pronounce de, were used 
interchangeably to refer to the differentiation of the Dao in each human being.  However, the basic 
meanings of the two characters are different.  德 means virtue, while 得 means “to receive”, “to 
have”, or “to obtain”.  De is often translated as “virtue”, but evidently this translation fails to 
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ontological reality engendering and sustaining the cosmos, and de describes the 
differentiation of the Dao into each thing and human being. 
  De is not only the share of the Dao in human beings, it also means that 
one attends to this sharing carefully and holds it permanently.  While the Dao 
creates human beings, de sustains them and guarantees them a life free of worry 
and bitterness.  It is the core of Laozi’s view of human nature: to maintain 
throughout one’s life what one is endowed with from the Dao.   
 So far I have focused on the idea of human nature in the Laozi.  Now let us 
see whether there is any similar idea in the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi.  It is 
generally agreed that Zhuang Zhou composed the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi, 
and his followers appended to them the outer and miscellaneous chapters.  
Scholars have revealed inconsistencies between the inner chapters and the outer 
and miscellaneous chapters in idea and language.98  One of them is that the term 
                                                                                                                                      
communicate the meaning of de得.  Moreover, as I will argue below, this translation is somewhat 
misleading, as the word “virtue” is typically associated with Confucianism rather than Daoism. 
   
A related translation is “power,” for “virtue” in its Latin origin means “power”.  Although 
this translation hits the mark to some extent, it is only a derivative of the meaning of virtue德 and 
that of attainment得.  In Confucianism and Daoism one’s power relies entirely on one’s virtue and 
one’s attainment of the Dao respectively.   
 
Some scholars translate de in its Daoist context.  Rudolf G. Wagner, for example, renders 
de as “receipt/capacity”.  This translation is more accurate than that of “virtue” or “power” in 
communicating Daoist ideas.  In the Laozi and the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi, de usually 
means one’s receipt from the Dao.  This receipt has no moral dimension, since Daoism saves its 
most vitriolic criticism for Confucian morality.  In view of this, the translation of “virtue” in Daoist 
context may cause confusion.   
 
 I leave de untranslated in this thesis, and refer it to the differentiation of the Dao or the 
sharing of the Dao in each human being.   
 
Philip J. Ivanhoe produces interesting argument regarding the power of de (virtue).  See 
“The concept of de (virtue) in the Laozi,” in Mark Csikzentmihalyi and Philop J. Ivanhoe, ed., 
Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi (State University of New York Press, Albany, 
1999), 239-257; Rudolf G. Wagner, The Craft of A Chinese Commentator Wang Bi on the Laozi, 
182, 183, 273. 
 
98 Liu Xiaogan劉笑敢, Philosophy of Zhuangzi and Its Development莊子哲學及其演變
(Press of Chinese Social Sciences中國社會科學出版社, 1988), 5-20.  The first three chapters of 
Liu’s work are translated into English by William E.  Savage, Classfying the Zhuangzi Chapters 
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“nature” does not occur in the inner chapters but occur frequently in the outer and 
miscellaneous chapters.   
 The idea of human nature in the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi is similar to 
that in the Laozi.  That is, human nature has its base in the Dao.  Zhuang Zhou 
was concerned with the well being of human beings.  According to him, to live a 
peaceful life in constant change, one must know the Dao.  Unlike Laozi, Zhuang 
Zhou conceived the Dao primarily as a principle of ceaseless transformation 
circulating the cosmos.  Once realizing that everything is transient and nothing 
lasts forever, people will not be affected by loss and gain, including life and death.  
Zhuang Zhou encouraged people “to approach de” (進德) (2/6/6), which conveys 
a meaning similar to that of “returning to the root” (歸根) in the Laozi.  One 
should follow one’s nature and this allows one’s nature to be completely fulfilled.  
A completely fulfilled nature is a perfect reflection of the Dao.  A person fully 
fulfilling his nature is at one with the Dao.    
Such a person is the ideal of Daoism, who is esteemed as “the authentic 
person” (真人 zhenren) (6/15/32, 6/16/2, 6/16/5, 6/16/7, 6/16/14, 6/16/20), “the 
numinous person” (神人 shenren) (1/2/2, 1/2/14, 4/12/11, 4/12/17), or “the perfect 
person” (至人 zhiren) (1/2/2, 2/6/17, 4/9/2, 5/14/13, 5/14/14, 5/15/10, 7/21/21).  
Such people do not resist change.  They ride the tides of transformation, changing 
with the changes of the external world.  They attain the ultimate de (德之至) 
(4/10/21), i.e., they embody the Dao. 
                                                                                                                                      
(Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1994), 18-39; A.C. Graham, “How Much 
of Chuang tzu Did Chuang Tzu Write?” in Studies in Classical Chinese Thought edited by Henry 
Rosemont Jr. and Benjamin I. Schwart, Journal of the American Academy of Religion Thematic 
Issue (1979).  Chico: American Academy of Religion, 1980, 459-501. 
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To sum up, Laozi and Zhuang Zhou maintained a similar view of human 
nature, despite the absence of the word “nature” in their writings.  They based 
human nature in the Dao.  A key concept to understand their views is de, meaning 
the differentiation of the Dao in each human being, or the receipt or share of the 
Dao in each human being.  This concept bridges the Dao and its creation, making 
the transcendental Dao present in each thing.  What is the most important is that 
one should keep this de intact and possess it permanently. 
1.4.2. Human nature in the outer and miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi 
 In the outer and miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi, the issue of 
human nature is no longer mediated by the term de, though the latter is still in use.  
There the word “nature” is used directly and frequently.  In contrast with the term 
de, whose use in the Laozi indicates a prior concern with the Dao, the term 
“nature” points directly to human beings and the myriad things.  Given this, the 
frequent occurrence of the term “nature” in these chapters suggests a shift in 
Daoist concern from the Dao to human beings, or from the absolute principle to 
individual life. 
The understanding of nature in the outer and miscellaneous chapters of the 
Zhuangzi is substantive. 99   There nature is taken to refer to concrete things.  For 
                                                 
99 However, this does not mean that the metaphysical reason for human nature is entirely 
neglected in these chapters.  In several passages the term “nature” is related to the Dao, in the same 
way as it is in the Laozi and the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi.  For example, in chapter 9 it is said,  
If one identifies perfectly with ignorance, his de will not lose; if one identifies 
perfectly with dispassion, this is called pristine simplicity.  It is by being 
pristinely simple that the nature of people is fulfilled.  
同乎無知，其德不離；同乎無欲，是謂素樸；素樸而民性得矣。 
 
  This is parallel to Laozi’s view that people should have no knowledge and no desire (ch. 
3), and they should attend to the simplicity and embrace the unhewn (ch.19).  What is implied here 
is because the Dao is simple and unhewn, human nature determined by the Dao is simple and 
unhewn.   
  
 Translation is Lynn’s and altered slightly. 
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animals and inanimate things, nature pertains to their physical features and 
capacities.  For example, a horse’s hoof can withstand frozen snow and its fur can 
resist strong wind.  It feeds only on grass and water, and needs no special shielding 
(ch.9).  All these are the true nature of a horse.     
 As for human beings, nature refers to human life.  As A. C. Graham puts it, 
“nature seems to refer, not to life in general or particular lives, but to the course of 
life proper to man, in particular to health and longevity.”100  To live a life of health 
and longevity, first of all, one need correct the misunderstanding of human nature.  
No doubt, the moral understanding of human nature in Confucianism is the main 
target of Daoist criticism.  In addition, Daoists also sought to dispel another view, 
which holds human nature to be physical desires.  To them, this view is just as 
wrong as the Confucian view. 
 One can get a sense of the Daoist notion of human life from its criticism of 
other views.  Daoism conceives human life as consisting of two sides, body (身 
shen) and heart/mind (心 xin).  Only if one’s body and mind are both nurtured, can 
one live a life of health and longevity.  However, false views often mislead people 
and ruin their otherwise healthy and happy lives.  To be specific, the Confucian 
view that human nature is benevolent and righteous disturbs one’s mind, and the 
view that human nature is only physical desire damages one’s body. 
Influenced by the Confucian view, one is keen to be virtuous.  However, in 
the Daoist view, one’s enthusiasm for moral cultivation seriously damages one’s 
originally tranquil and simple mind.  Even worse, with moral cultivation being 
highly valued, people cannot realize the damage that it causes to the human mind 
                                                 
100 A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” in Studies 
in Chinese Philosophy & Philosophical Literature (The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 
Singapore, 1986), 10. 
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and life.  As reiterated in the outer and miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi, it 
is easy to know that people should not sacrifice their lives for profit, but it is hard 
to recognize that to sacrifice one’s life for reputation and morality is equally 
harmful.  People make effort to achieve various goals.  A mean man sacrifices his 
life for profit, and the sage sacrifices his life for others.  In the Daoist view, the 
two equally hurt life and damage nature (8/22/27-30, 8/23/1-5). 
 While morality disturbs the tranquility and simplicity of the human mind, 
uncontrolled physical desires damage the human body.  The view that human 
nature includes natural desires is popular during the Warring States period.  The 
lengthy debate between Mencius and Gaozi is enough to prove this.  Despite their 
sharp contrast in other aspects, Confucianism and Daoism agree that this 
misunderstands human nature.  It is dangerous, for it legitimates one’s indulgence 
in sensory pleasures.  A person obsessed with desires will lose sight of his true 
nature.  The authors of the Zhuangzi followed Laozi in saying, “the five colors 
dazzle one’s eyes, blurring one’s sight; the five sounds harass one’s ears, 
deafening one’s hearing; the five smells suffocate one’s nose, hurting one’s 
forehead; the five tastes numb one’s mouth, reducing the sensibility of one’s 
palates.  These four groups, plus moral norms, reputation, and other preferences 
that disturb human mind, are extremely harmful to human life.”(12/34/4-6)  
 To summarize, in the outer and miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi 
human nature is associated with a life of health and longevity.  To live a life of 
health and longevity, one needs to take care of both mind and body.  To be 
specific, one should dispel the Confucian conception of human nature, and thus 
free oneself from concern with moral achievement.  One also needs to refute the 
view that human nature is only physical desires and thus save oneself from 
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insatiable desires.  Maintaining one’s mind tranquil and simple and confining 
one’s body only to basic necessities, one will live a life of health and longevity. 
1.5 Two Perspectives of Human Nature: Principle vs. Substance 
 So far I have reviewed the development of the concept of human nature 
from the Warring States period to the Han dynasty in both Confucianism and 
Daoism.  In this part I bring an important theme to a close, which runs through this 
development, i.e., a contrast between the two understandings of human nature as 
principle and as substance. 
The concept of human nature, as interesting and intriguing as it is, invites 
disagreement.  As shown earlier in this chapter, scholars may debate whether a 
view is egalitarian or inegalitarian, or whether it highlights the commonality or the 
individuality of human beings.  Especially of interest to this thesis, such a review 
shows that there are two distinctive perspectives of human nature, i.e., to 
understand human nature as a principle and as a substance.  Mou Zongsan has 
approached this question in a comparative way.101  In my view, this distinction 
between the two perspectives is more fundamental, and all other disagreements 
mentioned above can be traced to it.   
Although the concepts of egalitarianism and commonality are generally 
associated with Confucianism and their opposites with Daoism, the two 
understandings of human nature as either principle or substance are not necessarily 
associated with Confucianism and Daoism respectively.  The distinction between 
                                                 
101According to Mou Zongsan, the good of human nature in Mencius’ view is absolute 
and certain, in the same way that the moral principle operates in Kant’s thought, while the good of 
human nature interpreted in terms of qi, as in Wang Chong’s case, is just a potential and cannot be 
necessarily realized.  This is one of the main themes of his book Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理 
(Taibei: Xuesheng shuju 臺北：學生書局, 1978). 
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principle and substance is actually applicable to the whole Chinese philosophical 
tradition of human nature. 
As argued before, it is not clear in the Analects whether people are alike in 
their biological or spiritual aspect.  The conceptual ambiguity in Confucius opens 
the possibility of various interpretations for later thinkers.   
The renowned scholar Mou Zongsan compares Mencius with Kant and 
proposes that Mencius interprets human nature in terms of an absolute moral 
principle.  This approach is valuable, as it introduces a comparative worldview to 
the understanding of Mencius, and more broadly, Chinese philosophy.  However, 
Mencius’ case differs significantly from that of Kant.  In other words, Mencius’ 
view of human nature is not a purely metaphysical inquiry but is based empirically 
on everyday phenomena.  Mencius did stress that human nature is the Mandate of 
Heaven, which can be considered to be a moral principle in its absoluteness and 
universality.  But he also argued long to show that human nature is simply one’s 
sympathetic feelings or senses for the suffering of others.  Such feelings or senses 
operate not purely as abstract principles but are psychological phenomena 
associated closely with one’s physical body.  Moreover, the significant role of qi 
in Mencius’ thought is also evident.  Mencius emphasized that one should nourish 
one’s haoran zhi qi (the flood-like qi 浩然之氣), which is a crucial part of moral 
cultivation.  The concept of qi came to be a popular concept in the Warring States 
period.  Although Mencius did not explicitly address the connection between 
human nature and qi, it is clear from his argument that to nourish qi is a 
fundamental part of nourishing one’s nature.  As such, Mencius seemed to 
maintain that human nature is made from the substance of qi.  Consequently, he 
seemed to understand human nature as both a principle and a substance.  But how 
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are these two understandings related to each other?  Mencius did not address this 
question.  We will see in chapter 2 that Wang Bi did.    
As for Gaozi and Xunzi, since they understood human nature as cravings 
for food and sex and desires of self-preservation respectively, which are generally 
associated with the physical body, they can be said to hold a substantive view of 
human nature. 
The case of Han Confucianism is similar yet for a subtly different reason.   
Due to the overwhelming dominance of the theory of qi endowment, Han 
Confucians produced substantive interpretations of human nature.  According to 
them, qi is the material from which human beings and human nature emerge.  
Moreover, qi decides whether one’s nature is good or bad.      
The development of the concept of human nature in early Daoist 
philosophy also shows a contrast between principle and substance.  The Laozi 
centers on the ontological base of human nature and its relation with the Dao.  As 
such, its understanding of human nature is that it is a principle, in that the Dao is 
the absolute principle determining human nature.  In contrast, in the Zhuangzi 
human nature is rarely traced to its origin.  In most passages human nature is 
defined in terms of health and longevity.  This substantive understanding of 
human nature is stated mainly in the outer and miscellaneous chapters of the 
Zhuangzi.  The inner chapters may reflect a transitional stage between the two 
understandings.  They are closer to the Laozi, as they contain no reference of the 
term “nature” but use the term de; meanwhile an intense concern for a life free of 
worry and bitterness also pervades the outer and miscellaneous chapters.   
 The contrast between principle and substance reflects a shift in Daoist 
concern from the Dao to human beings.  The Laozi is an enquiry into the origin 
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and the absolute principle of the universe: the Dao.  It devotes most of its passages 
to portraying the nature and the power of the Dao.  Although human beings and 
human affairs are discussed in the text, one has the impression that this discussion 
is only for illustrating the power of the Dao.  Given this, it is not surprising that 
Laozi’s understanding of human nature is quite abstract, since he was largely 
concerned with the reason for the existence of human beings.  However, this 
abstract understanding seems hard to comprehend.  That is, it is unclear how to 
fuse the abstract nature, as the endowment of the Dao, with the physical body.  
We will see in chapter 2 that Wang Bi produced an innovative explanation of this 
problem. 
 However, the authors of the Zhuangzi would not confront this problem, as 
they simply focused their attention on the human world.  To be more specific, they 
were concerned with how to live life in accordance with the Dao.  The Dao here 
refers to a principle of transformation, which is subtly different from the 
metaphysical principle in the Laozi.  Realizing that the world is in constant 
transformation, people are not disturbed by their losses and gains.  Even 
benevolence and righteousness are transient customs.  Consequently, freeing one’s 
mind from prejudice and keeping one’s sense organs only for the bare necessities 
of life, one lives a peaceful life free of worry and bitterness. 
 Later in the Wei-Jin period, absorbing nutrients from both Confucianism, 
Han Confucianism in particular, and early Daoism, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang made 
the contrast in understanding human nature and the Dao, as mentioned above, 
more evident in their respective commentaries on the Laozi and the Zhuangzi.  
This will be explored in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 2 Wang Bi: NatureDao and Natureqi  
 
 
Arguably the brightest star in the intellectual circle of the Wei-Jin period, 
Wang Bi (王弼 A.D. 226-249) represents a new height in the development of 
Chinese philosophy.  Within a short lifespan of 24 years, Wang Bi produced 
highly significant commentaries on two of the most enduring works of Chinese 
philosophy, the Laozi and the Yijing.  He also wrote a commentary on the Analects, 
but only a few fragments of that text are extant.  His commentary on the Laozi, in 
particular, made Wang Bi legendary during his lifetime, and he has been seen as 
one of the most important commentators up to the present day.102 
Just as in Chinese literati painting, what is most individual in a person can 
only emerge in and through ritualized expression,103 many Chinese philosophers 
have to construct their own philosophical thought through interpreting the almost 
ritualized classics—the Analects, the Laozi, and the Zhuangzi. Wang Bi shows 
himself to be an innovative and critically independent philosopher, although he 
works within the tradition of commentarial writing.  In his interpretation of the 
fundamental theme of the Laozi, i. e., the Dao, Wang Bi developed an elaborate 
philosophical conception of Nonbeing.  His arguments on the nature of Nonbeing, 
the relationship between Nonbeing and beings, “root and branch” (benmo本末), 
and “substance and function” (tiyong 體用) bestow upon Wei-Jin thought an 
unparalleled metaphysical depth. 
                                                 
102 For Wang Bi’s biography and other background historical materials, see Lou Yulie 樓
宇烈, Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋 (Beijing: zhonghua shuju 北京中華書局, 1980, 1999), 639-
648; Wang Xiaoyi 王曉毅, Wang Bi pingzhuan 王弼評傳 (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press 南
京大學出版社, 1996), 166-192.  Also see Richard J. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 5-
20; Rudolf G. Wagner, The Craft of A Chinese Commentator, 9-26.     
 




This chapter examines Wang Bi’s distinctive ideas of human nature.  It is 
my proposal that Wang Bi understood human nature as consisting of two parts, 
natureDao and natureqi.  NatureDao is the differentiation of the Dao in each human 
being, while natureqi is the substance that forms human nature materially.  The 
significance of this distinction lies in that it solves a key problem existing in Han 
Confuciansim.  Han Confucians generally agreed that human nature is a mixture 
of good and evil, but they failed to present a convincing explanation of that 
mixture.  They did formulate a theory of qi endowment to account for the 
hybridity of human nature, but, as pointed out in chapter 1, qi endowment varies 
not only in degree but also in kind.  In other words, according to this theory, a 
person is good, because he is endowed with benevolent qi; he is more benevolent 
than others, because he is gifted with more benevolent qi.  Obviously, this kind of 
argument is rather circular.  However, as we will see later, Wang Bi, by his 
distinction between natureDao and natureqi, was able to answer such questions that 
faced the Han Confucians clearly and convincingly, i.e., the question of the 
hybridity of human nature and that of the commonality and diversity of human 
beings.  I will discuss this point at length later. 
The first part of chapter 2 begins with an examination of the concept of the 
Dao and that of nature, which aims to show how the former bears decisively on 
the latter.  Then I clarify the role of qi in Wang Bi’s concept of human nature.  
This is important because it is widely accepted that Wang Bi represents a 
complete break with the qi cosmology of the Han.  However, my examination 
shows that qi still remains important in him, as it is the substance that forms 
human nature.  The second part of chapter 2 focuses on the relationship between 
nature and feeling.  My submission is that in Wang Bi’s view, natureDao is beyond 
 71
good and evil, whilst feeling is subject to moral judgment.  Whether feeling is 
good or bad depends on whether it is subordinate to natureDao.  The last part is 
mainly built on the debate between He Yan and Wang Bi on whether the sage has 
feelings.  It is about the nature of the sage and whether sagehood is inborn.  The 
sage exceeds the common people in his spirituality (shenming 神明).  So whether 
sagehood is inborn comes to be whether spirituality is inborn.  I propose that 
Wang Bi not only attributed spirituality to natureqi, which he inherited from his 
predecessors, but also stressed that it is informed by the Dao, which proves to be 
his own original contribution.  As such, spirituality pertains to a full rediscovery 
of one’s natureDao and a thorough comprehension of the Dao.  As spirituality is 
based on special refined qi and involves a high degree of intelligence, both of 
which are inborn, sagehood is then inborn. 
2.1. NatureDao: Human Authenticity and Natureqi: Human Substance 
2.1.1. The formless and nameless Dao: Nonbeing  
Before dealing with Wang Bi’s view of nature, it is necessary to look into 
his conception of the Dao.  Wang Bi interpreted the Dao as Nonbeing, for it is 
both formless and nameless, and he also interpreted the Dao as empty and still, 
which has a decisive bearing on his view of nature. 
The concept of the Dao is not exclusive to Daoism, but it holds the central 
position in Daoist thought, as the concept of ren (仁 benevolence) does in 
Confucianism.   In particular, the Laozi sketches the fundamental aspects of the 
Dao, which comes to be the chief source of inspiration for later Daoist thinkers.  
Wang Bi tried to reveal the great meaning hidden between the lines of the Laozi, 
which is, in his words, “to esteem the root and rest the branches (chongben ximo
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崇本息末).”104  The root is a metaphor for the Dao.  Wang Bi made every effort to 
illustrate the philosophical significance of the Dao, the most distinctive and 
innovative of which is the interpretation of the Dao as Nonbeing.  
The creativity of the Dao is highlighted in the Laozi; Wang Bi formulated 
a detailed explanation of this creativity.  In other words, he aimed to give a clear 
answer to the question: how can the Dao create the myriad things?  His answer is 
that the Dao is Nonbeing, which is both formless and nameless. 
The physical world abounds with things that can be felt by the sense 
organs.  People recognize the existence of things by perceiving their physical 
properties, forms, colors, smells, and sounds, for example.  But Wang Bi found 
that it is impossible to trace the origin of things within the physical world itself, 
which leads only to infinite regress.  If there is something that qualifies as the 
origin of things, it must be beyond the physical world and completely different 
from things in this world.  As things are normally construed as having physical 
properties, the origin of things must be a reality without any such properties.105  
Only then is it capable of “serving as the progenitor and master of things in all 
their different categories, of covering and permeating everything in Heaven and 
Earth.”106  
                                                 
104 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 198; Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 37.   
 
105 As Wang Bi illustrates,  
If it (the origin of things, the Dao) were warm, it could not be cold; if it were the 
note gong (宮), it could not be the note shang (商).  If it had a form, it could 
necessarily be distinguished from other things, if it made a sound, it would 
necessarily belong somewhere among other sounds. 
若溫也則不能涼矣，宮也則不能商矣。形必有所分，聲必有所屬。 
 
Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 195; Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 30.   
 
106 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 195; Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 30.   
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Besides being formless, the Dao is also nameless.  These two 
characteristics of the Dao are not isolated from each other.  The relationship 
between them is a causal one.  Because the Dao is formless, it is nameless.  
According to Wang Bi, the name of a thing is used to define the form of the thing 
(名以定形).107  Name and form always emerge concomitantly.  If one thing has a 
form, there must be a name to define this form; similarly, if a name is used, it must 
point to a form.  Since the Dao does not have form, it does not have name. 
However, in Wang Bi’s treatment, the namelessness of the Dao takes on 
greater philosophical complexity.  On the opening line of the Laozi, Wang Bi 
commented,  
The Dao that can be spoken and the name that can be named point 
to things and describe forms, but neither of them is in constancy.  
The Dao can neither be spoken nor named.  
可道之道，可名之名，指事造形， 非其常也。故不可道不可名
也。108 
This quotation suggests that Wang Bi also considered the Dao to be unnamable.  
Then the question that arises is how to understand the Dao as both nameless and 
unnamable.109  
At first sight, the Dao is unnamable may mean that one is unable to give a 
name to the Dao.  This understanding holds the incapability of human beings 
                                                 
107 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 63; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 95. 
 
108 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 1; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 51.  
 
109 I have benefited from A. T. Nuyen on this question, although we discuss it from 
different perspectives.  Nuyen proposes that the Dao is nameless because it is unnamable, not even 
as “the nameless,” and the Dao is unnamable because the nature of the Dao is paradoxical.  See A. 




responsible for the namelessness of the Dao.  However, I am afraid that this is not 
Wang Bi’s point.  
There are indeed some things in the physical world that one cannot name at 
present.  But it is necessary to point out that the namelessness of these things is 
different from that of the Dao.  Generally speaking, the physical world consists of 
two groups of things, those with tangible forms, for example, human beings, 
animals, and planets, and those without forms, for example, emotions.  The former 
have names in accordance with their forms.  As for the latter, the situation is more 
complicated.  Despite being formless, some of them can be named but others 
cannot.  For example, in most cases a person can name the feelings that he or she 
has experienced, which are normally categorized as joy, anger, sadness and delight.  
But on some occasions one may feel a mixture of sadness and delight, or of love 
and hatred.  As a Chinese saying goes, one feels like that the five sauce pots are 
overturned, with the sour, sweet, bitter, hot and salty tastes all mixed up.  At this 
point it is hard to find an appropriate word with which to communicate this 
complicated feeling.  In other words, one cannot give it a name, thus it stays 
nameless.  
However, although a thing in the physical world is nameless at present, this 
does not mean that it is nameless permanently.  A thing is nameless probably for 
the following reasons: the language in its current stage of development is 
inadequate to communicate it, or one is not proficient in the language to name it.  
However, this does not exclude the possibility that it might be named in the near 
or distant future.  With the development of language and human intelligence, a 
name suited to that thing will be found sooner or later.  It is just a matter of time.  
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In light of this, although some things in the physical world are currently nameless, 
they are potentially namable.  
The case of the Dao, however, is completely different.  The Dao cannot be 
named because of its nature.  Wang Bi says, the name of a thing is determined by 
the thing itself, whereas the descriptions of it are issued by human beings (名生乎
彼，稱出乎我).110  In light of this argument, that the Dao is nameless is also 
decided by the Dao itself.  On the one hand, the Dao as the origin of beings is 
beyond the physical world.  Since language applies only to the physical world, as 
Wang Bi seems to hold, the Dao is beyond the regime of language.  On the other 
hand, as A. T. Nuyen puts it, the nature of the Dao is paradoxical,111 for example, 
the Dao is both transcendental and immanent, both the weakest and the most 
powerful, therefore no language can accurately communicate the profundity of the 
Dao.  Although various terms are employed to convey the Dao, for example, 
profundity (xuan 玄), depth (shen 深), greatness (da 大), subtlety (wei 微), and 
remoteness (yuan遠), they are only descriptions of this ontological reality.  They 
may help one to comprehend that reality, but can never exhaust its true meaning.  
Consequently, the namelessness of the Dao has nothing to do with the 
development of language.   
To summarize, that the Dao is nameless can be understood from two 
perspectives: (1) the Dao is formless, so it is nameless; (2) the nature of the Dao 
cannot be communicated accurately by language, so the Dao is nameless.  In other 
words, because the Dao is intrinsically unnamable, it is nameless forever. 
                                                 
110 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 197; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 36.   
 




Being formless and nameless, the Dao is also interpreted as emptiness (xu
虛 or kong空) and stillness (jing靜).  In many passages, emptiness is used as a 
synonym for Nonbeing, since both convey the meaning of being devoid of any 
physical properties.  But one’s understanding of emptiness should not stop here.  
Clearly, “emptiness” is intended primarily to communicate the operative principle 
of the Dao, i.e., the principle of non-action.  “Non-action” means not purposively 
doing something, letting things pursue their proper courses freely and not 
artificially interfering with them.  The principle of non-action shows how the Dao 
deals with its creation.  
To illustrate this principle in terms of emptiness, let me take an example.  
One grows up within a fabric of knowledge and opinions.  These form the 
preconditions for one’s judgment.  When A meets B, A may assume that B comes 
from a certain region because of his accent, or that B is a white-collar worker 
according to his attire, or that B is cheerful as there is always a smile on his face.  
Before A can make such assumptions, the knowledge about accent, clothes, or the 
connection between smile and cheerful temperament must have already been 
formed in A.  Only in this way can A judge how B appears.  In this regard, A does 
not keep an empty mind when meeting B.  
The case of the Dao is quite different.  Although esteemed as the creator of 
the myriad things, the Dao does not impose on them.  The Dao itself is beyond the 
dichotomy of beautiful and ugly, right and wrong, like and dislike; so it does not 
make any differentiation among things or show any partiality for certain things.  
There is no preference in the Dao.  Contrasted with A, who is full of knowledge 
and opinions, the Dao is empty.  Such emptiness, without preferences and 
therefore contention, is absolutely still.  The emptiness and stillness of the Dao is 
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crucial to Wang Bi’s understanding of human nature.  This will become evident in 
the following examination. 
2.1.2. NatureDao: what is authentic in the human being 
The character 性 (nature, xing) is not found in the Laozi, but it occurs 21 
times in Wang Bi’s commentary.  Although Wang Bi, like the author of the Laozi, 
was primarily concerned with Nonbeing (the Dao), he kept an eye on Nonbeing’s 
creation: human beings and the myriad things.  According to Wang Bi, to keep the 
physical world in harmony, the only way is to comprehend Nonbeing and return to 
it.   In other words, Wang Bi exalted Nonbeing intentionally for the sake of the 
physical world.  Therefore, rather than placing an overwhelming emphasis on 
Nonbeing, Wang Bi intended to construct an ideal relationship between Nonbeing 
and beings.112  Nonbeing is esteemed for creating beings, but only through beings 
is the creativity of Nonbeing recognized.  In this light, beings are significant in 
their own right.  Given this, Wang Bi cannot but include the issue of human nature 
within his philosophical horizon, since ideally human nature is a perfect reflection 
of the Dao.  
The concept of de is the key to understanding the relationship between 
Nonbeing and beings, or that between the Dao and (the nature of) things.  Since 
the Dao is the ontological basis for the existence of the myriad things, it follows 
that the former decides the nature of the latter, or in other words, xing derives from 
the Dao in the sense of an ontological foundation.113  On the other hand, the Dao 
                                                 
112 This will bear on his understanding of the nature of the sage and his spirituality, which 
I will discuss in the third part of this chapter. 
 
113 Qian Mu錢穆 pointed out that the Dao is the principle that makes things what they are 
(suoyiran zhi li所以然之理), the original principle of things (benran zhi li本然之理), as well as 
the necessary principle of things (biran zhi li必然之理).  See his paper, “Wang Bi Guo Xiang 
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is not only beyond but also within the myriad things.  Thus, the Dao present in 
each thing forms the nature of that thing.  At this stage of the argument, the 
concept of de is taken as synonymous with xing, since de is generally understood 
as what things receive from the Dao.  Wang Bi says,  
The Dao is what things come from; de is what things receive.  
Following the Dao, things attain de, thus they cannot but esteem the 




As argued in chapter 1, the concept of de conveys a similar meaning as 
nature (xing) in the Laozi.  Wang Bi basically followed the Laozi in this usage; but 
a subtle difference is still discernable.  The character xing (nature) does not occur 
in the Laozi; thus, there is no way to obtain a clear definition of xing from it.  Now, 
if de is taken to be synonymous with xing, as some scholars suggest, 115  the 
argument would be quite simply that xing should be understood as de in the sense 
of what a person is endowed with naturally.  However, in Wang Bi’s case, as I 
will show later, since xing encompasses two parts, natureDao and natureqi, it is 
necessary to make clear whether de is taken to refer to natureDao or natureqi, or 
both.  It is significant that Wang Bi stressed the dependence of de on the Dao, 
which seems to suggest that the concept of de points to the Dao part of human 
nature.  However, one may counter that since the Dao creates everything, 
                                                                                                                                      
zhuyilaozhang yonglizi tiaolu” 王弼郭象注易老莊用理字條錄, Xinya xuebao 新亞學報, 1.1 
(1955): 136.  
114 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 137; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 149.  
 
115 See footnote 93, chapter 1, p 55. 
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including the constitutive qi of human beings, de should also cover the qi part of 
human nature, i.e., natureqi.  The argument presented here is that the distinction 
between natureDao and natureqi, which sets apart a metaphysical understanding of 
the Dao from a cosmological understanding of it, remains decisive in Wang Bi’s 
thinking.  Although the two can never be acturally separated, they are 
conceptually distinct.  It is clear that Wang Bi limited the use of de to the 
metaphysical sphere of the Dao, as shown above.  In this respect, I propose that de 
refers to specifically the endowed Dao part of human beings.   
The Dao defines human nature.  Since the Dao is ziran (naturalness or 
spontaneity 自然), human nature is ziran too.116 In general Wang Bi took the 
concept of ziran to describe the nature of the Dao and that of the myriad things 
including human beings.117  But the concept of ziran has subtly different meanings 
when applied to the Dao, things, and human beings respectively.  In the case of 
the Dao, it primarily points to a metaphysical principle engendering and sustaining 
the physical world.  Meanwhile, the Dao is also within the physical world.  
Especially, when the Dao penetrates the sociopolitical scene, ziran refers to a 
principle of non-action, which is a pragmatic method of governing.  I will return to 
this point in chapter 4.   
When ziran applies to things, it means a principle of development innate in 
things.  There is no clear distinction between human beings and all other things in 
Daoism; the term “wuxing” (the nature of things 物性) is generally used, which 
                                                 
116 In many cases, the Dao is defined in terms of ziran and wuwei.  Although ziran and 
wuwei can be used as both a noun and an adjective, this difference in word class does not cause 
any substantive change in the explanation of the Dao.  In other words, either ziran and wuwei are 
synonyms of the Dao depending on various contexts, or they describe the attribute or feature of the 
Dao. 
 
117 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 77; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 105. 
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encompasses the nature of human beings.  Even though, one can still discern a 
difference between the nature of things and that of human beings with respect to 
ziran.  The ziran of things pertains to an innate principle or way of development.  
For example, Wang Bi says, “No stifling the nature of things, then they fulfill 
themselves”; 118  “things have their constant nature; if one deliberately does 
something with them, one will lose”.119  Or as A. C. Graham puts it, the nature of 
a thing is “its proper course of development during its process of sheng (life
生 ).” 120  A thing will reach its end in accordance with its own principle of 
development.  Any interference with this development, even if it is out of good 
intentions, is unwelcome.    
In the case of human nature, ziran pertains to what is authentic in human 
beings.  Wang Bi hardly used the terms “human nature” and “the nature of human 
beings.”  Instead, he employs the terms “authenticity” (zhen真), “the One” (yi一), 
“the uncarved block” (pu樸), “emptiness” (xu虛 or kong空), and “stillness” (jing
靜) to interpret human nature.   
The Chinese character zhen 真 means what is true, real, genuine, and 
authentic; its opposite jia假 meaning the false, the wrong, and the unreal.  Just as 
the pairs of “the One” vs. “the many (duo 多 ),” “the uncarved block” vs. 
superficiality, emptiness vs. fullness, and stillness vs. disturbance make evident, 
Wang Bi sought to draw a contrast between the true nature of human beings and 
                                                 
118 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 24; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 67. 
 
119 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 77; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 105. 
 
  120 A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” in Studies 
in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (the Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 
Singapore, 1986), 10. 
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what he considered to be the false views of human nature, the Confucian view in 
particular. 
The One is the authenticity of human beings.121  As Wang Bi observes,   
 One should make the One the master.  How could the One ever be 
discarded?  The more one has, the farther one is [from the One], but 
being diminished gets one closer to it [the One].  When diminution 
goes as far as it can go, one obtains the Ultimate.  
以一爲主，一何可舍？愈多愈遠，損則近之，損之至盡，乃得
其極。122 
To illustrate the opposition between the One and the many, Wang Bi also used the 
metaphor of a tree. 
The way of ziran is just like a tree.  The more branches a tree has, 
the farther the branches are from the roots; the fewer branches it has, 
the closer they are to the root.  The more one has, the farther one is 
from one’s authenticity.  Therefore one is confused.  The less one 




“The many” is taken to refer to knowledge, desire, fame, self-interest, and 
all other mundane things that people are normally concerned with.  In Wang Bi’s 
                                                 
121 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 22; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 65. 
 
122 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 117; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 135. 
 
123 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 56; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 89. 
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view, if one is distracted by these things, one will lose sight of one’s nature; if one 
is clear of them, one maintains one’s authenticity. 
Wang Bi also used “the uncarved block” (pu樸) to explain the authenticity 
of human beings.  He commented on the Laozi 28: 
The uncarved block means authenticity.  When what is authentic is 
shattered, many ways and types (of being) are born.  It is just like 
various vessels.  Considering that people are in dismissal, the sage 
appoints officers for them.  He takes the good as teachers, and the 
bad as material (to learn from); he changes their habits and 




When the Dao declined, there came the discriminations of different works 
and opinions.  To avoid disorder and confusion, the sage invented institutions to 
manage things and transform people, one part of which was rites and morality.  
Wang Bi drew a contrast between the Dao (the uncarved block) and sociopolitical 
institutions (the vessels).  Since the latter was founded after the Dao shattered, 
they were less valuable than Confucianism claimed.  Morality, in particular, did 
not characterize the authentic nature of human beings, as it was in Confucianism.  
The word pu (the uncarved block) can be understood in terms of 
“substance” (質 zhi).  Both pertain to an original state of something prior to any 
external work being done to it.  Even in modern Chinese, the combination of 
                                                 
124 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 75; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 103. 
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“substance” and “the uncarved block”, zhipu 質樸 , is still popularly used to 
describe a person who is simple, plain, unsophisticated, and unadorned. 
Related to this point, Confucius insists that a gentleman should be a perfect 
blend of wen (文) and zhi (質).  Generally speaking, wen refers to elegant manners, 
proficiency in literature and the arts, whereas zhi points to a substance, a kind of 
raw material that is simple and natural.  While a person can cultivate his wen 
through education, his zhi is an innate quality that is stable throughout his life and 
will not be affected too much by environment.  According to Confucius, without 
zhi, wen will degenerate into meaningless superficiality.  The connotation of pu in 
Wang Bi’s writings is similar to that of zhi in the Analects.  However, what 
Confucius considered to be necessary, i. e., wen, is rejected by Wang Bi.  
Originally, human nature is simple, which is a prefect reflection of the Dao 
in human beings.  It is in simple harmony because it has very few requirements.  
But with the invention of the various institutions by the sage, people are caught in 
the strife for fame and profit.  To take the example of morality, people initially 
have no knowledge of good and evil.  But once the moral norms are established, 
they begin to conduct themselves intentionally, in hope of attaining fame and 
profit.  Eventually, the primitive harmony of human nature is ruined.  The mind of 
the human being is crammed with discrimination, judgment, desire, intrigue, and 
conspiracy.  When people get used to it, they take it for granted that this is the 
“true” state of human nature, but forget what the original and real human nature is.  
In this context, it is easy to understand why Wang Bi reiterated the significance of 
the authenticity of human beings.   
Besides “the One” and “the uncarved block,” Wang Bi also used the terms 
“emptiness” and “stillness” to convey what he construed to be the true nature of 
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human beings.  Wang Bi considered human nature to be empty, for it is 
completely devoid of anything like discrimination, judgment, preference, and 
desire.  Human nature is still in that it maintains the original empty state and is 
indifferent to things like knowledge, desire, fame, and self-interest.  In this regard, 
Wang Bi held that knowledge and desires do not form a part of human authenticity.  
An authentic person is an “ignorant” person.  However, an ignorant person should 
not be understood as illiterate or uneducated.  On the contrary, in Wang Bi’s view, 
an ignorant person has attained a thorough comprehension of the Dao, which is 
free of thought and theory.  He pays no attention to ordinary knowledge and 
material achievement.  He does have common knowledge, after all, it is simply 
inconceivable that a normal person is born in a cultural vacuum or he knows 
nothing about the conventional values of his culture.  But being entirely concerned 
with comprehending Daoist wisdom, he simply attaches no significance to them.  
As a result, he may not write, read, talk, discuss, or in any other way, the worldly 
topics, which makes him look ignorant in the eyes of the world.  To summarize, an 
ignorant person in the Daoist sense knows ordinary knowledge but does not care 
about it.  He is only interested in the most profound wisdom of the Dao. 
According to Wang Bi, being empty and still is not only the true nature of 
human beings but also a method by which one can discover one’s true nature.  He 
commented on the Laozi 16: 
That is, “to attain emptiness” is the ultimate [nature] of things; “to 
maintain tranquility” is the true [nature] of things.  Things move and 
grow.  Maintaining emptiness and tranquility, one sees the 
movement of things in circles: things arise from emptiness; motions 
arise from tranquility.  Therefore, although the myriad things 
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transform, in the end they return to emptiness and tranquility.  This 




Two points need to be noted of the above passage.  Firstly, having an 
empty and still mind, one is sensitive to the Dao and is more likely to comprehend 
it.  If one’s mind is crammed with desires and prejudices, one is unable to 
concentrate on the Dao.  Only an empty mind can fully appreciate the function of 
the Dao, in the same way as a perfect mirror reflects a thing without the least 
distortion.  
Secondly, although human nature is still, it should not be understood as 
totally static, as human nature tends to “attain emptiness” and “maintain 
tranquility”.  Human nature actually has its own function or ability.  I will return 
to this issue in the second part of this chapter, where I will show that human 
nature does have a capability, but a limited capability. 
To summarize, in Wang Bi’s interpretation, human nature has its 
metaphysical origin in the Dao.  The Dao decides human nature; the Dao is ziran, 
so human nature is ziran.  Ziran is what is authentic in human beings.  Wang Bi 
employed the concepts of “the One”, “the uncarved block”, and “emptiness and 
stillness” to illustrate the authenticity of human beings.   By this illustration he 
tried to dispute the Confucian view of human nature, which crams superfluous 
notions, such as benevolence and righteousness, into human beings.   
2.1.3. Qi (vital energy): the substance that making human nature 
                                                 
125 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 35-36; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 75. 
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It has been a widely accepted position that Wang Bi broke with the qi 
cosmology prevalent in the Han dynasty and built up a metaphysical framework 
based on the concept of Nonbeing,126  which seems to indicate that qi plays no role 
in Wang Bi’s thought.  However, this does not stand up to careful scrutiny.  
Lin Lizhen has pointed out that the concept of qi remains crucial to Wang 
Bi.127  On Confucius’ famous statement, “By nature people are alike, through 
practice they are apart”, Wang Bi commented that “people are alike in that human 
nature is neither good nor evil, but they differ in that human nature is either thick 
or thin.”128  In Lin’s view, Wang Bi understood human nature as an endowment of 
qi.  People are alike in that qi has no moral assets; and they are different, for the 
endowed qi varies from one person to another in both quality and quantity.129  
It is noteworthy that Lin recognizes the role of qi in Wang Bi’s conception 
of human nature, but the plausibility of her argument is weakened for the 
following reasons.  First, her understanding of human nature as an endowment of 
qi fails to address the core of Wang Bi’s conception of human nature.  I have 
shown that Wang Bi was mainly concerned with the differentiation of the Dao in 
each human being, which constitutes the nature or authenticity of each human 
being, in the same way as morality does in the Mencius.  Although qi is a part of 
human nature, it is not decisive.  
                                                 
126 Tang Yongtong 湯用彤, Wei-Jin xuanxue lungao 魏晉玄學論稿, 59-65. 
 
127 Lin Lizhen 林麗真, “Wang Bi ‘xing qi xing’ shuo xilun” 王弼 ‘性其情’說析論, in 
Wang Shumin xiansheng bashi shouqing lunwenji 王叔岷先生八十壽慶論文集 (Taibei: Daan 
chubanshe臺北：大安出版社，1993), 599-609. 
 
128 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 632. 
 
129 Lin Lizhen 林麗真, “Wang Bi ‘xing qi xing’ shuo xilun” 王弼 ‘性其情’說析論, 602. 
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Second, it is questionable that qi does not have any moral assets, as Lin 
holds.  I instead see the theory of qi as an example illustrating one characteristic of 
Chinese philosophy, i.e., the blending of value and fact.  For many Han 
Confucians, being intelligent or stupid, having civil or martial ability, and being 
virtuous or not are all determined by the variance in endowment of qi.  Even 
though it is unclear how the variance of qi (a judgment of fact) results in being 
virtuous or not (a judgment of value), there is a clear implication that qi does have 
moral assets.  As argued in chapter 1, the difference in endowment of qi is a 
difference not only in degree but also in kind.  One person endowed with qi of 
benevolence becomes virtuous, while another endowed with qi of deviance 
becomes vicious.  Evidently, qi does have moral assets within it.  
Third, if one approaches human nature merely from the moral perspective 
of good and evil, as Lin does, one misses the essential point of Wang Bi’s 
interpretation of human nature.  That is, human nature as the share of the Dao in 
the human being is beyond good and evil.  This point will be examined in detail 
later.  
So far as the role of qi in Wang Bi’s thought is concerned, two passages 
are noteworthy. One is his commentary on the Analects 17:2, as quoted above.  
The other is from his commentary on the Laozi: 42 and reads, 
The birth of the myriad things, I know its master (the Dao); 
although they have myriad forms, they are similar in coming out of 
qi. 
故萬物之生，吾知其主；雖有萬形，沖氣一焉。130 
                                                 
130 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 117; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 135. 
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Combining this passage with other passages on the Dao, one gets Wang Bi’s 
cosmology: the physical world logically originates from the Dao, and is materially 
made from qi.  Under this cosmology, human nature is a combination of the 
metaphysical share of the Dao and the physical substance of qi.  
In light of this combination, we get a fresh understanding of Wang Bi’s 
commentary on the Analects 17:2.  Human nature, as the de (receipt or share) of 
human beings from the Dao, is beyond good and evil.  The Chinese term “wushan 
wue 無善無惡” translates literally as “neither good nor evil.” but Wang Bi used 
this term not to express neutrality between good and evil.  Rather, he intended to 
show that human nature, in its authentic state as determined by the Dao, is beyond 
the kind of discrimination that good and evil are involved.131  On the other hand, 
the qi part of human nature varies from one person to another both in kind and in 
degree, which accounts for the differences of human beings.      
                                                 
131 Wang Bi made lengthy discussion to show that both the Dao and the sage, who 
embodied the Dao, did not make any discrimination among things.  Since human nature is decided 
by the Dao, it is also devoid of any sense or knowledge of good and evil.  To take some instances 
of Wang Bi’s discussions, it is said, 
 
The mother of the five teachings is neither bright nor dark, neither kind nor cruel.  
五教之母, 不曒不昧,不恩不傷。 
 
Heaven and earth allows things to follow their natural bent and neither engage in 
conscious effort nor start anything, leaving the myriad things to manage 
themselves.  Thus they “are not benevolent.”  The benevolent have to establish 
institutions and influence behavior, for they are prone to use kindness and make 
conscious effort.  
天地任自然, 無爲無造, 萬物自相治理, 故不仁也。仁者必造化立施, 有恩有
爲。 
 
This is why the person of superior virtue only functions in accordance with the 
Dao.  He does not regard his virtue as virtue.... The person of inferior virtue 
establishes goodness as the way to keeping things in order.  
上德之人, 唯道是用, 不德其德。…下德立善以治物。 
 
Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 195, 13, 93; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 




I have examined the concepts of the Dao, nature, and qi in Wang Bi’s 
thought.  To summarize the relationships between them: (1) Human nature 
consists of two parts, i.e., the part of the Dao (henceforth I use natureDao to refer to 
the Dao aspect of human nature) and that of qi (henceforth natureqi for the qi 
aspect of human nature).  They should not be seen as actually separate but 
conceptually distinguishable from each other.  (2) The Dao is the metaphysical 
basis for human nature, while qi is the material constituent of human nature.  (3) 
The Dao and qi respectively account for the commonality and the multiplicity of 
human beings.  (4) It is the Dao part of human nature that basically defines human 
beings. 
2.2. The Relationship between Nature and Feeling: NatureDao Guides Natureqi  
2.2.1. Pervious views of the relationship between nature and feeling   
The Chinese character qing 情 normally translates as feeling or emotion.  
But this translation does not exhaust what is communicated by qing 情 .  In 
different contexts 情 also means “fact,” “nature,” “desires,” “preference,” and 
“innate tendecy.”  A. C. Graham proposes that qing never means “passion” in Pre-
Han literature; rather, it conveys the meaning of “fact,” “genuine,” and 
“genuinely.”  The meaning of passion or desire was not prevalent until much later, 
when Buddhism became established in China.132   
However, available evidence in Pre-Han literature does suggest that 情
qing means not only feeling but also desire.  Graham’s explanation of qing情 is 
                                                 
 
132 A. C. Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Chinese Philosophical Literature, 
59; Chad Hansen, “Qing (Emotions) 情 in pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” in Emotions in Asian 
thought edited by Joel Marks & Roger T. Ames (State University of New York Press, 1995), 194. 
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certainly applicable to Mencius.  For example, Mencius said, “as far as one’s real 
condition (qing情) is concerned, one can be morally good [6A:6].”  Probably for 
this reason, the Qing philosopher Dai Zhen (戴震 1723-1777) stated that the word 
qing in the Mencius does not mean feeling, but original substance and fact.133  
However, counter examples are also evident.  For example, Xunzi wrote, “the 
form [of man] shapes and the spirit [of man] generates; like, dislike, joy, anger, 
sadness, and pleasure are within him, this is what we call his natural qing (形具而
神生, 好惡喜怒哀樂臧焉, 夫是之謂天情).”134  A definition of qing is also found 
in the Liji 禮記.  It reads, “What is human qing?  It is joy, anger, sadness, fear, 
love, hatred, and desire.  All these are innate.”135  These passages show clearly 
that both feeling and desire are constituents of qing in pre-Han literature.   
Despite the various meanings of qing 情, the discussion below confines 
simply to that of feeling and deviant feeling, i.e., desire.  The relationship between 
nature and feeling is an intriguing question that has attracted a great deal of 
philosophical attention in the history of Chinese philosophy.  Before Wang Bi, 
three thinkers’ views are most noteworthy.  They are Xunzi, Dong Zhongshu, and 
Liu Xiang.  Xunzi might be the first to make a clear distinction of nature, feeling, 
and desire.  He said, “Nature is the product of Heaven, feeling is the substance of 
nature, desire is the response of feeling.” As already discussed in Chapter 1, 
                                                 
133 Dai Zhen 戴震, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng 孟子字義疏證 (Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 
1982), 41. 
 
134 Xunzi jijie荀子集解, vol. 11，On Heaven天論篇, 318.  Burton Watson, Basic 
Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsun Tzu, and Han Fei Ztu, 1967, 80; John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation 
and Study of the Complete Works, vol.3: 16. 
 
135 The Liji禮記, annoted by Zheng Xuan鄭玄 (Taiwan: Zhonghua shuju 臺灣：中華書
局，1981), 7.  
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although Xunzi conceptually distinguished nature, feeling, and desire, the three in 
fact refer to one thing.136  
Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) is probably a pioneer to explain nature and 
feeling in terms of good and evil.  According to him, human nature has two 
aspects, nature and feeling, which correspond to the yang and yin of Heaven 
respectively.  Because yangqi is benevolent and yinqi is malevolent, nature is good 
whereas feeling is bad.  This view of nature and feeling was influential in the 
development of Chinese philosophy.  The debate between He Yan and Wang Bi 
on whether the sage has feelings is believed to stem from their different 
approaches to this view.  I will return to this in the third part of this chapter. 
Liu Xiang is probably the first to explain nature and feeling by employing 
morally netural concepts: the internal and the external (neiwai 內外), motion and 
stillness (dongjing動靜), and the incipient and the fully realized (weifa 未發 yifa
已發).  He says, 
Man’s nature is as it is because it is inborn; it remains within his 
person and is not expressed.  His feelings are as they are because 
they result from contact with things; they take form externally.  
 性，生而然者也，在於身而不發；情，接於物而然者也，形出
於外。137 
Unlike Dong Zhongshu, who drew a clear line between nature and feeling 
and held that the former is good and the latter bad, Liu Xiang thought that the two 
resonate with each other.  Since nature is a mixture of good and evil, feeling 
                                                 
136 See footnote 77 in Chapter 1, p.44. 
 
137 Huang Hui黃暉， Lunheng jiaoshi論衡校釋, vol.1: 133; A Source Book, 295. I thank 
Lynn for his advice on the translation. 
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should not be completely evil.  In this respect Liu Xiang’s view sounds more 
reasonable in that it acknowledges the role of feeling in one’s life.  Besides, Liu 
Xiang envisioned human nature to be active.  It intends to make contact with 
things and to express itself externally.  So it is inevitable that inner nature 
becomes externally expressed feeling.  It is also noteworthy that Liu Xiang 
indicated that feeling is the tendency of nature.  The question that arises is why 
nature has a tendency to respond to things.  Liu Xiang did not address this 
question.  Wang Bi provided an explanation, as shown below. 
 For Wang Bi, the question of the relationship between nature and feeling 
can be approached from two sub-questions: the relationship between natureDao and 
feeling and that between natureqi and feeling, since human nature has two aspects, 
the Dao and qi.  As for the first question, my proposal is that natureDao is neither 
good nor evil, while feeling is subject to moral judgment.  Whether feeling is 
good or bad depends on whether it is subordinated to natureDao.  As for the second 
question, my examination shows that natureqi tends towards contact with things, 
from which feeling generates.  Whether the contact of natureqi with things, i.e., 
feeling, is good is similarly decided by natureDao.  When natureqi drifts with things 
and is far away from natureDao, feeling degenerates into desire. 
2.2.2. Wang Bi’s view of the relationship between nature and feeling  
(1) the relationship between natureDao and feeling 
 
Confucius says, “By nature people are alike, through practice they have 
become far apart.”  Wang Bi produced a long commentary on this passage.  It 
reads: 
(1) If one does not direct one’s feelings with one’s innate nature 
(xing qi qing性其情), how can one conducts oneself properly in the 
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long run?  This is the uprightness (zheng正) of feelings.  If the mind 
strays and loses its authenticity, this is the deviance (xie 邪 ) of 
feelings.  (2) To make feelings closer to nature, this is [the meaning 
of the saying] to direct one’s feelings with one’s nature.  If one can 
make one’s feelings close to one’s nature, it is not a problem to have 
desires.  If one pursues one’s desires and drifts with things, this is 
[why Confucius said that one’s feelings are] far away [from one’s 
nature].  If one desires something but does not drift with it, this is [ to 
say that one’s feelings are] close to [one’s nature].  (3) Being close to 
one’s nature makes one’s feelings upright, but it does not mean that 
nature is upright.  Although nature itself is not upright, it can make 
one’s feelings upright.  This is like that one feels warm when 
approaching fire, but fire is not warmness.  Although fire is not 
warmness, it can warm things or make people feel warm.  (4) How 
can fire do it?  It is by its qi, (which generates) warm airflow.  
Similarly, how can [nature] make one’s feelings upright?  It is by 
principle (yi儀) and stillness (jing靜).  (5) However, we also know 
that some people’s nature is thick and others’ is thin.  Confucius says, 
“By nature people are alike.” If nature is the same from one person to 
another, there is no need to employ the word “alike”.  If nature is 
completely different from one to another, the word “alike” is not 
supported.  The word “alike” indicates that human nature is both 
similar and different from one person to another, but the similarity of 
human nature is highlighted.  People are alike in that their nature is 
neither good nor evil, but they are different in that their nature is 
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either thick or thin.  Despite the difference, human nature is not 
completely different from one to another.  In this regard, it is said 











To facilitate the analysis below, I divide the above quotation into 5 sections, 
as marked by (1)-(5).  Here Wang Bi addressed two main questions: the 
relationship between nature and feeling, or to be specific, between natureDao and 
feeling in sections (1)-(4), and the implication of the word “alike” in section (5).  
On the first question, first of all Wang Bi holds that feeling may be either 
proper or improper, while natureDao is neither good nor evil.  This is simple to 
understand.  NatureDao inherits the characteristic of the Dao, which is beyond good 
and evil.  Or, as Wang Bi emphasized, natureDao is not good, although it is able to 
make other things good. However, feeling is always related to things in the 
physical world, which is subject to moral judgment.  I will revisit this point shortly. 
                                                 
138  Wang Bi jijiaoshi 王弼集校釋 , 632.  Lynn makes instructive suggestion on the 
translation of this difficult piece of passage. 
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Second, whether feeling is proper or improper depends on whether it is 
under the influence of natureDao.  When feeling is close to natureDao, even desire 
may not be disregarded.  Here Wang Bi did not point out where desire comes from.  
But in light of the views of Xunzi, Dong Zhongshu, and Liu Xiang, Wang Bi 
probably agreed that desire describes the response of feeling to things.  Desire is 
not necessarily bad.  If one is fully informed by the Dao, one can keep one’s desire 
proper.  In other words, when one gets closer to one’s natureDao, one’s feeling and 
desire will not be excessive. 
Third, although natureDao is not good in the same way as it is not bad, it can 
make feeling upright by its principle (yi 儀) and stillness (jing 靜).  The words 
“principle” and “stillness” relate natureDao to its origin: the Dao.  As argued earlier, 
the Dao is both a metaphysical principle and a pragmatic principle that things 
should accord with.  As a practical principle, it means no interfering with things 
and being clear of discriminations.  Since the Dao defines human nature, in its 
original stage human nature is also empty and still.  That is, human natureDao does 
not discriminate beauty from ugliness, good from bad, etc.  Consequently, it guards 
feeling from being distracted by things like beauty, wisdom, fame and profit and 
prevents feeling from degenerating into uncontrollable desires.   
However, the questions that arise are: how is it possible for natureDao to 
influence feeling, since it is determined by the Dao that does not impose on things, 
and how can natureDao account for the goodness or badness of feeling, since it is 
itself beyond good and evil?  Regarding the first question, although the authentic 
human nature is empty and still, this does not mean that it is static and incapable.  
NatureDao is able to guide feeling, because the power of the Dao penetrates the 
universe.  Through non-action, the Dao makes the myriad things complete; being 
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still, it manages all kinds of motions; maintaning empty, it sustains the multiple 
things; staying lower, it conquers the highest; remaining weak, it defeats the 
strongest.  The Dao serves as a shining example for the human being.  The ruler 
models himself after the Dao, in order to rule his nation; the common people 
model themselves after the Dao to live a harmonious life.  The Dao does not 
coerce people, but it exerts an influence on people.  NatureDao influences feeling in 
the similar way.  NatureDao is an ideal model for feeling to follow. However, the 
influence of a model is limited, for others do not necessarily follow the model.  As 
such, although natureDao can influence feeling, it is not in total control of feeling.  
This explains why in many cases feeling degenerates into desire. 
A possible explanation of the second question may be gathered from a 
passage in the Lunyu jijie yishu 論語集解義疏 by Huang Kan (皇侃).  It reads,  
There are various explanations of nature and feeling.  I just follow 
an old one. That is, nature is inborn and feeling is completion.  
Nature is what human beings have when they are born, thus it is 
construed as “inborn”; feeling exists as desire is aroused and moves 
and reveals itself externally, thus feeling is construed as 
“completion.” Although nature is neither good nor evil, it is either 
thick or thin.  Feeling is one’s longing for things, so it is either 
deviant or upright.  Since nature is what the human being originally 
has and it has not yet involved function, it should not be considered 
as bad.  Nor should it be considered as good.  Therefore, it is said 
that nature is neither good nor evil.  Why I know this, because the 
notions of good and evil always apply to things and through things 
they come to be recognized.  Thus the Laozi says, “People know 
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that (an object of) beauty is beautiful, but they do not know that it is 
beautiful in the light of ugliness; they know that goodness is good, 
but do not know that goodness is good in the light of badness.” All 
these notions are discussed in reference to things.  Feeling is either 
deviant or upright, as feeling points to things.  If one allows his 
feeling to drift without control, it is deviant; if the tendency of 
feeling accords with principle, then feeling is upright.  Therefore, 










Huang Kan wrote this passage right before he cited Wang Bi’s commentary 
on the Analects 17:2.  According to Wang Baoxuan, since Huang Kan used Wang 
Bi’s commentary as his main illustration, he would agree with Wang on the issue 
                                                 
139 Huang Kan 皇侃, Exegesis of the Commentaries on Analects (Lunyu jijie yishu 論語集
解義疏), in Shisanjing zhushu buzheng十三經註疏補證 edited by Yang Jialuo 楊家駱 (Taibei: 
shijie shuju 臺北: 世界書局, 1990), vol.14: 176; Lo Yuet keung, “The Formulation of Early 
Medieval Confucian Metaphysics: Huang Kan’s (488-545) Accommodation of Neo-Taoism and 
Buddhism,” in Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, Texts, and Hermeneutics, 
Kaiwing Chow, et al eds. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp.57-83; cf. 
Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 53. 
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of nature and feeling.  Given this consideration, the above passage is helpful in 
explaining Wang Bi’s position of nature and feeling.140 
As the above passage shows, nature points to an internal and intact state of 
the human being, while feeling pertains to an externalized response of the human 
being to things.  Feeling is construed as belonging to the world of things, as it is an 
externalization committed to concrete things.  
  The discussion of nature and feeling reveals a contrast not only between the 
internal and the external, and between stillness and motion, but also between the 
natural and the social.  Of especially significance to this thesis, the latter contrast is 
closely related to the debate over the relationship between ziran (naturalness and 
spontaneity自然) and mingjiao (rites名教), which is one of the burning issues of 
Learning of the Profound.  Generally speaking, in the Wei-Jin context naturalness 
refers to the Dao and the primitive state of human beings and things, while rites 
refer to social institutions and conventions, the Confucian moral doctrine in 
particular.  Wang Bi would further explain naturalness by analogy with the root 
(ben 本) and rites with the branch (mo 末); since rites (things) generate from 
naturalness (the Dao), their existence should not be disregarded.  I will return to 
this question in chapter 4.  So far as the issue of natureDao and feeling is concerned, 
while natureDao is undoubtedly naturalness, feeling, as Wang Bi seemed to indicate, 
to some extent is social phenomena.  For example, although the feeling of 
happiness is itself universal, the way to express it varies from one culture to 
another. 
The third question concerning Wang Bi’s commentary on the Analect 17:2 
is: despite natureDao being neither good nor evil, can it not be envisioned as good in 
                                                 
140 Zhengshi xuanxue正始玄學, 387; also see Wang Bi pingzhuan 王弼評傳, 323. 
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the light of its capacity to make feeling upright?  The answer to this question may 
involve a clarification of the notions of good and bad, which are generally used as 
moral terms.  However, there are cases in which “good” and “bad” do not have any 
moral connotation.  When one says that this is a good computer, it means such 
things as that the computer has large storage, operates speedily, and has strong 
immunity to viruses.  In other words, people decide whether a computer is good by 
looking at whether it functions well.  Normally, when “good” is used to describe a 
thing, it takes on no moral dimension.  “Good” may also be used to qualify a human 
being in an amoral way.  For example, John is said to be a good teacher.  This is not 
necessarily a moral judgment of John.  Rather, it is more likely about the skills, the 
training, or the accomplishments that John has as a teacher, such that he can 
organize his lectures logically, express his ideas eloquently, inspire students to think 
deeply, his students get high scores, and so on.   
In light of the above argument, the usage of “good” and “bad” can be 
classified into two senses, i.e., in a broad sense and in a narrow sense.  In the case of 
the former, “good” means objective utility and benefit; in the case of the latter, it 
means accordance with the moral regulations and rites.  Two elements determine 
the sense in which “good” is used: moral agent and moral intention.  Having them 
in the context, “good” is used in a narrow sense; otherwise it is used in a broad 
sense.  Given this classification, the Dao can be said to be good, as it creates and 
sustains the myriad things; but the Dao is good in a broad sense not in a narrow 
sense.141  Good and bad in a narrow sense pertain to Confucian morality in the 
                                                 
141 For example, it is said in chapter 8 of the Laozi,  
居善地, 心善淵, 與善仁, 言善信, 正善治, 事善能, 動善時。 
Goodness in position depends on location; goodness in heart depends on 
profundity; goodness in association depends on benevolence; goodness in words 
depends on sincerity; goodness in affairs depends on ability; goodness in action 
depends on timeliness. 
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context of the Laozi and Wang Bi’s commentary on it.  Returning to the question 
raised above, natureDao may be envisioned as good in that it makes feeling upright, 
but this does not contradict Wang Bi’s view that natureDao cannot be envisioned as 
good or evil in the Confucian sense. 
(2) the relationship between natureqi and feeling 
I have analyzed Wang Bi’s position on the relationship between natureDao 
and feeling.  Then the question is how did Wang Bi deal with the qi part of human 
nature, natureqi, or what is his view of the relationship between natureqi and feeling, 
since natureDao and natureqi are never separate and only distinguishable conceptually.  
Another related question is where does feeling come from?  The answers will be 
explored in this section. 
Xunzi, Dong Zhongshu, and Liu Xiang provided their respective views as 
to the origin of feeling, as examined earlier.  Dong Zhongshu held that both nature 
and feeling are endowed by Heaven.  In contrast, Xunzi and Liu Xiang agreed that 
feeling is the response of human nature to things.  That is, feeling generates out of 
the contact of one’s nature with things.  This view was widely adopted by the 
Daoists in the early years of the Han dynasty.  Generally, they thought that nature is 
still, while feeling is active.  When nature responds to external things, it becomes 
feeling. 
Wang Bi inherited this view and formulated his theory of nature and feeling.  
He agreed with his predecessors that feeling stems from nature.  But the question is, 
since nature consists of two parts, the Dao and qi, from which part does feeling 
arise? 
                                                                                                                                      
Wang Bi commented that people should always be in accordance thus with the Dao.  
Evidently, the Dao is a natural goodness.  See Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 20; cf. Lynn, The 
Classic of the Way and Virtue, 64. 
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Evidently, the answer is not natureDao.  Because natureDao is devoid of any 
physical properties, there is no way that natureDao contacts with things.  On the other 
hand, qi is proactive and in ceaseless transformation. 142  So it always happens that 
the contact of natureqi with things results in feeling.  Even the sage, in Wang Bi’s 
view, is no exception.  In this sense, natureqi can be considered to be an innate 
biological and psychological determinant, and one of its key expressions is feeling, 
as the inner qi-constituted nature comes into contact with external stimuli.   This 
also answers the question raised earlier: why does nature have a tendency to 
respond to things?    
NatureDao guides natureqi, and whether feeling is proper depends on 
whether the contact of natureqi with things is under the influence of natureDao.  
When the contact is under the influence of natureDao, feeling generating from this 
contact is upright.  When natureqi drifts with things and strays far away from 
natureDao, the resultant feeling is deviant.  At this point, feeling degenerates into 
desire.  Feeling and desire pertain to the different stages of the transformation of 
natureqi, or in other words, qi is the substance from which feeling and desire are 
made.  In this regard, natureqi, feeling, and desire are various descriptions of one 
thing, in a way similar to what we find in the Xunzi.   
Up to this point I have analyzed Wang Bi’s view of the relationship 
between nature and feeling.  To summarize, natureDao is the decisive core of human 
nature, and natureqi is the substantive constituent of human nature.  Despite being 
still, natureDao is able to influence natureqi.  However, since natureDao is a non-action 
                                                 
142 Zhang Dainain 張岱年, Zhongguo gudianzhexue gainianfanchou yaolun 中國古典哲
學概念範疇要論 (Beijing: zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe 北京: 中國社會科學出版社, 1989), 
30-35. English version is available under the title Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, translated 
and edited by Edmund Ryden (New Haven and London: Yale University Press and Beijing: 
Foreign Language Press, 2002), 46-57. 
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entity, its influence is limited.  On the other hand, natureqi is active and tends 
towards contact with things.  It may be influenced by natureDao, or may wander with 
things and diverge from natureDao.  Both feeling and desire refer to the response of 
natureqi to things.  When this response is under the influence143 of natureDao, the 
resultant feeling is good; when this response is free of the influence of natureDao, the 
resultant feeling is bad.144  This bad feeling is also called “desire”.145 
The paradoxical nature of qi in Wang Bi’s view of human nature is 
discernable.  On the one hand, qi is the necessary constituent of human nature; on 
the other hand, it is also on many occasions the obstacle to rediscovering the share 
of the Dao in human nature.  It is not clear whether Wang Bi’s view of human 
nature anticipated the dichotomy of nature of Heavenly principle (tianli zhi xing天
理之性) and nature of qi endowment (qizhi zhi xing氣質之性) in Zhu Xi’s (朱熹
1130-1200) thought.  However, his position on the relationship between nature and 
feeling has much bearing on Cheng Yi’s (程頤 1033-1108) view of the same 
question.  Tang Junyi proposes that Cheng Yi’s view could be traced to Li Ao’s (李
                                                 
143 More needs to be said on “influence”, since it is vital to the relationship between 
natureDao and natureqi.  NatureDao can influence natureqi in that each person has his or her share of 
the Dao in his or her nature.  Only the sage presents perfectly the Dao in his entire mode of being.  
Ordinary people may be distracted by external things and thus lose sight of the Dao.  However, 
because of the share of the Dao, even a bad man has a sense of what is right and wrong and what 
he ought to do.  This makes possible for him to be drawn close to (近) the sage, or to return to (返) 
his Dao nature that has been neglected.  
 
 
144 While Wang Bi rejected a moral understanding of the Dao, he stressed that feeling is 
subject to moral judgment.  As quoted earlier, he employed the characters zheng 正 (upright) and 
xie 邪 (deviant), instead of the frequently used 善 (shan good) and 惡 (e bad) by Confucians, to 
explain the issue of feeling.  While there is room for arguing whether zheng and xie can be 
explained in terms of good and bad, it is evident that zheng and xie are indeed evaluative terms. 
 
145 Bad feeling is desire in the sense that it refers to one’s obsession with something.  As 
Wang Bi made it clear, deviant feeling means that one simply follows one’s desire and drifts with 
things (逐欲遷), and wanders off and loses one’s anthenticity (流蕩失真). 
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翺 772-841), and further to Wang Bi’s.146  In recent years, many scholars have 
realized that Wang Bi’s discussions of nature and feeling has significant bearing on 
the philosophical thought of the Song dynasty.147 
2.3. The Ideal Sage: His feelings and Spirituality 
The Han system of official appointment was based on the evaluation of a 
candidate’s moral cultivation.  With the corruption of Confucian state ideology 
towards the end of Han, this evaluation came to focus more and more on a 
candidate’s personality, character, disposition, and capacity.  In addition, the 
evaluation of real persons came to be replaced by discussions of more general topics, 
such as the various characteristics of human beings, and the personality of the 
sage.148   
The question of whether the sage has feelings received significant attention 
in the Wei-Jin period.  The debate over this question reflects Wei-Jin thinkers’ 
                                                 
146 Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun yuanjiao pian 中國哲學原論原教篇 
(Taibei: xuesheng shuju 臺北: 學生書局, 1984), 184.  For an analysis of the connection between 
Wang Bi’s position of nature and feeling and Cheng Yi’s, see Zhou Daxing 周大興, “Wang Bi’s 
‘xing qi qing’ de renxing yuanjinlun”王弼 ‘性其情’的人性遠近論, 361-370. 
 
147 Meng Penyuan 蒙培元, Zhongguo xinxing lun 中國心性論 (Taibei: xuesheng shuju 臺
北: 學生書局,1990), 185-194; Jiang Guozhu 姜國柱 and Zhu Kuiju 朱葵菊, Zhongguo 
lishishangde renxinglun 中國歷史上的人性論 (Beijing: zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe 北京: 
中國社會科學出版社, 1989), 75-77; Xu Kangsheng 許抗生, Weijin xuanxue shi 魏晉玄學史 
(Xi’an: shanxi daxue chubanshe西安: 陝西大學出版社, 1989), 123-128. 
 
148 The intellectual movement towards the end of the Han dynasty is usually referred to as 
qingyi (Pure Criticism 清議).  Qingyi is thought to be practically or politically oriented, for its 
criticism of the socio-political problems, leaving aside its contribution to the Han system of official 
appointment in terms of character-evaluation.  Intellectual discussions in the Wei-Jin period are 
usually termed qingtan (Pure Conversation清談).  As the term indicates, qingtan is thought to 
center on purely philosophical topics.  However, in recent year, many scholars have pointed out the 
political dimension of qingtan.   As shown in this thesis, the topics of qingtan are broad including 
both philosophical and socio-political issues.  See Tang Changru唐長孺, “Qingtan yu qingyi” 清
談與清議, in Wei Jin Nanbeichao shi luncong, 289-297; Wang Xiaoyi王曉毅, Zhongguo wenhua 
de qingliu, 90. 
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concern with the personality and the nature of the sage, the distinction between the 
sage and the common people, and whether sagehood is attainable.  
This part is mainly built on the debate between He Yan and Wang Bi on 
whether the sage has feelings.  I try to show Wang Bi’s insights into the nature of 
the sage, which contrasts with the popular view in his time.  Specifically, my 
analysis focuses on Wang Bi’s interpretation of the similarity and difference 
between the sage and the common people, and his expectation of the latter, despite 
that sagehood is ultimately inborn.  
2.3.1. He Yan: The sage does not have feelings  
The text of the debate between He Yan and Wang Bi reads, 
He Yan held that the sage does not have the feelings of joy, anger, 
sadness, and pleasure.  His argument was so convincing that Zhong 
Hui and others followed him and elaborated on it.  But Wang Bi 
disagreed with them.  He said, “The sage exceeds the common 
people due to his spirituality (shenming 神明).  However, like the 
common people, the sage also has the five feelings.  Because of his 
flourishing spirituality, the sage is able to comprehend the chaos and 
reach Nonbeing; because of the five feelings that the sage has like 
the common people, he cannot but respond to things with joy and 
sadness.  However, the feelings of the sage respond to things but are 
not bound by them.  Now, if one thinks that the sage does not 








The available literature suggests that He Yan’s view enjoyed greater support 
than Wang Bi’s in the Wei-Jin period.  For example, Zhong Hui and others were 
convinced by He Yan.  Other evidence is also found in Shishuo xinyu 世說新語. 
Wang Rong (王戎 234-305), the influential minister of the Jin dynasty, stated that 
“the sage does not have feelings while the lower people cannot be said to have 
feelings [because of their indulgence in desires]; feelings are found just in people 
like us.”150  When asked whether the sage has feelings, Wang Xiu (王脩 ca. 335-
358), too, made a direct negative reply.151 
One passage from He Yan is helpful in explaining his view.  Confucius said 
that Yan Hui never vented his anger on others.  He Yan commented on it: 
The common people give full rein to their feelings, and their joy and 
anger thus run counter to the principle.  Yan Yuan follows the Dao, 
and his anger does not exceed what is proper.  To vent one’s anger 
on others is to drift with one’s feelings.  If one can make one’s anger 
accord with the principle involved, it is easy for one to not drift with 
feelings.  
                                                 
149 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋,  640. cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 13. 
 
150 Shishuoxinyu  世說新語, 349;  cf. Mather, A New Account of Tales of the World, 347. 
 





It seems that He Yan also maintained a view of the three grades of human 
beings, though the classification was made in terms of feeling.  The sage has no 
feelings, the common people indulge in their feelings, and between them are the 
worthies such as Yan Hui, and the intellectual elite, for example, He Yan and 
Wang Rong who can perfectly express their feelings.153 
Some scholars observe that He Yan was influenced by the view dominating 
early Han Daoism: nature is good and feeling is evil; nature is still and feeling is 
active.  Since feeling is evil, it is hard to imagine that the sage has feelings. Besides, 
since the sage maintains tranquility and is never disturbed by things, there is no 
way that feelings arise in the sage.154  Other scholars propose that the debate 
between He Yan and Wang Bi reveals their divergence in viewing the relationship 
between the sage and the secular world.  It was a common view in the Wei-Jin 
period that one’s feelings result from one’s contact with things.  In this context, He 
Yan’s view implies that the sage never responds to things.  Consequently, the sage 
is absolutely transcendent of the secular world.  However, under Wang Bi’s 
interpretation, the sage does respond to things.  This allows the sage to be within 
the secular world and exert his influence on the common people.155  
                                                 
152 He Yan 何晏, Lunyu jijie 論語集解, in Lunyu zhengyu 論語正義 edited by Liu 
Baonan劉寶楠, in Zhuzi jichang諸子集成, vol.1: 32. 
 
153 Tang Yongtong has a detailed analysis of this question, see “Wang Bi shengren 
youqing lun” 王弼聖人有情論, in Tang Yongtong xueshu lunwenji湯用彤學術論文集, 255. 
 
154 Wang Baoxuan 王葆玹, Zhengshi xuanxue 正始玄學, 374. 
 
155 Alan K.L Chan, Two Visions of the Way, 36. 
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Of special interest to this thesis, the debate on whether the sage has feelings 
is related to the question how sagehood should be understood, is it inborn, or can it 
be acquired through effort?  It is clear that He Yan viewed sagehood as inborn.  
Since feeling generates out of the contact of nature with things, the lack of feelings 
in the sage implies that he has a special inborn nature.  Wang Bi disagreed with He 
Yan in this respect.  According to him, the sage has feelings just as the ordinary 
people, but he excels in his spirituality.  In this context, how sagehood should be 
understood comes to be how the sage’s spirituality should be understood.  If this 
spirituality is inborn, sagehood is inborn, and vice versa.  Alan Chan understands 
the spirituality of the sage as “complete self-realization and spiritual 
enlightment,”156  which is attainable.  However, I try to show below that Wang Bi 
viewed sagehood as inborn, in that the potential (or capacity) for sagehood is 
inborn.  But the comprehension of the Dao involves various levels; although only 
the sage can reach the highest level, Wang Bi appreciated the common people’s 
effort in trying to approximate the sage. 
2.3.2. Wang Bi: The sage has feelings  
The main points of Wang Bi’s view are: the sage has feelings like ordinary 
people; the sage responds to things but is not bound by them; the sage is able to do 
this, because he exceeds ordinary people in his spirituality. 
As Wang Bi put it, joy, fear, sadness and pleasure are natural to people,157 
and cannot be discarded.  The sage is no exception in this respect.  Wang Bi wrote 
to a friend: 
                                                 
156 Alan K.L Chan, “Zhong Hui’ Laozi Commentary and the Debate on Capacity and 
Nature in Third-Century China,” Early China, 28-29 (2003-2004): 146. 
 
157 Wang Bi jijiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 625. 
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 One might be intelligent enough to pursue the ultimate and trace 
the subtle, but cannot get rid of his innate nature.  Although the 
capacity of Yan Hui was well within Confucius’ grasp, he was still 
happy to meet Yan Hui, and sad when Yan Hui died.  You often 
laugh at others for failure to make their feelings accord with the 
principle.  Now, you know that naturalness cannot be gotten rid of.  
Although I have known you well, I miss you much if I do not see 
you for ten or fifteen days.  Therefore, Confucius’ feeling for Yan 






Confucius has been esteemed as the sage from the Han dynasty onward.  His 
prestigious position was unchallenged even in the Wei-Jin period when the Laozi 
and the Zhuangzi prevailed.  Wei-Jin thinkers would debate on the position of 
Laozi, but they unanimously held Confucius as the sage.159  In the above passage, 
Wang Bi gave an example to illustrate the sage’s feelings.  Unlike He Yan, who 
separated the sage from the ordinary people, Wang Bi bridged the two.  The sage 
has feelings just like any ordinary person.  
                                                 
158 Wang Bi jijiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 640. 
 




Although the sage interpreted in this way is familiar and friendly to ordinary 
people, he is still different from them.  Both the sage and ordinary people respond 
to things, and the feelings of both generate from this response.  However, the sage 
is able to remain unbound by things, whereas ordinary people may be distracted by 
things.  In light of the analysis in the previous part, the natureqi of the sage contacts 
things yet this contact stays under the influence of natureDao, whereas when the 
natureqi of ordinary people comes into contact with things, it drifts away from 
natureDao.  In the passage cited above, it is said that people should make their 
feelings accord with principle.  Now it is clear that this principle refers to the Dao, 
or more precisely, natureDao. 
One question needs to be clarified at this point: whether Wang Bi was 
inconsistent in his views concerning the sage’s feelings.  According to Wang 
Baoxuan, when Wang Bi commented on the Laozi, he thought that the sage does 
not have feelings, which may be influenced by a view dominating the Han-Wei 
period that feelings and desires should be eliminated; but when he commented on 
the Analects and the Yijing, he changed is mind and believed that the sage has 
feelings, for feelings and desires are acknowledged in Confucianism as long as 
they are regulated by principle.160  
According to Lin Lizhen, Wang Bi is a gifted philosopher, and is not likely 
to have changed his view on this issue in his short lifespan.161  Now the question of 
Wang Bi’s consistency turns on his commentary on the Laozi, since it is believed 
that Wang Bi rejected feelings when commenting on this work.  My suggestion is 
                                                 
160 Wang Baoxuan 王葆玹, Zhengshi xuanxue 正始玄學, 379-383; Fung Yu-lan馮友蘭
also suggested that Wang Bi was inconsistent in his views of feeling.  See his book Zhongguo 
zhexueshi 中國哲學史 (Taiwanshangwu yinshuguan臺灣商務印書館, 1993), vol. 2:607; A 
History of Chinese Philosophy, translated by Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1952-53), vol.2: 189. 
 
161 Lin Lizhen 林麗真, “Wang Bi ‘xing qi qing’ shuoxilun” 王弼 ‘性其情’說析論, 600. 
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that Wang Bi did not discard feelings as a whole but only the unnatural feelings 
brought on by Confucian rites.  
First of all, it is necessary to point out that Laozi and Zhuangzi disparaged 
only the “unnatural” feelings of human beings.  Both hold that human feelings are 
simple and few in their original states.  But the establishment of the Confucian rites 
causes them to become superficial and excessive.  When one’s longings for 
“valuable” things accumulate, one may resort to deceitful methods.  Eventually, the 
simplicity of human feeling is ruined.  The Laozi 19:1 reads, “get rid of 
benevolence and do away with righteousness, and people will return to filial piety 
and compassion.” Obviously, Laozi did not reject filial piety and compassion, so 
long as they flow naturally from one’s inborn affections for one’s parents and 
fellow human beings.  But he severely criticized the false filial piety and 
compassion that people intentionally expressed for various purposes driven by self-
interest.   
In the utopia that Laozi pictured, people have simple and natural feelings, 
but they do not have the slightest knowledge of filial piety, brotherly love, and 
compassion, which, in the Daoist context, damages the primitive harmony of 
human community.  Wang Bi is sensitive to this subtle implication of Daoism.  
From the Zhuangzi he borrowed the example of fishes: fishes wet one another with 
their spit to survive, after they are thrown out of the sea.  When fishes live freely in 
the water, they do not have any idea of the virtue of supporting each other; only 
after they are isolated from the water, do they know such a virtue. 162   The 
knowledge of virtue indicates that paradise is already lost.   
                                                 
162 Wang Bi jijiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 43. 
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Wang Bi’s view that the sage has feelings can be explained in light of his 
view of the relationship between nature and feeling.  Since natureqi is what each 
human being is endowed with and since it is prone to contact with things, the sage 
cannot but have feelings.  However, as the sage’s natureqi is always close to his 
natureDao and under the influence of natureDao, his feelings are always in 
accordance with the Dao.  Or in other words, his feelings remain simple and 
authentic.  These feelings, for both Laozi and Wang Bi, cannot be discarded, as 
they are natural.   
More evidence for supporting natural feelings is found in Wang Bi’s 
commentary on the Laozi.  He used the term “be free of knowledge and desire” 
(wuzhi wuyu 無知無欲) rather than “be free of knowledge and feelings” (wuzhi 
wuqing 無知無情) to describe the authenticity of human beings.  “Desire” is 
generally understood as deviant feelings, or in Daoist terms, artificial feelings.  In 
view of this, the term “be free of knowledge and desire” indicates that without 
Confucian knowledge one is free from artificial or deviant feelings, but not 
feelings as a whole.    
2.3.3. On spirituality and whether sagehood is inborn 
The concept of spirituality (shenming神明) is the key to understanding not 
only the sage’s feelings but also whether sagehood is inborn.  It makes the sage’s 
feelings distinguishable from those of the common people, and ultimately accounts 
for the sage’s difference from the common people.  Whether ordinary people have 
promise to become a sage depends on whether this spirituality is attainable either 
through education or by other methods.   
Before Wang Bi, the concept of shenming 神明 had been addressed in 
classics like the Zhuangzi, the Xunzi, the Yizhuan, the Guanzi, the Huainanzi, and 
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Heshangdong’s commentary on the Laozi.  Its meanings vary according to 
context,163 which can be classified into three types.  Shenming may mean divinity 
or the profundity of the divinity.  To give an example, it is said in the Yizhuan, 
“Nearby, adopting reference from his own person, and afar, adopting reference 
from other things, [Pao Xi庖犠]164 thereupon made the eight trigrams in order to 
become thoroughly conversant with the virtues inherent in the numinous and the 
bright (shenming) and to classify the myriad things in terms of their true, innate 
nature.”165  Considering the mythological origin of Chinese culture, “the numinous 
and the bright” here is more likely referring to supernatural powers or agents.  
Shenming is also taken to mean human spirit, which is used interchangeably 
with another word jingshen (spirit 精神).166  Up to Wang Bi’s time human spirit 
had been defined as a kind of essential or refined qi (精氣), which can be dated 
                                                 
163 Edward J. Machle, “The mind and the ‘shen-ming’ in Xunzi”, Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 19 (1992): 361-386; Xu Kangsheng 許抗生 , “Chudu ‘taiyi shengshui’” 初讀 “太一生
水,” Daojia wenhua yanjiu 道家文化研究, vol.17: 310-312; Zhang Dainian 張岱年, Key Concepts 
in Chinese Philosophy中國古典哲學概念範疇要論, 95-96. 
 
164 Pao Xi庖犠 also names Fu Xi伏羲.  He is the mythological ancestor of the Chinese 
people and the founder of Chinese civilization.  He is said to have invented the hexagrams and to 
have been the first to domesticate animals. 
 
165 Huang Shouqi and Zhang Shanzhi, 黃壽祺，張善之， The Zhouyi with Translation 
and Annotation周易譯注 (shanghai guji chubanshe上海古籍出版社，1989), 572; Richard John 
Lynn, The Classic of Changes, A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 77.  Translation altered slightly. 
 
166Zhang Dainian 張岱年, Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy 中國古典哲學概念範疇
要論, 95.  The evidence he cited there reads, 
  
One exhausts one’s spirit (shenming), but does not know that things are the same. 
 勞神明爲一，而不知其同也。. 
 
The mind is the ruler of the body and the master of the spirit (shenming). 
心者形之君也，而神明之主也。 
 
For the original texts, see Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 10; 
The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 41;  Xunzi jijie荀子集解, vol. 15, On dispelling 
misconceptions 解蔽篇，333; Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsun Tzu, and Han Fei 
Ztu, 129; John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol.3, 105. 
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back to the Warring States period.167  Human spirit conceived in this way is the 
core or essence that defines human being and activates the physical life.  In other 
words, human spirit is independent of and contrasts with the human physical form 
(xing 形).  One’s physical form or body is only an inanimate container or dwelling; 
it is given life when being filled with refined qi.  If this kind of qi dissipates, one 
dies.   
Han thinkers followed and developed this notion of human spirit.  To take a 
few examples, Dong Zhongshu says,  
The clarity of qi is its essence (jing), a person with such clarity is a 
worthy.  The valuable thing for nourishing one’s body is to 
accumulate such essence; the right way to govern the nation is to 
accumulate such worthies.  
氣之清者爲精, 人之清者爲賢, 治身者以積精爲寶, 治國者以積
賢爲道。168   
                                                 
167 Passages from the Guanzi read,  
It is ever so that the vital essence (jing) of things is what gives them life.  Below 
it gives life to the five grains; above it creates the ranked stars.  When floating 
between heaven and earth, we call it ghosts or spirit.  When stored in the breast, 




The vital essence (jing) is the essence of the vital energy (qi). 
精也者，氣之精者。 
 
For Chinese texts see Yan Changyao顔昌嶢, Guanzi jiaoshi 管子校釋 (Changsha: Yuelu 
shushe長沙: 嶽麓書社, 1996), 396, 400; English translation is Guanzi: political, economic, and 
philosophical essays from early China: a study and translation by W. Allyn Rickett (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 39, 43.  Translation is altered slightly. 
 
As for the issue of the relationship between human spirit and qi, see Zhang Dainian 張岱
年, Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy 中國古典哲學概念範疇要論, 93; Li Ran李冉, 
“Zhongguo zhexue de qilun yu rujiao”中國哲學的氣論與儒教, Zhenxue yanjiu哲學研究, 8 
(2003): 66-72. 
 
168 Lai Yanyuan賴炎元，Chunqiufanlu jinzhu jinyi 春秋繁露今注今譯, 173. 
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It is said in the Huainanzi,  
The physical form of the body is the dwelling of life; qi is what 
fills life; spirit is the controller of life.  
夫形者, 生之舍也; 氣者, 生之充也; 神者, 生之制也。169   
Passages from Heshang Gong’s commentary on the Laozi read,170   
The reason that a human being is alive is that he or she possesses spirit.  
人之所以有生者, 以有精神。171   
If one could embrace the One, so that it does not escape the body, 
then one would live long.  The One is what the Dao produced in 
the beginning; it is the refined qi of the Great Harmony.  
人能抱一使不離於身, 則長存. 一者道使所生, 太和之精氣也。172   
Besides meaning human spirit, shenming is also taken to refer to the spirit of 
heaven and earth.173  It is difficult to give a clear definition of the spirit of heaven 
and earth.  It may pertain to the wonders of nature, or the principle sustaining the 
cosmos, or the profound character of the universe.  What is clear now is: since qi is 
the essential element constituting the universe, there is something common 
between the spirit of heaven and earth and that of a human being.  Therefore, it is 
said in many classics that one can comprehend and even be at one with the spirit of 
                                                 
169 Zhang Shuangdi 張雙棣, Huainanzi jiaoshi 淮南子校釋, vol. 1:124. 
 
170 Alan Chan discusses the issue of qi and spirit in Heshanggong’s commentary on the 
Laozi.  See his book, Two Visions of the Way, 125-133.   
 
171 Wang Ka王卡, Laozi Daodejing Heshanggong zhangju老子道德經河上公章句, 
(Zhonghua shuju中華書局, 1993), 279. 
 
172 Wang Ka王卡, Laozi Daodejing Heshanggong zhangju 老子道德經河上公章句, 34; 
Translation is cited from Alan Chan’s book Two Visions of the Way and altered slightly.  See Two 
Visions of the Way, 130. 
 




heaven and earth through certain methods of cultivation.174  At this point, the 
concept of qi is most critical in that it makes possible the unity of Heaven and 
human beings (tianren heyi 天人合一).  
Turning to Wang Bi, however, he produced a different interpretation of 
shenming, which once again proves him to be an innovative heir to the tradition.  
In summary, he understood shenming as the sage’s unique intelligence, i.e., his 
ability to comprehend the Dao.  This kind of shenming is not only defined in terms 
of qi, but also and most importantly, is informed by the Dao.  In other words, the 
sage’s shenming is a perfect interaction between his natureDao and natureqi. 
In Wang Bi’s writings, shenming 神明 is used interchangeably with two 
other terms: jilan 極覽 and xuanlan玄覽.  The three compounds have the same 
grammatical structure, i.e., the first character is used as an adjective to qualify the 
second, a noun, in each compound.  Ming 明 means sharp-eyedness, clear sight, 
and an ability to see clearly and deeply, and lan 覽 has a similar meaning of to look 
                                                 
174 To take some instances, it is said in the Zhuangzi, 
He came and went alone with the pure spirit of heaven and earth, yet he did not 
view the ten thousand things with arrogant eyes. 
獨與天地精神往來，而不敖倪於萬物。 
 
Xunzi maintained that one could understand the profundity of the universe through 
education.   
If a common man in the street devotes himself to learning, concentrates his mind 
and will, and thinks deeply and examines things carefully, continues his efforts 
and accumulates good acts unceasingly, he can understand the spirit (shenming) 




Cf. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 373; Xunzi jijie荀子集解, vol. 17, on the 
evilness of nature 性惡篇, 340; Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsun Tzu, and Han Fei 
Ztu, 167; John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol.3, 159. 
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at or view something.  Shen 神, ji 極, and xuan 玄 describe how profound, deep, 
and ineffable this sight is.175  
If shenming means a clear sight of something, what is the object of this sight?  
As Wang Bi made clear, shenming is not directed to external things but to the Dao.  
Ming does not mean that one is sharp-eyed or clear-sighted in understanding 
physical objects.  It pertains to one’s understanding or comprehension of the Dao; 
as Wang Bi agreed with Laozi, to know constancy is ming (知常曰明).176  Literally, 
ming conveys that to uses one’s eyes to look, to see, to watch, to observe, to 
examine physical things.  But the Dao is devoid of any physical properties.  It 
cannot be seen, be heard, or be touched.177  To understand the Dao does not 
involve one’s sense organs.  Rather, as they are prone to be distracted by external 
things, which will block one’s sight of the Dao, one should refrain from using 
                                                 
175 Shenming神明, jilan 極覽, and xuanlan玄覽 can also be read in other ways, given 
that the Chinese characters concerned belong to more than one word class.  It is possible to treat 
the two characters in each compound both as nouns.  The three compounds may then mean “a clear 
sight of the ineffable”, “vision of the ultimate”, or “vision of the profound.”   
 
It is also possible that the first character is used as nouns and the second as verbs in each 
compound.  With the nouns turning to be the objects of the verbs, the three words come to mean 
“to see clearly the ineffable”, “to look at the ultimate”, or “to look at the profound.”   
 
A third alternative is that shen 神, ji極, and xuan玄 are used as advs to qualify ming 明 
and lan 覽 as verbs, then the three terms mean “to see deeply”, “to view ultimately”, or “to watch 
insightfully.”   
 
The various readings of shenming and its two synonyms actually convey the similar 
meaning, i.e., shenming is a distinguishing sight, vision or understanding either for its object or for 
its method.  Consequently, the various ways of reading shenming will not affect the argument of 
this thesis. 
 
176 Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 36, 146; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 
76, 156. 
 
177 Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 31, 41, 126, 146; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and 
Virtue, 72, 78, 141, 156. 
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one’s sense organs and keep clear of the luxuries that please one’s sense organs.  
This is why the sage does not provide for the eye.178  
The distinguishing nature of the Dao determines the method of pursuing 
shenming, i.e., the method of self-cultivation to understand the Dao.  As one 
already has the differentiation of the Dao in one’s nature, to cultivate oneself 
simply means to return to one’s natureDao, of which one has lost sight as a result of 
indulgence in external things.  Or to understand the Dao simply means to 
rediscover one’s natureDao, which has been covered with layers of misconceptions. 
So, the approach of self-cultivation is inward (xiangnei向內 or qiunei 求內) not 
outward (xiangwai向外 or qiuwai 求外), as Wang Bi’s distinction between nei 內
and wai外 stresses.179    
Wang Bi also proposed some concrete methods of self-cultivation. For 
example, it is to maintain a tranquil and empty mind by removing the 
misconceptions of human nature and unnatural feelings, and to comprehend the 
function of the Dao with a tranquil and empty mind.  To take some examples, 
Wang Bi says, 
Can you cleanse away the misleading and the specious and so 
attain vision capable of grasping the ultimate and the subtle, not 
allowing things to get in the way of its brightness or flaw its 
numinous power?  If so, it will be one with mystery from 
beginning to end. 
                                                 
178 Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 28; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 70. 
 






With emptiness and quietude, one observes their eternal return [to 
the Dao] 
以虛靜觀其反復。181 
Based on the above argument, I consider shenming in Wang Bi’s writings to 
refer to the sage’s spirituality.182  This spirituality is characterized by a high degree 
of intelligence.  This special kind of intelligence should not be equated with 
practical skills or know-how, with which one is able to do certain things or solve 
certain problems.  To be more precise, shenming pertains to the sage’s ability to 
comprehend the Dao, to be at one with the Dao, and to embody the Dao naturally 
in his entire mode of being.   
Now the question is whether spirituality is inborn or attainable through 
practice.  Basically, Wang Bi thought that this spirituality is inborn, as the qi 
                                                 
180 Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 23; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 66.  
 
181 Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 36; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue,  75. 
 
182 Lou Yulie 樓宇烈 proposes that the comprehension of the Dao is a kind of mystical 
spirituality devoid of any desires and misconceptions.  Livia Kohn thinks that Wang Bi represented 
the continued development of the Chinese mystical tradition, which originated from the early 
Daoist philosophy of the Laozi and the Zhuangzi.  She interprets Wang Bi’s view of sagehood 
within this mystical framework. 
 
The issue of mysticism needs careful examination, which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  However, I would like to consider Wang Bi to be a rationalist in light of his strong socio-
political concerns.  The core concept of his philosophy, i.e., the Dao, is not mystical.  It pertains to 
the ontological reality.  When applied to socio-political field, it turns to be a policy of non-action, 
which includes many pragmatic methods of governing.  As for self-cultivation, it is not a 
completely ineffable enlightment.  As shown in the thesis, Wang Bi proposed some methods of 
self-cultivation, to reduce desires and to get rid of misconceptions, for example, which are neither 
mystical nor abstract.  As for the sage, who represents the culmination of self-cultivation, Wang Bi 
emphasized that he is paragon for the common people.  This indicates that the sage’s teachings and 
behavior, at least some part, are understandable so that the common people can imitate the sage.  If 
sagehood is simply a mystical spirituality, how can the common people follow the sage? 
 
Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 24; Livia Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy 




endowment that accounts for the sage’s intelligence is inborn.  It is a popular view 
in the Han dynasty that qi endowment accounts for one’s morality, capacity, 
disposition, and fate.  Since Wang Bi followed this view and attributed the 
differences among human beings to their endowed qi, he would likely understand 
the sage’s spirituality as an intellectual capacity, generated from his endowment of 
qi.  In this respect, spirituality is constituitive of the sage’s nature.183 
A comparison between Mencius and Wang Bi might be useful for 
understanding this intelligence.  Mencius defined sagehood in terms of moral 
cultivation.  If a common person directs his or her attention persistently to the four 
moral sprouts and nurtures them properly, he or she has the promise to become a 
sage. 184   In contrast, sagehood in Wang Bi’s writings involves an ability to 
understand the Dao.  To take an example from Wang Bi, the sage, like ordinary 
people, experiences fortune and misfortune too.  However, unlike ordinary people, 
who are invariably disturbed by their sense of gains and losses, the sage is able to 
realize the interchangability between fortune and misfortune, and eventually be 
free of worry and bitterness.185   
However, the sage’s spirituality should not be understood as completely 
decided by his qi endowment.  The special nature of the sage’s spirituality lies in 
that it is informed by the Dao.  In this respect, spirituality is also closely related to 
natureDao.  I understand spirituality as a perfect interaction between natureDao and 
natureqi.  The sage is endowed with special refined qi, which facilitates him to 
                                                 
183 This indicates that if Wang Bi had took part in the debate over the relationship between 
nature and capacity (caixing 才性), he would align himself with Fu Gu (傅 嘏 209–255) and 
Zhong Hui (鍾 會 225–264), who held that nature and capacity are identical or correlated with 
each other. 
 
184 Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 149-158. 
 
185 Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 152; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 161. 
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discover his natureDao.  Meanwhile, although natureDaois tranquil, it is not static.  
As discussed earlier, natureDao is a code (yi 儀) or principle (li理), which can extert 
an influence on one’s qi.   In the sage’s case, since he is endowed with special 
refined qi, which is naturally in tune with the Dao, his natureDao can extert a 
dominant influence on his qi so that it regulates the latter completely.  As a result, 
the sage’s qi never drifts with external things.  With no external disturbance, the 
sage can concentrate on comprehending his natureDao and achieve a thorough 
understanding of the Dao. 
The argument up to this point suggests that Wang Bi produced a balanced 
interpretation of shenming.  As discussed earlier, before Wang Bi shenming had 
been defined in terms of refined qi.  Wang Bi inherited this notion, but he stressed 
that refined qi is informed by the Dao.  In other words, shenming is a perfect 
interaction between qi and the Dao.  This is consistent with his view of the 
relationship between Nonbeing and beings.  Nonbeing is the origin, but it cannot 
be made manifest or flourish without beings.  Qi belongs to beings and the power 
of the Dao is perceivable through it.  Consequently, a balanced approach to the 
sage’s ideal nature reflects a balanced view of Nonbeing and beings.  This 
balanced approach becomes more evident when Wang Bi discussed the 
relationship between naturalness (ziran 自然) and the rites (mingjiao 名教), to 
which I will return in chapter 4. 
However, despite the inbornness of sagehood, Wang Bi appreciated a 
common person’s effort to try to rediscover his or her natureDao and to understand 
the Dao.  He did not imply that the sage possesses this spirituality even as a child, 
nor did he say that normal people would never get close to it.  If these were the 
case, one may wonder the point of Wang Bi’s lengthy discussion that natureDao 
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should regulate natureqi.  In my view, Wang Bi formulated his theory not only for 
the ruler, as Wagner suggests,186 he did it also for the general reader.  To restore 
order in society is not completely in the hands of the ruler.  It also depends on each 
individual rediscovering his or her nature, which is the share of the Dao.  Given 
this consideration, it would be strange that Wang Bi simply stressed the inbornness 
of this spirituality in a work written also for ordinary readers to communicate the 
meaning of the Dao.  As shown above, Wang Bi did discuss the methods of self-
cultivation, which is crucial for one to rediscover one’s natureDao.  This suggests 
that in Wang Bi’ view, even the sage’s spirituality is the result of a long process of 
self-cultivation.  And the common people can improve their understanding of the 
Dao through certain methods of self-cultivation.  In light of the above discussion, I 
think that Wang Bi appreciated one’s effort in trying to attain this spirituality.  
However, the sage finally achieves this spirituality, while the common people do 
not.  They may improve their understanding of the Dao, but they cannot achieve 
the thorough comprehension of the Dao as perfect as that of the sage.   
One point needs to be made clear.  To attain sagehood, practice is necessary 
but not sufficient.  The common people can improve their understanding of the 
Dao through practice, but practice alone is not enough to bring in the spirituality as 
perfect as the sage’s.  Because of their inadequate endowment of qi, they lack a 
high degree of intelligence, which is both necessary and sufficient for one to 
comprehend the Dao. 
The intelletual ability of understanding the Dao involves various levels.  
Although only the sage reaches the highest level, the common people are 
encouraged to approximate it.  It is not the case that either one fully comprehends 
                                                 
186 The Craft of A Chinese Commentator, 168. 
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the Dao or one does not have any knowledge of the Dao.  One can acturally make 
a progressive understanding of the Dao through self-cultivation, the culmination of 
which can be said to approximate the sage’s spirituality.   
A common person’s understanding of the Dao is different from that of the 
sage.  As Wang Bi illustrates, the sage can be compared to the numinous powers 
(shen 神), as both share the same Dao and they unite to revert to it.187  The sage’s 
spirituality benefits all creatures under Heaven.  But a common person’s 
understanding of the Dao benefits himself only, i.e., entail him a full lifespan free 
of damage and bitterness (quanshen 全身  or quansheng 全生 ).  When one 
comprehends the Dao, one’s specific capacity can be fully utilized.  But the sage, 
being at the one with the Dao, is able to let all capable persons subordinate to 
him.188 
In his commentary on the Analects, Wang Bi drew a clear line between a 
gentleman and the sage.  He says, 
A gentleman 189  responds to things only after they fully develop, 
watches things when things take shape, chooses the right place to 
conduct himself, and depends on study to comprehend the whole 
situation; therefore he does not enter and serve a state ruled by a 
                                                 
187 Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 158; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 165. 
 
188 Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 81; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 108-
109. 
 
189 In Lou Yulie’s Wang Bi jijiaoshi the subject is “Confucius”.  I replace it with “a 
gentleman” according to Tang Yongtong’s explanation.  If a person deals with things only after the 
transformation of them comes to be evident, he cannot be said to be at one with the Dao.  It is 
impossible that Confucius falls into this category, since he was esteemed as the sage in the Wei-Jin 
period.  The person conducing himself in this way, for example, Yan Hui, is called gentleman (君
子 junzi) inferior to the sage.  
   
Tang Yongtong湯用彤, “Wang Bi zhi Zhouyi Lunyu xinyi,” 王弼之周易論語新義, in 
Wei-Jin xuanxue lungao 魏晉玄學論稿, 101; it is translated by W. Liebenthal as “Wang Bi’s New 
Interpretation of the I Ching and Lun-yu,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 10 (1947): 124-61. 
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person of bad repute.  The sage, however, reaches the remote and 
considers the subtle, his responses to things and his transformations 
are miraculous, the dirty cannot stain his pureness, and the vicious 
cannot damage his nature.  Therefore he is able to avoid danger 




As the above quotation shows, a gentleman has to accumulate knowledge 
and copes with things prudently.  The sage, because of his spirituality, is able to 
deal with whatever situations naturally and effortlessly.  Confucius once sighed 
that if it is impossible to meet a sage, it is good to meet a gentleman.  Wang Bi 
seemed to hold a similar view: to be a gentleman is a difficult yet attainable task, 
but to become a sage without the necessary endowment is impossible.191   
In summary, sagehood is inborn in that the sage’s spirituality is inborn, for 
the practice of self-cultivation is necessary but not sufficient for attaning 
spirituality.  The spirituality has its origin in the sage’s nature.  That is, the sage is 
endowed with special refined qi.  This kind of qi provides a favourable condition 
for the sage to rediscover his natureDao.  The sage’s qi endowment accounts forhis 
high degree of intelligence, with which he is able to comprehend the profoundity 
of the Dao and embody the Dao naturally in his entire mode of being.   
                                                 
190 Wang Bi jijiaoshi 王弼集校釋, 632. 
 




So far I have examined Wang Bi’s conception of human nature, his view 
of the relationship between nature and feeling, and his understanding of the ideal 
nature of the sage.  To summarize the main point of my examination, Wang Bi 
inherited certain insights from Han Confucianism and formulated a fresh 
interpretation of human nature.  He considered human nature to be consisting of 
natureDao and natureqi.  NatureDao is the differentiation of the Dao in each human 
being and defines what is authentic in each human being.  Natureqi is the substance 
that forms human nature, and feeling is generated from the contact of natureqi with 
things.  Whereas natureDao is neither good nor evil, natureqi, or its contact with 
things, i.e., feeling, is subject to moral judgement.  Whether feeling is good or not 
depends on whether it is under the influence of natureDao.  In contrast with the 
common people, whose feelings may drift with things, the sage’s feeling is always 
proper.  This is because of the sage’s spirituality.  Spirituality pertains to the 
sage’s capacity to comprehend the Dao and his being at one with the Dao.  It is a 
balanced interaction between his natureDao and natureqi.  As the sage is endowed 
with special refined qi and a high degree of intelligence, he is able to develop his 
spirituality through self-cultivation.  In this respect, I propose that Wang Bi 
considered sagehood to be inborn, in that the potential or capacity for sagehood is 
inborn.  However, Wang Bi appreciated the common people’s effort to rediscover 
their natureDao.  Although their understanding of the Dao is not as perfect as that 
of the sage, it is sufficient for them to live a fulfilling life and is necessary for a 
harmonious society.  
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Chapter 3 The Limits of Nature and Self-Knowledge  
 
 
Guo Xiang (郭象 A.D.252? -312) is a major figure in Wei-Jin intellectual 
history.192  He is remembered in the history of Chinese philosophy especially for 
his commentary on the Zhuangzi.  His contemporaries thought highly of him as 
second only to Wang Bi.193  In the Zhengshi era, Wang Bi’s commentary on the 
Laozi, together with He Yan’s work on the Laozi,194 made “Laozi and Zhuangzi so 
prevalent that they rivaled Confucius.”195  Slightly later, with the appearance of 
the commentaries on the Zhuangzi by Xiang Xiu (A.D.227-280) and Guo 
Xiang,196 “Confucian and Mohist words came to lose their appeal while Daoist 
                                                 
192 Tang Yijie湯一介 collects the various biographies of Guo Xiang and other historical 
documents about him from various sources in his book, which is very helpful.  See Guo Xiang yu 
Wei-Jin xuanxuey郭象與魏晉玄學, 307-321. 
 
Despite his important contribution to Wei-Jin philosophy, Guo Xiang has received less 
attention from Western researchers.  Brook Ziporyn has published a book entitled The Penumbra 
Unbound: The Neo-Taoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang (Albany, New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2003), which is the first book-length study of Guo Xiang in English. 
 
193 Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 112; cf. Mather, A New Account of Tales of the World , 578. 
 
194   A passage from Shishuoxinyu reads,         
He Yan went to see Wang Bi when he completed his commentary on the Laozi.  
However, after reading Wang Bi’s commentary on the Laozi, He Yan was 
convinced by its profundity and accuracy.  He said, “it is with a man like this 
that one can discuss the relationship between Heaven and human beings”.  He 




This seems to indicate that He Yan was so convinced by Wang Bi’s commentary that he 
had to present his own commentary in a different way.  See Shishuoxinyu 世說新語, 107; cf. 
Mather, A New Account of Tales of the World , 101. 
 
195 Wang Yunxi 王運熙 and Zhou Feng 周鋒, Wenxindiaolong yizhu 文心雕龍譯注 
(Shanghai guji chubanshe上海古籍出版社, 1998), 157. 
 
196 As is well known, Guo Xiang has been accused of having plagiarized from Xiang 
Xiu’s commentary on the Zhuangzi.  The charge was first recorded in Shishuoxinyu (111-112; A 
New Account of Tales of the World, 105-6) and followed by later historians without question until 
the Qing dynasty.   Based on the biography of Xiang Xiu in the History of the Jin Dynasty, which 
indicates that Guo Xiang paraphrased Xiang Xiu’s commentary and extended it (History of the Jin 
Dynasty: Biography of Xiang Xiu 晉書·向秀傳, 1374), the Qing scholar Qian Zeng 錢曾 (1629-
1701), and later Wang Xianqian 王先謙 (1842-1917) and Wu Chengshi 吳承仕 (1885-1939), 
proposed that although Guo Xiang is indebted to Xiang Xiu, his commentary is not a complete 
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words became popular.”197  If Wang Bi, with his associates, were the pioneers of 
the xuanxue revolution, then Guo Xiang provided the concluding chapter to it.  
The two philosophers are most representative of this unique development in 
Chinese philosophy of the Wei-Jin period.   
Guo Xiang derived insight from both the Zhuangzi and the entire classical 
and Han tradition to arrive at a coherent view of human nature.  It is my proposal 
that by his innovative concept of xingfen (the limits of nature 性分), as by the 
distinction between natureDao and natureqi  in Wang Bi’s case, Guo Xiang was able 
to answer  the question of the origin of good and evil. As opposed to the Han 
Confucian view that evil is an innate part of human nature, Guo Xiang believed in 
the natural good of human nature.  Evil, in his view, is produced externally by 
trying to exceed one’s limits of nature.  So the most important thing is to develop 
self-knowledge of one’s limits.  This self-knowledge, in its perfect version, is a 
mindset of freedom and spontaneity.  The external distinction between Confucian 
and Daoist behavior then dissolves with such a mindset.  
This chapter explores Guo Xiang’s view of human nature and the 
sociopolitical implications of his view.  In the first part, I inquire into what the 
concept of nature refers to concretely in Guo Xiang’s commentary.  The inquiry 
suggests that Guo Xiang maintained a comprehensive view of human nature and 
                                                                                                                                      
copy of the latter’s.  In other words, Guo Xiang offered his own ideas also in interpreting the 
Zhuangzi.  Since then, scholars are generally more sympathetic towards Guo Xiang and agree that 
Guo developed Xiang Xiu’s ideas and in so doing contributed significantly to Profound Learning.   
 
Both Tang Yijie湯一介 and Su Xinwo蘇新鋈 make clear summaries of the discussions 
on this issue.  See their respective books Guo Xiang and Wei-Jin philosophy 郭象與魏晉玄學, 
127-148; The Philosophy of Guo Xiang 郭象莊學平議 (Taiwan: xuesheng shuju臺灣學生書局，
1980), 12-17.  
 
197 Fang Xuanling 房玄齡，Biography of Xiang Xiu 向秀傳 , in History of the Jin 
Dynasty晉書 (Zhonghua shuju中華書局，1962)，vol.5: 1374. 
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he understood it to refer principally to life, physical features, capacity and feelings.  
Benevolence and righteousness form an indispensable part of human nature, only 
if they pertain to natural feelings rather than moral norms and the artificial 
expressions of moral norms.  Then I examine Guo’s innovative and intriguing 
conception of xingfen (the limits of nature 性分 ) and the related distinction 
between xingfen zhi nei (within the limits of nature 性分之內) and xingfen zhi wai 
(beyond the limits of nature 性分之外).  In this part, I explain xingfen in terms of 
capacity (cai才) and feelings (qing情), in hope of giving a clear idea of what 
xingfen is.  It is my submission that Guo Xiang was overwhelmingly concerned 
with developing a mode of self-knowledge, i.e., a consciousness of one’s natural 
limits.  This self-knowledge is attainable through one’s life experiences and 
comprehension of Daoist wisdom.  The last question of this part concerns whether 
Guo Xiang is a “fatalist.”  I suggest that the answer depends on the sense in which 
the concept of fatalism is used.  I understand Guo Xiang as a fatalist in an 
objective sense.  Subjectively, he is surely not a fatalist, in that self-knowledge is a 
positive affirmation of who one is and that happiness is not based on external 
conditions but on one’s inner state of mind.  The last part of this chapter explores 
the sociopolitical implications of Guo Xiang’s view of human nature.  The first 
question concerns the ideal society in which each person possesses the self-
knowledge of his or her limits.  Then I examine the issue of non-action.  It is my 
proposal that in Guo Xiang’s interpretation, non-action is not a set of rigid ethical 
requirements; rather, it pertains to a mindset of freedom and spontaneity.  Finally, 
I address the question whether Guo Xiang is an anarchist, as this issue is directly 
associated with his understanding of non-action. 
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3.1. A Comprehensive View of Nature 
 Chinese philosophers generally agreed that nature is what human beings 
are endowed with naturally.  However, they diverged in what nature refers to 
substantively.  By Guo Xiang’s time, various views of human nature had been 
formulated.  Guo Xiang integrated these views into his philosophical system and 
arrived at a comprehensive view of human nature.  Of utmost significance is that 
he interpreted the Confucian term renyi (benevolence and righteousness) in a 
Daoist way, and in so doing sought to reconcile Confucianism with Daoism. 
3.1.1. Self-transformation: the denial of the Dao as the creator 
The relationship between Nonbeing and Being gave rise to a fundamental 
debate in Wei-Jin intellectual history.  The debate centered on whether Nonbeing 
can produce Being.  Some intellectuals in the early Wei period, He Yan and Wang 
Bi for example, stated that Nonbeing produces Being.  Others in the later Wei and 
early Jin period disagreed, of whom the representatives were Guo Xiang and Pei 
Wei (裴頠 267-300).198  They held that Nonbeing cannot produce Being and that 
Being produces itself. 
In sharp contrast with Wang Bi, who highlighted the ontological 
significance of the Dao, Guo Xiang did not specify the creativity of the Dao, nor 
did he mention the common origin of human nature.  He formulated a theory of 
“self-transformation” (duhua 獨化), which forms the basis of his philosophy, and 
is also the starting point from which I begin the exploration of his concept of 
nature. 
                                                 
198  Pei Wei wrote an essay “Esteeming Being” Chongyoulun 崇有論 to refute that 
Nonbeing produces Being.  He said, “Ultimate Nonbeing cannot produce Being; therefore, Being 
comes into being by itself spontaneously (夫至無者, 無以能生。故始生者, 自生也。).  Chinese 




Guo Xiang stressed that the Dao cannot create Being and Being comes to 
be of itself.  He says, 
Since Nonbeing is just that, Nonbeing, it cannot generate Being.  
As Being has not yet been generated, it cannot cause generation.  




In Wang Bi’s view, despite lacking any physical features, the Dao does 
“exist” in the sense that it is the fundamental principle of all life, pervasive, ever-
present and sustaining all processes in the universe.  Guo Xiang, however, 
conceived of Nonbeing as an absolute non-existence.  In Wang Bi’s thought, the 
Dao creates all things; the latter in turn have a share in the nature of the Dao.  But 
Guo Xiang rejected such a creator-creature relationship.  Beings are produced not 
on account of any external agent or act of will but by themselves spontaneously 
without any intention.  Once things come into being, their nature is formed 
spontaneously.   
The theory of self-transformation is not only about the self-generation of 
things, but also about the ceaseless transformation of things, which is also natural, 
as there is nothing external making things transform in this way or that way (非有
使然也). 200  Guo Xiang says, 
                                                 
199 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, in Sibu beiyao 四部備要
(Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju上海：中華書局, 1935), vol. 151: 8;  I benefit much from Richard J. 
Lynn’s suggestion on the translation of Guo Xiang’s text, see his Zhuangzi: A New Translation of 
The Sayings of Master Zhuang As Interpreted by Guo Xiang (Columbia University Press, 
forthcoming) 
 
200 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 89. 
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As for the strength of strengthlessness, none is stronger than 
transformation. … Such strength not stopping for even a moment, 
suddenly the new things happen.  The myriad things in the universe 
change ceaselessly.  The world is totally new, but people think of it 
as the old one.  The boat moves every day, but people see it as 
remaining in one place; the mountain changes every day, but 
people consider it as the same as what it was before. … Thus the I 
who existed before is no longer the I who exists now.  I always go 





Although Guo Xiang did not take the Dao to refer to an ontological reality, 
he did understand the Dao as a principle of self-transformation, a principle of 
following the nature of a thing.  Most importantly, as we shall see, the Dao is also 
taken to refer to the state of mind when a person comprehends and follows the 
above principles naturally in his/her entire mode of being.  Consequently, the Dao 
in Guo Xiang’s view is not beyond the physical world, but within it; the Dao is not 
an independent reality, but a perfect property intrinsic to things and human beings. 
This view is different from Wang Bi’s, who hold that the Dao is both beyond and 
within the physical world, and is both a transcendental reality and dependent on 
things.  I will revisit this issue in chapter 4. 
                                                 




3.1.2. The meaning of nature (xing) in Guo Xiang’s Zhuangzi commentary 
Chinese philosophers generally defined nature as what human beings are 
endowed with naturally.  However, the question is that this definition does not tell 
us what nature means.  In other words, the definition is a formal definition; xing is 
a general, umbrella term, which leaves us wondering about its content.  Before 
Guo Xiang, there had been various attempts to solve the question; for example, 
Gaozi explained nature as human need for food and sex; Mencius saw nature as 
moral potential; and Zhuangzi, as life.  Deriving insights from his predecessors, 
Guo Xiang brought out a comprehensive answer to the question.  In contrast to 
Wang Bi, whose interpretation of nature is quite abstract, Guo Xiang took nature 
to refer concretely to four main sets of human phenomena: namely, life, physical 
features, capacity, and feeling.202 
(1) Life 
Guo Xiang often put the characters xing 性 (nature) and ming 命 (life or 
fate) together, using the compound xingming 性命 (life) to refer to nature.  In 
these cases, nature means life.  For example, he says, “Be satisfied with what one 
is naturally and be at ease with one’s nature (life) (足于天然而安其性命) (2:9)”; 
“one obtains from fully utilizing one’s nature (life) (取於盡性命之極) (11:3).”  
(2) Physical features 
Nature is also taken to refer to physical features or properties.  As Guo 
Xiang illustrates, borrowing from the Zhuangzi, by nature, a crane’s legs are long 
while a duck’s are short.  The former should not be shortened or the latter 
                                                 
202 This does not mean that xing 性 equates with xingming 性命 or xingqing 性情.  Rather, 
since xing性 is an abstract or ambiguous concept, I try to work out what it is, with evidence from 
the texts, by explaining it in terms of ming命, qing情, and cai才. 
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extended, as this will damage their nature.203  The Great Cedrela (dachun 大椿) 
lives long and the mushroom, short; both are determined by their nature.  The 
nature of a square is different from that of a circle.  Similarly, the nature of bitter 
taste is far from that of sweet taste.204 
(3) Capacity 
Due to certain properties, a thing is capable of doing certain things.  Thus, 
nature is also defined in terms of capacity (cai).  Thanks to their respective 
biological features, fish can swim and birds can fly.  Guo Xiang borrowed the 
example of a horse from the Zhuangzi.  The horse’s hoof can stand frozen snow 
and its fur can resist strong wind.  It feeds only on grass and water, and needs no 
special shielding.  Because of these properties, as Guo Xiang further suggested, 
which shows clearly his divergence from the Zhuangzi, horses can be used for 
transportation.205 
Another example from the Zhuangzi involves Li Zhu (離朱 ) and Shi 
Kuang (師曠).  They turned out to be a great painter and musician respectively.  
Although Guo Xiang did not appreciate their accomplishments, for their work, in 
his view, distracted people’s sight and hearing, he did admit, “Li Zhu and Shi 
Kuang have keen ears and sharp eyes by nature (離曠性聰明).”206  
                                                 
 
203 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 39-40. 
 
204 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 4, 24. 
 
205  Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注 , 41.  While the text 
describes the biological features of a horse to indicate that they should be followed, Guo Xiang 
made a piece of anthropomorphic and social commentary on it: a horse does not mind being ridded 
and it simply contempts glory and wealth. 
206 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 39.  
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Nature is also taken to refer to moral capacity, which is especially of 
interest to this thesis.  Guo Xiang commented on two virtuous persons in the 
Zhuangzi: 
Zeng Shen (曾參) and Shi Qiu (史鰌) are by nature good at being 
benevolent (性長於仁 ); those who are not good at being 
benevolent by nature always admire these two.  However, if people 




Two points are noteworthy here.  (1) Nature encompasses a moral capacity.  
(2) The moral capacity is different from one person to another.  In other words, 
some persons are more capable than others to be good.  Daoism saves its most 
vitriolic critique for the Confucian view of human nature.  But Guo Xiang did not 
completely reject the Confucian view, though as a commentator he was supposed 
to confine himself to the Zhuangzi text.  Confucians and Daoists have argued 
bitterly on the issue of the relationship between human nature and morality.  As I 
will show later, Guo Xiang actually produced a highly complex explanation of this 
issue, which is indicative of his indebtedness to both Daoism and Confucianism. 
(4) Feelings 
Guo Xiang took the compound性情 (xingqing) to refer to the emotional 
assets of the human being, as contrasted to intelligence or cognition.   
                                                 
207 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 39.   
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Consider the following examples from Guo’s commentary: it is because 
this man’s nature and feelings are different from others (此蓋性情之異者) (2:4); 
this is to artificially change his nature and feeling (斯矯其性情也) (12:9); to take 
nature and feeling as fundamental (以情性爲主也) (13:3). 
To summarize, in Guo Xiang’s understanding, xing encompasses life, 
physical features, capacity, and feeling.  There are overlaps between these subsets.  













Besides these, xing may encompass other constituents, given that Guo 
Xiang interpreted xing in a comprehensive way.  One of them might be character 
or composition, in the light of the popular practice of appreciating personality in 
the Wei-Jin period.208  Guo Xiang never remarked that xing encompasses only 
these four parts.  I address these four, simply because Guo Xiang discussed them 
at great length.   
                                                 
208 Shishuoxinyu 世 說 新 語 consists of the stories, conversations, and short 
characterizations of the famous men in the Wei-Jin period.  A theoretical and systematical inquiry 
into personality is Liu Shao’s work On Personality (Renwuzhi人物志).  It formulates a theory of 
appointing officials according to their characters and compositions.  English translation of the text 
is available: J.K. Shryock, The Study of Human Abilities: The Jen Wu Chih of Liu Shao, American 
Oriental Series, vol. 11(New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1937; reprint, New York, 1966). 
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That the four constituents overlap is easy to understand.  Life can be seen 
as a form of capacity and has both physical and emotional dimensions.  Capacity 
can be seen as physical or emotive; the latter finds expression in a person’s 
competence in dealing with human relationships.  There does not appear to be any 
overlap between feeling and physical features.  However, Guo Xiang was not a 
modern analytic philosopher; the point here is not to provide an analytic account 
of these constituents of nature but rather to show how nature can be understood 
concretely from these perspectives. 
3.1.3. Whether benevolence and righteousness are the nature of the human 
being  
The analysis so far has shown that Guo Xiang basically maintained a 
Daoist approach to human nature.  On the one hand, he interpreted nature in a 
negative way, especially in arguing that nature was not what Confucians had 
conceived it to be.  On the other hand, he explained nature in a positive way, 
referring it substantively to life, physical features, capacity and feelings.  Clearly, 
these references are used not in the Confucian moral sense. 
However, as mentioned above, Guo Xiang was not free of the influence of 
Confucianism.  As a matter of fact, it is hard to locate Wang Bi, Guo Xiang and 
other major Wei-Jin thinkers in either the Daoist or the Confucian school.  Guo 
Xiang did not completely dispel the Confucian idea of human nature signified by 
the terms benevolence and righteousness.  In some instances, he seemed to adopt a 
Mencian view and clearly stated that benevolence and righteousness are a part of 
human nature.   
 Benevolence and righteousness rightly belong to the nature and 
feeling (xingqing 性情) of human beings; one should just follow 
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them.  One who fears that benevolence and righteousness do not 
belong to human nature may be said to worry too much! 
 夫仁義自是人之情性,  但當任之耳。恐仁義非人情而憂之者,  
真可謂多憂也。209 
Guo Xiang reiterated the same theme elsewhere in his commentary: 
 Benevolence and righteousness rightly belong to human nature.  
But from the three sage-kings onward, people have joined in 
making lots of noise about this.  Consequently, they have ignored 
nature and sought to observe the traces [the rites],210 as if whatever 
they do is not enough. Is this also not worrying too much? 
 夫仁義自是人情也。而三代以下，橫共囂囂，棄情逐迹，如將
不及，不亦多憂乎。211 
At this point, one might conclude that Guo Xiang tried to reconcile 
Daoism and Confucianism in his conception of human nature.  However, the fact 
is that his view of benevolence and righteousness is far more complicated than the 
above passages suggest. 
            As shown above, Guo Xiang affirmed benevolence and righteousness as a 
part of inborn nature.  However, in other passages he took benevolence and 
righteousness to refer to the artificial moral institutions favored by Confucians. 
In chapter 14 of the Zhuangzi it is said, 
                                                 
209 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 40; cf. Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation. 
 
210 Brook Ziporyn makes a detailed analysis of the terms of “the traces (迹 ji)” and “what 
leaves the traces (所以迹 suoyiji)”.  I will come to them shortly.  The Penumbra Unbound, 31-61.   
 
211 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 40; cf. Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation.  
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Benevolence and righteousness are like the temporary and coarse 
huts of the past kings.  One can store in it for one night, but must 
not stay in it for long, for one would incur much blame when being 
seen there. 
仁義先王之蘧廬也。止可以一宿，而不可久處，覯而多責。212 
Guo Xiang commented on this passage as follows: 
Benevolence and righteousness belong to human nature.  Human 
nature changes and varies from the past to the present.  If one stops 
briefly in them and then goes on one’s way, one will remain 
inconspicuous.  If one gets stuck on one aspect of them, he 
becomes conspicuous, such conspicuousness leads to artificiality, 
and such artificiality leads to much blame.   
夫仁義者，人之性也。人性有變，古今不同也。故遊寄而過去
則冥，若滯而系於一方則見，見則僞生，僞生而責多矣。213 
Guo Xiang followed Zhuangzi in describing benevolence and 
righteousness metaphorically as “temporary accommodation.”  This metaphor 
indicates that benevolence and righteousness are not only changeable but also 
external to human beings.  In light of this, it is highly possible that Guo Xiang was 
talking about the normative dimension of benevolence and righteousness.     
Guo Xiang invented the term ji (traces, or footprints 迹) to demonstrate the 
transience and dependence of Confucian rites among other things.  Chapter 14 of 
the Zhuangzi says,  
                                                 
212 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 62; cf. Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation.  
 




The six classics are like the footprints left by the past kings, and 
they are not that by which the past kings left footprints.  Now what 
you say is just like footprints.  Footprints are made by shoes, but 
are they the shoes themselves?  
夫六經先王之陳迹也，豈其所以迹哉。今子之所言猶迹也。夫
迹，履之所出，而迹豈履哉？ 
Guo Xiang’s comment reads, 
What leaves the traces is the true nature.  For those following the 
true nature of things, their traces are the six classics.  Today, when 
people deal with things, they should consider ziran to be the shoes 
and the six classics to be the traces. 
所以迹者真性也。夫任物之真性者，其迹則六經也。況今之人
事，則以自然爲履，六經爲迹。214 
According to Guo Xiang, both moral norms and the classics bearing the 
sage’s teachings are the traces that the sage left behind.215  In the past, the sage 
instituted regulations to manage the human world.  They were merely the 
convenient means employed by the sage-king.  With the change of the 
environment, the regulations became outdated.216  Then people should not hold on 
                                                 
214 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 63; cf. Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation.  
 
215 Some researchers have made insightful arguments on the issue of “traces” in Guo 
Xiang’s commentary.  Mou Zousan牟宗三，Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理, 187-195; Tang Yijie
湯一介，Guo Xiang yu Wei-Jin xuanxue 郭象與魏晉玄學, 250-253; Brook Ziporyn, “The Self-so 
and Its Traces in the Thought of Guo Xiang,” Philosophy East and West, 43.3 (July 1993): 511-
540. 
 
216 Guo Xiang says,  
As for propriety and righteousness, when applied in the proper time, they are 
like the beauty of Xi Shi; but when they become outdated and are still preserved, 
they are like the ugly. 
況夫禮義，當其時而用之，則西施也。時過而不棄，則醜人也。 
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to them permanently.  Rather, they should comprehend the true nature, i.e., ziran 
of the sage, which is the constant root (ben) that underlies all changes. 
 We can now see the complexity of Guo Xiang’s argument of human nature.  
To summarize, (1) in most passages Guo Xiang interpreted human nature from an 
amoral perspective, referring it to life, physical features, capacity, and feelings, 
while in others he interpreted human nature in moral terms as benevolence and 
righteousness. (2) In some passages Guo Xiang affirmed benevolence and 
righteousness to be a part of inborn nature and universal, elsewhere he indicated 
that they are simply the transient moral institutions favored by Confucians.   
Now the question is whether Guo Xiang is inconsistent, or the Zhuangzi is 
inconsistent and therefore Guo Xiang as a commentator has to do justice to both 
these views, despite their apparent contradictoriness?  It is possible that Guo 
Xiang’s inconsistency is partly caused by the text of the Zhuangzi itself. 217  
However, I would like to propose that Guo Xiang saw the Zhuangzi as a coherent 
text, or even if he realized the inconsistency in it, as a prominent commentator and 
philosopher he would try to provide a coherent interpretation of it.  I make this 
proposal because commentarial writing is the most fundamental method of doing 
philosophy in traditional China.  Philosophers constructed their own ideas through 
commenting on the classics.  In this regard, the commentary itself can be seen as 
an independent work reflecting the thought of the commentator.  In my view, Guo 
                                                                                                                                      
Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 62. 
 
217 Liu Xiaogan劉笑敢 proposes that the inner chapters were composed earlier than the 
outer and miscellaneous chapters, as there is an evident discrepancy between the two in language 
and ideas.  For example, he points out that the characters Dao道 and de德 were used separately in 
the inner chapters, but they are used as a compound daode道德 in the outer and miscellaneous 
chapters.  Since compound normally occurs later than the single character in the development of 
language, this proves that the inner chapters are earlier than the outer and miscellaneous chapters.  
See Liu Xiaogan 劉笑敢, Philosophy of Zhuangzi and Its Development 莊子哲學及其演變, 5-20, 
William E.  Savage, Classfying the Zhuangzi Chapters, 18-39. 
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Xiang considered the Zhuangzi to be a reservoir of insight and truth and he tried to 
reveal its profound meaning.  Can the apparent inconsistency in Guo Xiang’s view 
of human nature, then, be resolved?   
First, the fact that Guo Xiang employed both amoral and moral language to 
describe nature need not be contradictory.  Nature is what human beings are 
endowed with naturally, including physical features, capacity, moral potential, and 
feelings.  Since Guo Xiang adopted a comprehensive understanding of human 
nature, depending on context he could highlight different aspects of nature in his 
commentary on the Zhuangzi.  This is different from Mencius who excluded non-
moral aspects from his conception of human nature.218  Guo Xiang is also different 
from Gaozi who explicitly excluded moral assets from his definition of nature.219  
To Guo Xiang, both the amoral and moral constituents must be taken into account 
in an understanding of human nature, though he was mainly concerned with the 
amoral dimensions of human nature.   
With respect to the second contradiction mentioned above, since the term 
of benevolence and righteousness has different meanings dependent on the context, 
the contradiction will not hold true.  In some passages the term refers to the 
                                                 
218 The Mencius 7B:24 reads, 
Mouth is concerned with tastes, eyes are concerned with colors, ears are 
concerned with sounds, tnoses are concerned with smells, and four limbs are 
concerned with ease, this is human nature, yet therein also lies the Decree.  That 
is why the gentleman does not describe it as nature.  Benevolence pertains to the 
relation between father and son, righteousness to the relation between the ruler 
and the subject, the rites to the relation between guest and host, wisdom to the 
good and wise man, the sage to the way of the Heaven, this is the Decree, but 






D.C.Lau, Mencius, Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1984, 295.  
Translation altered. 
 
219 Mencius 6A:4, 225. 
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natural affections of human beings, while in others it refers to moral regulations or 
institutions.  While natural affections are innate and universal, moral regulations 
or institutions are external and changeable.   
When benevolence and righteousness refer to natural affections, they are 
certainly the nature of each human being.  Neither Wang Bi, as shown in chapter 2, 
nor Guo Xiang rejected human feelings as a whole; rather, they valued the natural 
feelings of human beings.  In Guo Xiang’s case, natural feelings are valuable for 
being natural, not for being benevolent or righteous.  Benevolence and 
righteousness are only the invented names for them.  The names would change, 
but natural feelings themselves are permanent.  Clearly, although Guo Xiang 
retained the standard term of “benevolence” and “righteousness”, he highlighted 
the naturalness of feelings.  When benevolence and righteousness signify moral 
regulations or institutions, Guo Xiang was cautious with them.  He acknowledged 
their value as a means by which the sage-king managed the world.  But as they 
were invented for specific purposes and applicable to specific contexts, they were 
subject to change.  People thus should not hold on to them uncritically. 
To summarize, Guo Xiang formulated a comprehensive understanding of 
human nature as life, physical features, capacity, feeling, and moral potential.  By 
benevolence and righteousness, Guo Xiang in some passages referred to the 
natural affections that each person originally has, which falls within the scope of 
nature.  However, when referring to moral regulations or institutions subject to 
change, benevolence and righteousness have no place in human nature.     
3.2. The Limits of Nature and Self-knowledge 
 In this part, I try to grapple with the core and the most intriguing part of 
Guo Xiang’s theory of human nature: the conception of xingfen 性分 (the limits of 
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nature). Guo Xiang assumed a clear line between what is within the limits of 
nature (xingfen zhi nei 性分之內) and what is outside the limits (xingfen zhi wai 
性分之外 ), and emphasized that people should not transgress their limits.  
However, the question is how people can know the limits of their nature.  
Although a direct answer is not available in Guo Xiang’s commentary, there are 
indirect evidences that one can gather to figure out a reasonable explanation.  I 
propose that a mode of self-knowledge is the key to knowing one’s limits.  It is a 
consciousness that one can achieve through one’s life experience and 
comprehension of the Dao.  It is never independent of a comprehensive 
consideration of one’s particularities, context and other specific conditions. 
3.2.1. Xingfen (性分): the limits of nature 
The idea of xingfen is arguably the most important and distinctive 
contribution that Guo Xiang made to the Chinese philosophy of human nature.  
There are other synonymous terms in Guo Xiang’s commentary, such as wuji (物
極), xingji (性極), and benfen (本分).  To cite some passages from Guo Xiang, 
Each thing has its own nature; the nature of each thing has its own 
limits.   
物各有性, 性各有極。220  
Both the big and the small accord to the limits of their nature 
respectively.  
[小大] 各據其性分。221 
What a person is endowed with is limited. 
                                                 
220 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 4; Yu-lan Fung, Chuang-
tzu: A New Selected Translation with An Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hsiang,  30.  
 




There is an original limit to what a person is endowed with, which 
can neither be escaped nor increased. 
天性所受，各有本分，不可逃，亦不可加。223 
Two related terms are xingfen zhi nei (性分之內 within the limits of nature) 
and xingfen zhi wai (性分之外 outside the limits of nature), which also occur 
frequently in Guo Xiang’s commentary.  They demonstrate a clearer picture about 
the idea of xingfen.  It is as if a circle is drawn around a person.  The activities of 
the person must be limited within the circle and should not transgress it.  The 
circle is where the limits of the person’s nature are.  It decides what people can 
and cannot do. 
Two points are noteworthy of the above quotations.  (1) No external agent 
or act of will accounts for the limits of nature, and they are self-so when things 
come into being.  (2) The limits are fixed and cannot be changed.  People should 
accept the fact of their natural limits.  To provide a better understanding of xingfen, 
I will interpret it in some detail in terms of cai (capacity 才), since cai is a major 
constituent of nature and has been discussed the most by Guo Xiang. 
Before that, I need to clarify the relationship between what one can do and 
what one does actually in life, as the two will be mentioned frequently in the 
argument below.  In common understanding, one’s capacity defines what one can 
do and not necessarily what one does actually.  One’s capacity is natural 
endowment, while one’s actual doing or social position is also decided by 
                                                 
222 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 17. 
 
223 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 18. 
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circumstances, for example, family and education background.  Now, from the 
perspective of Western philosophy, this forms a contrast between “natural” and 
“social”.  However, the point is that this contrast does not exist in Guo Xiang’s 
worldview, in the same way that the contrast between fact and value is not 
recognized by many ancient Chinese philosophers.  As I will discuss at length 
later, the idea of yu 遇  (what one meets with) blurs the distinction between 
“natural” and “social”.  What one meets with during one’s life is natural, so one 
should accept it in the same way as one accepts any other natural objects or 
occurrences, as if it is the Decree or one’ fate.  In my understanding, it is not 
“social” but “artificial” that forms a contrast with “natural” in Guo Xiang’s 
worldview.  “Artificial” always points to a desire-driven, intentional, and 
purposive mind and activities induced by that mind.   
3.2.2. An illustration of xingfen in terms of cai (capacity) 
Each person has specific capacities, be they physical or intellectual, and 
this usually determines what he or she can do and in Guo Xiang’s understanding, 
does.  As Guo Xiang illustrates, the sage was able to be at one with the Dao, able 
to implement the policy of non-action and fully utilize other people’s capacities; 
so he became the ruler.  The worthies were able to deal with the affairs in some 
specific fields successfully; they became ministers and officials of various ranks.  
To take some instances from our own lives, a person may be good at 
communicating with others, or organizing a team to work together effectively; he 
or she may be capable of making an eloquent appeal for support, or administer the 
office routine in perfect order.  If these capacities are properly trained and 
unfavorable circumstances are excluded, he or she may come to be a salesperson, 
a manager, a politician or a lawyer, and a secretary respectively.  
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Capacity also varies from one person to another in degree, which 
determines the positions people hold.  For example, Mr. Yang Chen is a member 
of the national soccer team of China.  Although he is a good soccer player in 
China, no one would compare him with the Brazilian Ronaldo.  Obviously, Yang 
Chen has still a long way to go to rank among the world-class soccer players.   
Consequently, a person’s position in society is decided by the kind and the 
level of his or her capacity.  Of course, this is an ideal assumption that may not 
hold true in the complicated world.  But the point remains that for Guo Xiang 
there is a necessary connection between capacity and social role, which forms the 
context in which one may approach the concept of xingfen in terms of cai. 
Now, given that each person is doing a specific job and holds a specific 
position determined by his or her capacity, the question is should he or she always 
be satisfied with the current state of affairs?  In other words, does recognizing the 
limits of one’s nature mean never to long for promotion, progress or change?  For 
example, should a current senator or minister seek to become the president?  
Should the Chinese soccer player Yang Chen dream of becoming one of the 
world-class soccer players?  To take an extreme example, a man is unable to finish 
the work as his colleagues do, for he is stupid and clumsy.  So the man just 
accords to his nature and continues to work ineffectively? 
On this issue Guo Xiang seems at first glance to be inconsistent.  On the 
one hand, he insisted that even a slow horse is useful after being trained properly.   
If people abandon the horse for its slowness, or simply let the horse remain what it 
is, they are not utilizing the nature of the horse.224  Clearly, Guo Xiang encouraged 
people to make progress with their work.  On the other hand, one notices a 
                                                 
224 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 41. 
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recurring theme running through Guo Xiang’s commentary: one’s desire in 
becoming like others always result in confusion and suffering.  Guo Xiang 
lamented how wrong it is that a subject or a concubine intends to change their 
respective positions, and longs for the position of the ruler or the wife, 
respectively.225  They transgress the limits of their nature in the same way as a 
mantis does in trying to stop an oncoming chariot by its forelegs.  The mantis is 
doing what it cannot do, as the task exceeds its capacity.  Consequently, the 
impracticable ambition of stopping a running chariot makes the mantis the joke of 
others.226   
However, a careful examination suggests that Guo Xiang may not be self-
contradictory.  The capacities with which people are endowed are different both in 
kind and in degree.  While the former difference is fixed, the latter can be reduced 
through effort.  Ideally, what one does is decided by one’s capacity, which is 
unchangeable.  This is the limits of one’s nature and one should stay within it.  As 
Guo Xiang stressed, the sage ascended the throne and the worthies were appointed 
as ministers due to their respective capacities.  Both the ruler and the ministers 
should concentrate on their own duties rather than have a hand in others.227  Let 
me apply Guo Xiang’s concept to contemporary life.  A boy with swimming talent 
has been focusing on swimming training and has the promise to win the world 
championship.  This, in Guo Xiang’s term, is what the limits of his nature 
determine.  However, when the boy sees the great popularity of a famous soccer 
player, he changes his mind and hopes to become a soccer player too.  This is 
                                                 
225 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 9. 
 
226 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 22.  
 
227 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 9. 
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definitely undesirable, according to Guo Xiang, as the boy tries to do something 
out of admiration or desire, which is unnatural.  The boy makes an unwise 
decision, for he gives up the prospective success in swimming and begins a career 
that, because he does not have any talent for it, is doomed to end in failure.  Also, 
his natural talent for swimming would be put to waste, which deprives not only 
him but also society of potential benefits.   
Although the endowed capacity cannot be changed in kind, it can be 
changed in degree through practice.  One’s capacity is innate, but one needs to 
practice it continuously to become capable (言物雖有性，亦須數習而後能耳). 
228   The endowed capacity is simply a potential, and it is realized through 
continued practice.  Practice improves one’s capacity, making a capable person 
more capable.  Even a slow horse can become considerably fast through proper 
training. 
When discussing xingfen, in nine cases out of ten Guo Xiang used the 
character 安 an.  安 usually translates as “to be comfortable with, to be at ease 
with, and to be satisfied with”.  It does not mean that a man is always happy with 
his states, both good and bad.  Nor does it suggest a lazy acceptance of the current 
state and doing nothing to make progress.  Rather, it implies that a person 
accomplishes his work skillfully, as a result of practicing his capacity over a long 
period of time.  As a Chinese saying goes, more practice makes one more skillful 
(shu neng sheng qiao熟能生巧). Cook Ding’s amazing skill is an accumulation of 
daily practice.229  Each position has its requirements.  The person in a particular 
                                                 
228 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 75. 
 
229 The story of Cook Ding is primarily about Ding’s comprehension of the Dao, which 
accounts for his amazing skill.  However, it is simply unintelligible if his comprehension has 
nothing to do with his daily practice of butchering skill.  In other words, it is not that Ding derived 
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position has to practice his capacity to meet its requirements. Consequently, 
continued practice makes the person more competent.  He does his work 
successfully yet effortlessly; that is why he enjoys his work.  
Therefore, to maintain within the limits of one’s nature does not mean to 
be simply satisfied with one’s current state and make no progress.  Guo Xiang 
encouraged people to fully utilize their capacities through practice, which will 
give them a sense of self-sufficiency.  Only after a man is able to do his work 
skillfully and effortlessly, can he be said to be comfortable with (安) his position. 
The notion of practice needs to be especially noted, not only for its 
important role in realizing one’s nature, but also for its special connotation in Guo 
Xiang’s worldview.  It is noticeable that a contrast between xi ( practice習) and 
xue (to learn, to study學) was made in Guo Xiang’s commentary.  For example, 
Whatever one is able to do, although he does it, it is not deliberate, 
though he practices it, he does not study how to do it, though he 
talks about it, he does not dispute about it.  
凡所能者，雖行非爲，雖習非學，雖言非辯。230 
Guo Xiang would use the character xi 習 to suggest that one practice what 
one has already.  For example,  
                                                                                                                                      
his insights into the Dao suddenly from nothing, and then his skill improved remarkably.  Rather, 
an understanding of the Dao and the daily practice of skill interact with each other.  As the story 
suggests, when Ding just began his career, what he saw was the whole ox; three years later, he saw 
only parts of it; now he meets the subject with his spirit instead of his sight.  Clearly, Ding 
practiced his skill daily, and gradually developed his understanding of the Dao.  After a long term 
of practice and understanding, one day he suddenly attained a through comprehension of the Dao.   
From then on, his skill had been absolutely unique.  Although his amazing skill today is mainly 
due to a comprehension of the Dao, it is also dependent on an accumulation of daily practice.  See 
Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 17.   
 




Although the nature (capacity) of the thing is innate, it has to be 
practiced repeatedly to become capable. 
言物雖有性，亦須數習而後能耳。231 
It is by practice that one completes nature, and then nature looks like 
spontaneity. 
習以成性，遂若自然。232 
That thing has that particular nature, so let it practice it. 
彼有彼性，故使習彼。233 
Since xue 學  is an emblem of Confucianism (Guo Xiang termed 
Confucianism as mundane learning suxue俗學),234 Guo Xiang would interpret it 
as learning something external painstakingly, intentionally, deliberately, or 
learning from somebody else’s example in admiration, while in the case of xi習 
one simply practices what is innate in oneself.  As practice is natural, Guo Xiang 
emphasized that teaching or training should follow (yin 因) one’s nature.235  It 
should aim to develop what people have innately rather than instill something 
external into them. 
However, it must be pointed out that the practice of capacity only leads to 
the improvement or the strengthening of capacity.  It cannot change capacity in 
kind.  For example, despite the tough soccer training a gifted swimmer yet poor 
soccer player received, he has no promise to become a successful soccer player.  
                                                 
231 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 75. 
 
232 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 75. 
 
233 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 124. 
 
234 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 66. 
 
235 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 109. 
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In this regard, I propose that Guo Xiang considered sagehood to be inborn, as the 
nature of the sage is different from those of the common people.  Guo Xiang 
stated, “The special endowment of the proper qi of ziran is extremely rare.  
Among things only pine trees are endowed with it; among people only the sage is 
endowed with it (言特受自然之正氣者至希也。下者則唯爲松柏，上者則唯有
聖人).236  Consequently, whatever endeavor a common man makes to practice his 
nature; his capacities are always bound by the limits of his nature, that is to say, he 
has no promise to become a sage.237 
To summarize what I have argued about xingfen, the nature of each person 
has its limits; one should maintain within one’s limits and not transgress them.  To 
be more specific, the kind of capacity one is endowed with is unchangeable, and it 
determines the most suitable work for one.  Any horizontal comparison with 
others or effort to make horizontal moves is undesirable.  However, one can 
improve one’s capacity in degree through practice.  This is a vertical move in that 
it is a development to oneself within one’s limits.  It is also natural in that no 
                                                 
236 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 25. 
 
237 Guo Xiang says,  
If people want to become worthies, will they realize it?  If people make effort to 
become sages, will they attain it?  Certainly they will not.   
欲賢可以得賢，爲聖可以得聖乎？固不可矣。 
 
With respect to the relation between the sage and the common people, Guo Xiang seems 
to hold a view similar to Wang Bi’s.  The sage lives in the secular world and he looks like the 
common people in physical body and feeling expression.  But the sage has a kind of spirit, which 
distinguishes him eventually from other people.  For example, Guo Xiang says,  
 
The physical form of the sage is not different from those of the common people, 
therefore his hearing and sighting will deteriorate too.  But his spirit stays intact 
from beginning to end.  
聖人之形，不異凡人，故耳目之用衰也。至於精神則始終常全耳。 
 
Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 20, 100. 
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desire, comparison, or intention is involved and the improvement is simply a 
natural result of a full utilization of one’s capacity.  I will return to this point later. 
3.2.3. Xingfen in terms of qing (情) 
The character qing 情 occurs frequently in Guo Xiang’s commentary on 
the Zhuangzi.  It is identified as a key ingredient of nature and as such, an analysis 
of xingfen should also see how it is related to qing情.  The word qing 情 usually 
translates as feeling or emotion.  But this translation fails to convey the 
complexity of qing 情 in the commentary.  I collect Guo Xiang’s usages of qing 
and classify them into four groups. 
(1) Nature  
Qing 情 (qing) and nature (性 xing) are often used interchangeably in 
Chinese philosophical writings.  Guo Xiang also took qing 情 as synonymous with 
xing 性  in many passages of his commentary.  There 情 does not refer 
substantively to feeling or emotion, but is a more comprehensive term meaning 
what one has or is originally, which includes feeling (emotion), life, physical 
features, and capacity.  For example, Guo Xiang said that the ten thousand things 
have the ten thousand natures (萬物萬情) (2:2); and that each thing follows its 
nature (各隨其情) (18:1). 
(2) The Regular or Common State  
In some passages qing means the regular or common state of people.  It is 
a derivative of meaning (1).  If a person maintains what he or she is endowed with 
originally, this is his or her regular or common state.  Examples of this usage 
include the following: when times change, the common customs change too (時變
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則俗情亦變) (27:6); this is the common state of the common people (此百姓之大
情也) (32:1). 
(3) Desire, Preference, and Intention 
 Probably influenced by early Han Daoists and Liu Xiang, Guo Xiang also 
took qing to refer to obsessive feelings, uncontrolled desires, individual 
preferences, favors, or intentions.238  Evidence is available, for example in such 
passages as: one has the intention to become the sage and the worthies, but cannot 
obtain it (有情於爲聖賢而弗能也) (5:7); the feelings of favor and disfavor (夫好
惡之情) (5:7); the turbulences caused by desires (情欲之所蕩) (8:3). 
(4) Judgment, Opinion, and Discrimination 
 Guo Xiang also took qing to refer to judgment, opinion, and discrimination 
resulting from the limited knowledge or the arrogance of human beings.  To cite 
some examples: because people are bound to their own perspectives, [no one can 
be impartial] (由彼我之情偏) (2:10); without discrimination one is definitely 
impartial (無情至平) (5:4); right and wrong is what is meant by qing (以是非爲
情) (5:2).  
Relating the above classification of qing to the concept of xingfen, it is 
clear that qing belonging to groups (1) and (2) falls within the limits of nature, and 
is in harmony with nature, while qing belonging to groups (3) and (4) transgresses 
the limits, and should be purged.   
                                                 
238 Guo Xiang says, 
Human beings are born tranquil; this is their nature. They move in response to 
things; this is the desiring of nature.  Things come to distract human beings 
relentlessly, and human beings indulge in desires without control.  This will 




Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 29.  
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3.2.4. Self-knowledge: consciousness of xingfen  
A Chinese saying goes, “a content man is always happy 知足常樂 .”  
Though many people today acknowledge the wisdom connoted in the saying, they 
feel hard to live a life like that.  Although they may realize that they are never 
satisfied in chasing after vainglory and success, they feel that in a fiercely 
competitive world, they have to forge ahead.  Guo Xiang’s resolution is simple: 
each person has his or her limits, so they should just stay within their limits and be 
comfortable with them.  But, the question is do the common people have any idea 
of xingfen?  Do they know where their limits lie?  Apparently, the situation is not 
optimistic; there is a sense of urgency in Guo Xiang’s commentary in emphasizing 
the need for such self-knowledge.239  
This mode of self-knowledge, in my understanding, is a consciousness of 
xingfen.  In other words, it is an affirmation of who one is and the limits of one’s 
nature.  Having this mode of self-knowledge, one devotes oneself to what one is 
good at, improves one’s capacity through practice and attains a sense of 
satisfaction and accomplishment from within.   
This self-knowledge is free of thought and theory, and one can develop it 
from one’s life experience and comprehension of the Dao.  That is, one gradually 
develops a consciousness based on what one has experienced in life happily, sadly, 
angrily, and bitterly, etc.  In the early stage of development, it may not be called a 
consciousness but only some vague sense as to what one can and cannot do.  With 
the accumulation of experience, some of which may be the repetition of some 
                                                 
239 A Chinese idiom perfect for the English word self-knowledge is 自知之明 zizhi zhi 
ming, meaning that know one’s limitation, have a clear estimation of oneself, or know one’s 
strengths and weaknesses.  The etymology of自知之明 is not the concern here.  Although the 
Chinese idiom does not occur in Guo Xiang’s commentary, the idea of developing the wisdom of 
knowing oneself is evident in it. 
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especially happy or sad experiences in the past, what was a dim awareness 
becomes a clear consciousness of one’s limits.   
One usually gets a sense of limits by noticing the difference between 
oneself and others in physical capacity.  To take an example from Guo Xiang’s 
commentary, the peng bird has huge wings and can fly about ninety thousand 
miles; a small bird can only fly to the braches of a normal tree.  The small bird 
may admire the peng and try to fly as high as it does.  But its effort ends in failure.  
The repetition of this failure makes the small bird finally realize that it can never 
fly as high as a peng, for it does not have the huge wings. 
To take an example today, many jobs or positions require specific physical 
features.  One must be tall and strong to be a professional basketball player, and 
one must have a special figure meeting very strict standards to be a ballet dancer.  
So, if you are not gifted with such physical attributes, you have no promise to 
become a successful basketball player or a ballet dancer.  
The difference in intellectual capacity is not difficult to be discerned either.  
To be a professor in university, one must hold a doctoral degree.  A worker, who 
receives only elementary education, knows the gap between him and a professor.  
To take an example from Guo Xiang’s commentary, the worthies are unable to be 
identical with the Dao and unable to implement the policy of non-action as the 
sage does, so they become the ministers while the sage ascends the throne.  
However, the fact is that not everyone accepts one’s limits happily and 
then, as Guo Xiang hopes, does not admire others and just concentrates on what 
one can do and does.  The small bird may come away from the comparison with a 
passive resignation that it is just not good enough.  There is no contentment 
involved.  A farmer may persist in trying to become a minister.  The difference he 
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recognizes between him and a professor may actually motivate him to learn.  The 
questions that arise are: how can one get an affirmative knowledge of oneself, how 
can a determined person know where his or her limits lie, and if a worker, for 
example, is intelligent and persists in trying to become a minister, does he 
transgress his limits?  
The recognition of one’s difference from others does not necessarily yield 
self-knowledge.  This is why Daoist wisdom is necessary.  Daoist wisdom is broad, 
including comprehending the principle of ceaseless transformation and that of 
naturalness, to which I will return later.  Now suffice it to say that Daoist wisdom 
also involves understanding the root cause of one's unhappiness, which is desire.  
Guo Xiang employed the Chinese character zhi 志, which translates as will or 
determination, to convey this idea.  People are distracted by external things and 
determined to obtain them.  Strong will or determination to do something results 
in the transgression of one’s limits.240  Guo Xiang sighed, how sad that people are 
bound (lei 累) by external things.241  Desire can never be satisfied, for it grows 
incessantly.  When a man earns ten thousand dollars, he begins to think of earning 
fifty thousand; when earning fifty thousand, he wants to become a millionaire.  
Following his insatiable desires, the man loses sight of the limits of his nature.  
Worse, desire makes people dependent on external things.  Their joy and sorrow 
rely completely on the gain and loss of external things.  This is counter to Guo 
Xiang’s understanding of human beings as independent and free.  
                                                 
240 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 9. 
 
241 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 4. 
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Daoist wisdom also involves a positive affirmation of who one is and the 
limits of one's nature.  One’s life span242 and one’s physical energy are limited, 
which indicates that one cannot be perfect in every way.  One may find from past 
experience that one accomplished certain work easily, but failed to complete 
others even with tremendous effort.  This makes one realize one’s own strengths 
and weaknesses.  Ideally, this realization does not evoke a negative feeling in 
people.  To take the example of the peng and the small bird, in comparison with 
the former, the small bird not only knows its own limits, but also gets a sense of 
the peng’s limits.  Despite that the peng flies amazingly high, it relies on the wind 
to take off and the lake to perch due to its large shape.  Without these conditions, 
the peng is unable to fly.  Although the small bird can only fly to the branches of a 
normal tree, it can start and stop flying flexibly.  Now the small bird has a clear 
knowledge of its strengths and weaknesses.  Also it gets to know that every other 
has its limits.  With this knowledge, the small bird is neither ashamed of flying 
low nor conceited on account of its agility.  
A positive affirmation of who one is also gives one a sense of self-
sufficiency.  Knowing his strengths and weaknesses, a man devotes himself to 
perfecting what he can do.  His capacity improves gradually through continued 
practice.  He feels a sense of self-satisfaction through fully utilizing his capacity.  
Meanwhile, he does not envy other work that he is not good at.  He does not seek 
                                                 
242 By the time of Guo Xiang, religious Daoism was well established.  There was an 
attempt to attain immortality by means of religious Daoist cultivation.  Many Wei-Jin intellectuals 
tried to lengthen their life spans by taking certain medicinal substances, controlling the inhalation 
and exhalation of qi, and eating special food.  This indicates that people at that time realized the 
limitation of life span.  However, few people would naïvely expect an evergreen life by means of 
nourishing life.  As Guo Xiang clearly stated, to nourish life is not to attain an excessively long life, 
it is to live one’s full span in accordance to the Dao (養生非求過分，蓋全理盡年而已矣。Guo 
Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 17.)  This suggests that to nourish life is 
primarily to live one’s allotted span, given that many people indulged in desires and died much 
younger than they were expected, and then to extend one’s allotted span to a certain extent. 
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any horizontal moves from his current position to those of others.  Consequently, 
there is no way unhappiness would result.   
Now turning to the question: if one persists in trying to become like others, 
does one transgress one’s limits in Guo Xiang’s view?  For example, what if a 
farmer having the talent wants to become a minister? The farmer does not have a 
chance to go to school, but he likes to learn and has the intellectual capacity. 
Should he be content with his life as a farmer or should he pursue his “dream” of 
becoming a minister?  This is related to the contrast between what is “natural” and 
what is “social” mentioned earlier, to the point that what one can do is not 
necessarily what one does actually.  I think to this insistent farmer, Guo Xiang’s 
response would be negative. 
As a matter of fact, social hierarchy was not strictly observed during the 
turbulent Wei-Jin period.  A capable man in a lower position could take a number 
of opportunities to realize his capacity.  Cao Cao declared to recruit capable 
people regardless of their family background and moral cultivation.  If a person 
from a poor family was intelligent and well versed in clarifying names and 
analyzing principles (bianming xili 辨名析理), he would receive a warm welcome 
from the intellectual circle normally consisting of the descendants of noble 
families and became a member of that circle, and would be recommended to 
certain administrative position.  Given this context, if a farmer thinks that he is 
intelligent and should assume the duty of a minister, but he actually does farming, 
this, according to Guo Xiang, simply suggests that his current life has its basis in 
his nature.    
It is also possible that one’s current life is completely due to his misfortune.  
An excellent university student in law school has the promise to become a 
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successful politician.  But he has to leave off his study because of a family 
financial crisis and begins to do farming work.  Should this former student be 
content with his current life or should he pursue his dream of becoming a minister?   
As mentioned earlier, what one can do is not necessarily what one does 
actually.  Guo Xiang had to make an account of this discrepancy.  The key is the 
notion of yu (遇).  One comes across the character yu frequently when reading 
Guo Xiang’s writings.  In most passages yu means what one meets with 
throughout one’s life.  The meaning is neutral in that whatever happens to one by 
chance may be either good or bad.  In other cases, as opposed to the term buyu (不
遇), yu means that one’s capacity is recognized by the ruler or the superior officers 
and one is assigned to a suitable position.  Whenever Guo Xiang discussed the 
issue of yu, he employed the adjectives like an (be comfortable with 安), jing 
(calm 靜) and zu (be satisfied with足) to qualify yu.  In other words, he suggested 
that people should feel at ease with whatever happens to them, good or bad.243  
                                                 
243 To take some instances from Guo Xiang, he says, 
The cook and the men attending to the sacrificial utensils felt at ease with what 
they were assigned to; birds, beasts and all other things were all satisfied with 
what they had received; both Yao and Xu You stayed calm with what they had 




The sage always felt at ease with what he met, and he was open-minded and 
would not adhere to certain things.   
所遇即安，豁然無滯。 
 
One will not feel unsatisfied with whatever one meets. 
當所遇無不足也。 
 
People feel comfortable and sufficient with whatever they meet. 
當其所遇，無不自得。 
 
Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 5, 32, 14, 34. 
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The notion of yu (遇) is closely related with that of transformation (hua 
化).  Everything is in ceaseless transformation.  A man is unlucky today, but 
tomorrow something fortunate may happen to him.  You feel happy with what you 
have achieved now, but you do not know that you may lose it in near future.  
Currently Jack is a farmer, but who knows that one day he may become a minister, 
if he has the capacity!  Conversely, it is also possible that a current minister 
becomes a farmer one day.  A person is sad for the death of his beloved, but 
actually death is simply the dispersal of qi constituting his beloved.  What one 
meets with at any given time, either good or bad, is simply temporary; there is no 
need to be fixated on them.  A smart person will accept what he is given, feeling 
neither joy nor sorrow (故任其所受，而哀樂無所錯其間矣).244  
The notion of yu (遇 ) implies the unpredictability of one’s life in a 
continuously transforming world, which accounts for the discrepancy between 
what one can do and what one does actually.  It also implies the human being’s 
dependence on the external world, or the latter’s impact on the former.  Later we 
will see how Guo Xiang tried to eliminate this impact and to save human beings 
from bondage to any external things.  Now another important point needs to be 
noted.  To emphasize the inevitability of change in the universe and in one’s life, 
Guo Xiang would go so far as to suggest that what happens to one is already pre-
determined.  At this point, he directly used the character ming (fate or decree命), 
which introduces an element of fatalism. 
                                                 
244 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 18. 
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Transformation is just what is meant by ming245 in that nobody can resist 
change.  People may welcome change or reject it, but no matter what their 
attitudes are, change continues.  Yu (遇) reflects a kind of transformation.  One 
undergoes various situations throughout one’s lifespan.  One may be unable to 
predict what one will meet with in the either distant or near future, but what one 
will meet with is destined to happen.246  
Both transformation and what one meets with are self-so, i.e., ziran.  As 
argued in the first part of this chapter, transformation is self-transformation in that 
no external agent or power accounts for it.  Things change naturally; what a person 
meets with at any given time and in any given place is simply a temporary result 
of one moment of change.  So what one meets with is also self-so.247  To things 
                                                 
245 To quote a piece of passage from Guo Xiang, 
To take transformation as fate, one will not run counter to it. 
以化爲命，而無乖忤。 
 
 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 24. 
 
246 For example, Guo Xiang says, 
Although heaven and earth are vastand the myriad things are multiple,  what I 
have met is appropriately so.  Even the divinities of heaven and earth, the sages 
and worthies of the state, and the ultimately knowledgeable cannot make it so.  
Therefore, for what one does not meet with, one cannot meet; for what one 






A completely capable person just follows what he meets with. 
才全者，隨所遇而任之。 
 
Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 27, 27. 
 
247 Evidence from Guo Xiang’s commentary reads, 
Order or disorder, success or failure, and to be valued or not, all these are not 
made but naturally so. 
治亂成敗，遇與不遇，非人爲也，皆自然耳。 
 
Each person has his or her experience. But they do not realize that this is 




endowed with the most valuable asset of being self-so, what people can do is 
simply to accept and follow them. 
Now it is clear why Guo Xiang emphasized that one should feel at ease 
with whatever one meets.  First, as things are in ceaseless transformation, what 
one meets with is only temporary.  Therefore there is no point in shedding 
laughter or tears over them.  Second, what one meets with, which represents a 
kind of transformation, is naturalness.  Naturalness takes on the highest value and 
equates with the decree of heaven or fate.  People should accept and follow 
naturalness, with neither superficial intentions nor artificial feelings.248  
Guo Xiang’s argument reflects his deep concern of freeing people from 
unhappiness, which, according to him, results from their feelings and desires for 
external things.  As shown in the previous chapters, it is a popular notion in the 
Han-Wei period that feelings generate from one’s contact with things.  Obsessive 
feeling names desire.  Like Wang Bi, Xi Kang and other Wei-Jin philosophers, 
Guo Xiang is cautious with feeling, for feeling is prone to degenerate into desire, 
and makes people bound by external things.  When one desires something, one is 
desperate to obtain it.  Once obtaining the thing, one is afraid of losing it.  When 
losing it, one is heart-broken.  Desire causes one anxiety and bitterness.  It also 
                                                                                                                                      
 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 29, 25. 
 
248 A passage from Guo Xiang makes this point clear.  He says, 
Knowing fate means that one remains tranquil even if one knows that one 
cannot do anything with certain situation.  Then one feels neither happy nor sad.  
It is simply easy to be not disturbed by external things.  So one just takes what 
one meets with as one’s fate unconsciously, and does not concern oneself with 
what one meets; one becomes at one with the ultimate properness, neither joy 




Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 21. 
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makes people dependent on external things, which is obviously counter to Guo 
Xiang’s understanding of the freedom of human beings.   
Consequently, to be free and happy is to remove one’s desires for external 
things. 249   To put it in Guo Xiang’ terms, a free person is one who is not 
dependent on (wudai 無待), not bound by (wuxi 無系), or does not fasten to 
(wuzhi 無執) external things.  He just accepts whatever happens to him and does 
whatever allotted to him spontaneously, i.e., without any desire, determination, or 
purpose.  Just as the example of the peng indicates, it flies high not because it 
admires the high and remote place but simply flaps its wings and flies high.  All 
these happen naturally, and they are not achieved through painstaking efforts (非
數數然求之也).250  If one desires something and is determined to attain that thing, 
one runs counter to the principle of naturalness.  As shown earlier, in Guo Xiang’ 
view, if one tries to become benevolent and righteous out of admiration, one is 
already superficial.   
In light of the above argument, it is clear that a farmer’s insistence to 
become a minister is undesirable.  To be a farmer is a person’s yu (遇); he should 
feel at ease with what he meets with, as it is just self-so.  But the current farmer is 
not happy with his position and is determined to become a minister.  Harboring 
                                                 
249 As Guo Xiang observed, 
Each person has his or her allotment, which cannot be altered by desire and 
admiration.  Then one’s bondage to desire and admiration can be removed.  
Unhappiness results from one’s bondage; once bondage is removed, there is no 
way unhappiness engenders.  Without unhappiness, everyone will feel 




Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 4. 
 
250 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 3, 4. 
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strong desire and determination, he is doing something unnatural, which will 
cause him anxiety and frustration. 
However, another point needs to be noted regarding the issue of desire.  
Guo Xiang encouraged people to make vertical change, i.e., to practice one’s 
capacity and make progress with it.  One may wonder whether desire or 
admiration is involved in this process.  As the above example of peng indicates, 
the vertical move does not result from one’s desire for external things.  It is simply 
what comes out of naturalness.  One simply utilizes one’s capacity to do what one 
is good at.  As one is good at it, one enjoys it.  When one enjoys it, one does it 
more.  The more one does, the more one practices one’s capacity.  The more 
skillful one becomes, the more enjoyable one feels with one’s work.  Evidently, 
this is a natural progression in that no desire, deliberation and purpose are 
involved.  If some material reward is granted to the person in this progression, it is 
simply the by-product of a full utilization of his capacity.  
In light of the above discussion, there may be another scenario for the 
farmer.  The farmer focuses on his farming work and concentrates on 
comprehending Daoist wisdom.  He gradually develops knowledge of the limits of 
his nature and attains a full comprehension of the Dao.  Due to this 
comprehension, the farmer is able to do his work with extraordinary skill, in the 
same way as Cook Ding does.  As situation always changes, he may be 
recommended to an administrative position for his competence.  Since he always 
feels comfortable with the current work and concerns himself with comprehending 
the Dao, he does each work assigned to him successfully.  At last he is promoted 
to a ministerial position.  A farmer becomes a minister at last.  But the most 
important point is that the whole process is not planned.  Rather, it happens 
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naturally.  Being a minister is simply a by-product of his fully utilizing his 
capacity.  
Up to now I have shown how one can develop a self-knowledge from both 
one’s life experience and comprehension of Daoist wisdom.  Now the question is, 
can one’s self-knowledge tell accurately where one’s limits lie?  My proposal is 
that self-knowledge is not a precise meter telling where one’s limits lie.  Rather, it 
is a comprehensive understanding of oneself, which is dependent on one’s 
particularities, context, and other specific conditions.  For example, in the context 
of Wei-Jin, when nourishing life was popular, how long should one hope to live?  
Having attained a consciousness of one’s limits, one would base one’s expectation 
on a comprehensive consideration of both genetic and environmental elements.  
For example, a man noticed that both his parents and relatives lived to the age of 
sixty to seventy, and the fellow people in his hometown had an average lifespan of 
sixty-three.  In addition, given the progress in medical technology and the 
development of Daoist methods of nourishing life in his time, the man expected a 
lifespan of sixty-five to seventy-five years.  He would not long for a life span of 
more than 100 years, which was obviously beyond his limits.  
To summarize, self-knowledge is a consciousness of one’s limits.  It is 
attainable through one’s life experience and comprehension of Daoist wisdom.  As 
life experience does not necessarily translate into practical insights, Daoist 
wisdom is needed.  Daoist wisdom involves understanding the root cause of one’s 
unhappiness, which is desire.  It also involves a positive affirmation of who one is 
and the limits of one’s nature.  Self-knowledge encompasses an acceptance of 
one’s fate, i.e., what one meets with during one’s life, which is seen as a kind of 
transformation and natural.  One is encouraged to make progress with one’s work 
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determined by not only one’s capacity but also one’s fate.  So if one wants to shift 
to another social position, one transgresses one’s limits of nature.   
A related question is whether Guo Xiang is a fatalist.  The answer depends 
on the sense in which the term “fatalist” is used.  Specifically, the question can be 
approached from either a subjective or objective perspective.  Here the distinction 
between “subjective” and “objective” lies in whether the evaluation is made by the 
person himself or by others, whether this evaluation depends on that person’s 
inner mental or psychological state or whether it emphasizes the substantial 
changes in that person’s material life.  
From Guo Xiang’s perspective, I am afraid that he would reject such a 
label.  Each person has his/her natural limits, which is an undeniable fact.  The 
most important thing is to develop a clear knowledge of one’s limits.  As a result, 
one will not waste one’s time on what is beyond one’s limits, but focus on what 
one is good at and makes achievements in that specific area, out of which a sense 
of self-satisfaction and equality arises.  Clearly, in Guo Xiang’s view, although 
one’s limits are pre-determined, this does not give one an excuse for doing nothing.  
Even a slow horse, as Guo Xiang illustrated, when properly trained, can run at 
considerable speed and is of some use. 251   To recognize the limits does not 
necessarily lead to a fatalist worldview.  The key is whether human effort is 
necessary and appreciated.  Guo Xiang urged people to develop self-knowledge 
and encouraged them to practice their capacities and make progress with them.  In 
this respect, Guo Xiang cannot be said to be a fatalist.  
Also in sharp contrast with a fatalist worldview, which always involves a 
negative feeling of one’s life and a passive retreat from society, Guo Xiang’s view 
                                                 
251 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 41. 
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of self-knowledge is a positive affirmation of who one is.  It is impressive that 
people, who develop a clear knowledge of their respective limits, are active and 
happy in Guo Xiang’s portrait.  As will show later in the next part, attaining self-
knowledge, a person retains his/her individuality and feels self-sufficient and 
equal with every other.  From this perspective, it is also hard to consider Guo 
Xiang to be a fatalist. 
However, looking at the question from an objective perspective, it is easy 
to discern the fatalistic feature of Guo Xiang’s view.  The notion of yu (遇) 
indicates human beings’ dependence on the external environment.  Whatever a 
person meets with during his life are always self-so, so he should feel comfortable 
with them.  Guo Xiang’s argument implies that people actually cannot do anything 
substantive to change the external environment or to reduce its impact on them.  
What they can do only is to change themselves, or more precisely, change their 
worldview or mindset.  As a result of this change, they accept whatever happens to 
them as their fate calmly.   
Actually, in proposing that change is possible, Guo Xiang seems not to be 
a fatalist.  Things always change, and what one meets with changes too.  A person 
is a farmer this year, but this does not necessarily mean that he remains a farmer in 
future years.  He may turn out to be a minister, who knows.  However, Guo Xiang 
went on to emphasize the inevitability of change.  Change is naturalness; 
naturalness is endorsed with a self-evident value of necessity (biranxing 必然性).  
That is, what one meets with during one’s life is out of one’s control and it 
happens whether one likes it or not.  One cannot do anything with what one meets 
with except accepting it.  This gives a sense of fatalism to Guo Xiang’s 
philosophy.    
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Evidently, an “either-or” answer is not applicable to the question of 
whether Guo Xiang is a fatalist.  To summarize my discussion, if fatalism pertains 
to a subjective mental state, which typically involves a negative feeling in human 
beings, Guo Xiang obviously does not fall into that category.  As shown before, 
by developing a self-knowledge of one’s limits and comprehending the Dao, one 
enjoys whatever one meets with and feels as equal and sufficient as anyone else.  
However, if fatalism points to the objective phenomenon that one cannot do 
anything proactively to change one’s life in a substantive way, then Guo Xiang, 
for the reasons mentioned above, can be labeled as a fatalist. 
The question of fatalism is also related to the question of freedom.  For my 
current argument, I narrow the application of the concept of freedom to personal 
life, leaving its socio-political aspects to another examination.  Now whether Guo 
Xiang is a fatalist comes to be whether one has the freedom of changing one’s life, 
and to what extent that one can change one’s life.  Guo Xiang indicated that a 
sense of freedom and happiness is not based on external conditions, for example, 
fame and material achievements, but on one’s inner mindset.  If freedom is 
understood as related to external things, i.e., the more one has, the freer one is, 
then even Liezi, as Guo Xiang observed, who can fly like the wind, cannot be said 
to be free, for he is still dependent on the wind to fly.252  If freedom is understood 
as an attitude of self-sufficiency, a small bird can be said to be free, even if it can 
only fly from one branch of a normal tree to another.  A millionaire would be 
unhappy that he could not live a life as luxurious as a billionaire whilst a blue 
collar worker may enjoy his life.  If one relies heavily on external things, one will 
be engrossed in pursuing them and then become a slave of one’s insatiable desires 
                                                 
252 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 4-5. 
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for external things.  However, one can be the master of one’s life, if one develops 
knowledge of one’s limits and utilizes one’s capacity, which forms the 
inexhaustible resource of one’s happiness and freedom.  This is probably the point 
of Guo Xiang’s understanding of freedom.  Materially conditioned freedom is 
actually a bond; a free mindset entails ultimate freedom, i.e., a freedom based on a 
clear knowledge of one’s limits.   
Brook Ziporyn proposes that Guo Xiang is definitely not a fatalist.  
However, I find that his argument is not fully convincing.  According to him, 
when Guo Xiang discussed the fixity of nature, he actually meant that one’s nature 
cannot be changed, not that it cannot change.253   It is noteworthy that Ziporyn 
understands the change of nature as a change in kind.  To use his terminology, 
one’s “determinacy” is always changing into a new determinacy.254   However, as 
pointed out before, Guo Xiang used the character xi 習 rather xue 學 to stress that 
capacity-encompassing nature should be practiced or followed.  Xue 學 means to 
learn something new purposively, while xi 習 means to practice, to follow, or to 
go over what one has originally.   The continued practice may improve one’s 
capacity, but cannot change it into another one.  Obviously, if nature is changeable, 
it changes in degree and not in kind.  
 In Ziporyn’s interpretation, nature is changeable also because things are 
always vanishing into another thing (yu wu ming 與物冥).  Ming冥, according to 
Ziporyn, means to become into, to change into (another thing).255  However, I 
                                                 
253 Brook Ziporyn, The Penumbra Unbound, 144. 
 
254 Brook Ziporyn, The Penumbra Unbound, 144. 
 
255 Brook Ziporyn, The Penumbra Unbound, 65-83 
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would understand ming冥 as a subjective mindset or psychological state rather 
than an objective activity.  I will return to this point shortly.   
Guo Xiang stressed the distinction between xingfen zhi nei (what within 
the limits of nature) and xingfen zhi wai (what outside of the limits).  He drew a 
clear line between one thing and another.  Actually, in Guo Xiang’s view, an ideal 
society is where each individual retains his or her distinctiveness and feels content 
with who he or she is.  It is absolutely undesirable that one envies or admires 
others, and needless to say, wants to change to become like another.  
Of utmost importance, the character ming冥 does not refer to an activity 
but a mental state.  Ming冥 literally means dark and obscure, from which derives 
the meaning of being indistinguishable or equality in the Daoist context.  As 
shown in chapter 1, Dong Zhongshu used ming冥 to suggest that the common 
people need to be educated.  In contrast, in the Daoist context ming 冥 was 
esteemed as an ideal state of human beings: having no knowledge of the 
distinctions, for example, between good and bad, beautiful and ugly, and superior 
and inferior, and thus making no judgments and comparisons.  In Guo Xiang’s 
writings, there is another character qi 齊 conveying a meaning similar to that of 
ming冥.  The term qiwu (literally meaning to equalize things齊物) may shed light 
on the implication of the phrase yu wu ming與物冥.  Obviously, when Zhuang 
Zhou and Guo Xiang used the term of qiwu齊物, they did not mean that people 
are actually able to eliminate the physical differences among things and as a result 
all things turn out to be identical.  Rather, it is more plausible to interpret the term 
in a way suggesting that people treat the myriad things equally, as if there is no 
difference among them.  Similarly, yu wu ming與物冥 does not mean vanishing 
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(changing) into things.  Rather, it refers to a mental state that one does not realize 
any distinction between oneself and any other thing, as if they are alike.256  To use 
Guo Xiang’s words, a person attaining this mental state is one who forgets oneself 
(ziwang自忘 or wangwo忘我) or show no intention or partiality (wuxin無心).  
But meanwhile, he still remains who he is and is distinct from others 
substantively.257  By realizing the self-sufficiency of one’s nature and seeing no 
difference between oneself and others, one is in perfect harmony with others and 
finds no need to become like others.    
3.3. The Sociopolitical Implications of Guo Xiang’s View of Human Nature 
 In general, the various theories of human nature in the history of Chinese 
philosophy serve as the base of various sociopolitical policies.  For example, if the 
view that human nature is good is widely accepted, the government would attach 
more emphasis on virtue and establish institutions to encourage moral cultivation.  
                                                 
256 For example, it is said in Guo Xiang’s commentary on the Zhuangzi,  
Forgetting the distinction between others and me, and equalizing the differences 
among the myriad things. 
遺彼忘我, 冥此群異。 
 
Therefore one will follow one’s nature straightly and make oneself 
indistinguishable from whatever one meets with. 
故將任性直通，無往不冥。 
 
Inward, one’s mind and spirit run randomly; outward, one’s ears and eyes are 
exhausted and lost in external things.  This is because one locates oneself in 
some inappropriate place and fails to merge with things.  If one does not merge 
oneself with things, how is it possible for one to stay in step with  all the 




Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 4, 10, 20, 20;  cf. 
Lynn, Zhuangzi: A New Translation. 
 
257 As Guo Xiang observes, 
As for a person who merges with things, although he undergoes the most drastic 
changes, he will never fail to be himself. 
與物冥者, 雖涉至變，而未始非我。 
 
Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 13; cf. Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation.  
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If the view that human nature is evil is accepted, the government would seek to 
formulate legal and moral norms to place constraints on people.  If human nature 
is ziran, i.e., in natural order, no artificial policy but that of non-action would be 
implemented, as both Wang Bi and Guo Xiang maintained.  There is a close 
connection between a thinker’s view of human nature and his view of 
sociopolitical issues.  As one will see below, Guo Xiang is no exception. 
 In this part I explore the sociopolitical implications of Guo Xiang’s view 
of human nature.  I first portray the ideal society founded on that everyone has 
developed self-knowledge.  It is an equal and stable society where each individual 
person is self-sufficient.  This makes the policy of non-action possible.  Then I 
address some questions related to non-action.  Does non-action refer to a set of 
behavioral rules or a kind of mindset?  Is Guo Xiang an anarchist?   
3.3.1 The ideal society based on self-knowledge 
  Following the previous parts, let us see what a society will be like if each 
person in it has attained self-knowledge.  I try to piece together a picture of it with 
evidences gathered from Guo Xiang’s writings.  It is an ideal society where the 
distinctiveness of each person is respected; each person feels self-sufficient and 
equal with others in that he/she obtains a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment 
from fully utilizing his/her nature; because of this sense of self-satisfaction and 
equality, the society enjoys stability and peace. 
(1) Individuality 
Modern scholars often employ the concepts of individuality and 
commonality to characterize the Daoist and Confucian understanding of human 
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nature respectively.258  According to them, in conceiving human nature as moral 
assets, Confucianism is overwhelmingly concerned with the commonality of 
nature.  On the other hand, exploring human nature from a naturalist perspective, 
Daoism emphasizes the individuality of nature.  There is some truth to this 
characterization, but it still needs careful reexamination. 
As key concepts in Chinese philosophy normally have various 
connotations, it would be safer to interpret them from within their context than to 
make a generalization of them.  It should also be clear which connotation(s) is (are) 
highlighted.  For example, the concept of the Dao is equally significant to both 
Confucians and Daoists.  But the former approach the Dao from a moral 
perspective, whereas in sharp contrast, the latter emphasize the Dao to be 
completely devoid of any moral meaning.  In view of this, it is necessary to clarify 
the meanings of the core term “ziran (自然)” in various Daoist texts.  As argued 
previously, ziran in the Laozi and Wang Bi’s commentary on it primarily refers to 
the Dao, the metaphysical reality and a principle of generation.  In the inner 
chapters of the Zhuangzi likely composed by Zhuang Zhou himself, besides a 
principle of transformation, ziran also refers to the mind of the person who has 
comprehended Daoist wisdom.259  In the outer and miscellaneous chapters of the 
Zhuangzi, ziran refers to the natural assets of human beings, such as life, physical 
                                                 
258 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三，Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理, 1-8; Tang Junyi 唐君毅，
Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun: on Nature 中國哲學原論[原性篇], 2; Zhuang Yaolang莊耀郎，Guo 
Xiang xuanxue  郭象玄學, 109-110. 
 
259 In chapter 7 of the Zhuangzi (In Response to Kings 應帝王), when asked the way of 
managing the state, Wu Ming (a person without name) replied that there is no need to manage the 
state.  One should with one’s heart roam in the realm of the flavorless, merge one’s qi with the 
dark and dim, and abide by naturalness (ziran) where there is no room for self-interest or partiality.  
If the ruler can achieve this, the state will be in order (遊心於淡，合氣于漠，自然而無容私焉，
而天下治矣).  The text of this passage can be found in Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 
郭象<莊子> 注, p. 36.  For similar descriptions or stories of the mental state of the Daoist sage,  
ibid, p.5 and p.38. 
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features, and capacity.  Some scholars interpret Daoism from a naturalistic 
perspective.260  However, this interpretation is only applicable to the outer and 
miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi, in that the term “naturalist” and 
“naturalism” in its English context primarily points to a biological perspective.  
Laozi and Zhuangzi were more interested in the metaphysical dimension and the 
spiritual sphere of ziran.  In light of this, it is clear that a “naturalistic” approach 
misses some fundamental points of Daoist philosophy.  
Second, it is an overgeneralization that Daoism concentrates entirely on 
the individuality of nature.  Laozi is evidence that the opposite is the case, as 
shown in chapter 1.  Wang Bi followed Laozi in this respect, though basically I 
would categorize him as neither Daoist nor Confucian.  As argued in chapter 2, 
Wang Bi was primarily concerned with natureDao, the share of the Dao in human 
beings.  By this share all people are alike. 
Turning to Guo Xiang, however, all evidence shows that he was concerned 
with the individuality of human nature.  His theory of self-transformation denies 
completely an absolute origin, to which all things can be traced.  Guo Xiang said, 
“Each thing has its own nature, the nature of each thing has its own limits (wu ge 
you xing 物各有性, xing ge you ji 性各有極)”.261  The character ge 各 in its 
Chinese context is an adverb and may translate as “individually”, “uniquely” or 
“respectively”.  In a great many cases Guo Xiang used 各 to qualify the concept of 
nature, indicating his emphasis on the uniqueness of each thing.   
                                                 
260 Rong Zhaozu 容肇祖, Wei Jin de ziran zhuyi 魏晉的自然主義, Taibei: Shangwu 
yinshuguan臺北:商務印書館, 1970. 
 
261 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 4; Yu-lan Fung, Chuang-
tzu: A New Selected Translation with An Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hsiang, 30.  
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The concept of xingfen also reflects the differences of human beings.  It 
draws a line between what one is and is not.  One developing a consciousness of 
one’s limits knows that each thing has its own limits.  As a result, ideally, each 
person’s distinctiveness is recognized and shown respect.     
Guo Xiang’s view of non-action may be understood in light of the 
individuality of human beings.  People are different, so it is hard to find an 
administrative policy applicable to all of them.  A policy effective in one 
community may turn out to be futile in another.  Consequently, the smartest 
strategy is not to make any policy, and let things follow their own courses as 
determined by their natures. 
The individuality of human beings alone is not enough to account for the 
policy of non-action.  Most important, Guo Xiang believed that things would 
develop properly without any external force.   
(2) Self-sufficiency 
 Confucianism explains human nature as moral potential, and Daoism of 
the Laozi interprets it as tranquility and emptiness. Despite the disagreement in 
explanation, both show a confidence in the human being and his nature.  For 
example, Mencius maintained that the common people can become like Yao and 
Shun; Laozi claimed that people will live a free and peaceful life if they return to 
their authentic nature.  However, some modern Confucian scholars propose that 
Confucianism shows more respect than Daoism for the dignity of the human being, 
for it values highly the moral potential of the human being.262  This proposal has 
                                                 
262 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三，Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理, 1-8; Tang Junyi 唐君毅，
Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun: on Nature, 中國哲學原論(原性篇), 2; Xu Fuguan徐複觀，History of 
the Chinese Philosophy of Human Nature: the pre-Qin Period 中國人性論史(先秦篇), 161-199. 
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gained generous support.  But I would like to propose a different understanding of 
this issue. 
Both Confucians and Daoists aimed at harmony among the people and 
harmony between people and their environment, but they diverge with respect to 
the method of achieving that harmony.  Confucians made effort to strengthen the 
rites, as an attempt to build up a good environment for nourishing the moral seeds 
in human beings.  In contrast, Daoists tried to strip away the rites imposed on 
human beings as much as possible to uncover the original simplicity of the human 
being.  This contrast indicates two subtly different attitudes towards human nature.  
Confucians might suspect whether a person could become good in the end without 
external aid, for moral nature is only a potential and may not reach fruition.  So 
they placed tremendous emphasis on rites, which, hopefully, would be an effective 
method to help people develop their moral potential.  In contrast, Daoists showed 
strong confidence in human nature.  They based the order of the world on human 
nature.  Once the rites that distort the true nature of the human being were washed 
off, they believed, everyone will rediscover his or her true nature and natural 
harmony will be restored. 
Guo Xiang is optimistic about the original nature of the human being.  He 
says,  
If one contrasts things on the basis of physical form, then Mount 
Tai is larger than an autumn hair.  If each thing accord to the limits 
of its nature, and fulfils its limits, then things with larger forms are 
not superabundant while things with small forms are not 
insufficient.  If each thing is comfortable with its nature, then an 
autumn hair will not find even its small size small, and Mount Tai 
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will not find even its large size large….  Without any sense of  
large and small, without longevity and dying young, thus a cicada 
will not covet the Great Cedrela but enjoy self-fulfillment, and a 
quail will not think highly of Heaven’s pool but enjoy self-
sufficiency.  If one feels comfortable with what one has naturally 
and enjoys one’s life, even Heaven and Earth cannot be said to live 
long, but are formed at the same time as me; even the myriad things 
cannot be said to be different, but achieve self-fulfillment the same 







It is clear from the above passage that each thing is self-sufficient.  One 
can live a proper life decided by one’s nature without any external help.  One’s 
self-sufficiency comes from a full utilization of one’s nature. One is happy with 
who one is and will not be disturbed by who one is not.  Consequently, each 
person is tranquil and happy.  The self-sufficiency of people is of great 
significance, as it gives people not only a sense of self-satisfaction but also a sense 
of equality.   
(3) Equality 
                                                 
263 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 11; Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation.  Translation altered. 
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 In the Zhuangzi, to make distinctions between, for example, right and 
wrong, beautiful and ugly, good and bad,264 is a futile and meaningless effort.  
There is no absolutely impartial criterion to assess things;265 thus people have to 
treat things equally. 
Guo Xiang, however, offered a different interpretation of equality.  That is, 
in view that each person fully utilizes his or her nature, enjoys his or her life, and 
sees no difference from others, all persons are equal.  Guo Xiang says, 
The big bird flies away each time for half a year, and perches at 
Heaven’s pool; the small bird flies half a day, and dashes against an 
elm and stops.  Comparing their capacities, they are different; 
enjoying their natures, they are alike. 
夫大鳥一去半歲，至天池而息。小鳥一飛半朝，搶榆枋而止。
此比所能則有間矣，其於適性一也。266 
Both Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang tried to abolish evaluative judgment.  But 
there is difference between them.  For Zhuangzi, since nobody is able to claim 
truth for his or her knowledge, things including human beings have to be treated 
equally.  According to Guo Xiang, however, the self-sufficiency of nature 
accounts for equality.  People are equal primarily because they utilize their nature 
and enjoy their lives equally.  The differences in physical features and other 
                                                 
264 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 13. 
 
265 Zhuang Zhou demonstrated how absurd it is to apply the value-laden terms to things 
and people.  For example, now A argues with B, and third party C acts as the referee.  If C 
appreciates A’s position, he cannot be just to B.  If C agrees with B, he cannot maintain impartial 
to A.  If C disagrees with both A and B, his judgment on them will be irrelevant.  If C agrees with 
both A and B, there would be no need C as referee.  Consequently, the question whether A or B is 
right remains unsolved, for it is impossible to find a relevant yet impartial referee 
 
266 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 3; cf. Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation.  
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aspects do not evoke either arrogance or negative feeling in them.  Their sense of 
self-satisfaction makes them feel equal with others.  As Guo Xiang made it clear, 
 A crossbeam is horizontal and a pillar is vertical; Li is ugly and Xi 
Shi is pretty.  Equality does not necessarily mean that things must 
have similar forms and similar measures.  This is why the 
horizontal and the vertical, the pretty and the ugly, the lenient and 
the amazingly facile, the weird and the pernicious are cited.  If 
things are “so” as what they ought to be “so”, are “suitable” as 
what they are suitable for, despite their various forms, all of them 




Some scholars propose that Learning of the Profound in the Wei-Jin period 
contributes an inegalitarian view of human nature, 268   in comparison with a 
general notion that Confucianism represents an egalitarian view of human nature, 
as it concentrates on the moral potential common to all and gives each one the 
promise of becoming a sage.  However, this interpretation may not be applicable 
neither to Wang Bi, given his primary concern with the differentiation of the Dao 
in all human beings, nor Guo Xiang.  Guo Xiang’s view that things are equal is 
based on his view that each individual thing is different from another.  In other 
words, when Guo Xiang proposed the idea of equality, he had already taken 
                                                 
267 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 10;  cf. Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation. 
 
268 Zongsan牟宗三, Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理, 1-8. 
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diversity into consideration.  This is clearly different from Mencius, whose notion 
of equality derives directly and logically from his view of a moral nature shared 
by all people.   
Guo Xiang started from the diversity of the phenomenal world, followed the idea 
of the self-sufficiency of nature, and arrived at the idea of equality.   
(4) Stability 
 A person, who develops a sense of self-satisfaction and equality by fully 
utilizing his or her nature, will not admire or covet others.  Since each person feels 
as “good” as all others, there will be no cause for social instability.  Guo Xiang 
says, 
Whosoever fulfills his true nature and functions in terms of 
spontaneous action, even though he is a slave, will be indifferent to 
all denigration and praise and remain content with his own lot. 
Therefore, whether this person knows this or not, either way he will 
remain completely at ease.  However, if the way of hoping favor is 
introduced, the inferior usurps the superior, things lose authenticity 
and people forget their original nature, then surrounded by 





                                                 
269 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 9; Lynn, Zhuangzi: A New 
Translation.  Translation altered. 
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 Unlike Zhuangzi, who disparaged social institutions, Guo Xiang showed 
himself a conservative thinker in defending the existing social hierarchy.  In his 
view, the existing social framework should be observed, as everyone’s position in 
it is determined by one’s nature and limits.  Here, Guo Xiang faced the same 
problem as Confucians did: the discrepancy between “ideal” and “reality”.  Ideally, 
one’s nature decides one’s position.  But actually one’s position is not necessarily 
decided by one’s nature.  Guo Xiang produced an account of this discrepancy, 
which is the notion of yu (what one meets with 遇).  The notion legitimates that 
one’s current situation is simply natural and thus acceptable.  Guo Xiang’s 
conservative position in this respect may be understandable, if one takes into 
consideration the long period of turbulence in Wei-Jin times.  Deeply concerned 
with the instability of society, he strongly criticized those who were dissatisfied 
with their current positions and sought change.    
3.3.2. The possibility of non-action (wuwei) 
Now let us see what Guo Xiang developed from his portrait of an equal 
and stable society where each individual person is self-sufficient.  Since each one 
is able to live a happy life by oneself and the society is then in natural order, Guo 
Xiang strongly advocated the implementation of the policy of non-action.   
(1) Non-action: a mindset of freedom and spontaneity 
The concept of non-action is addressed both in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi 
at great length.  There, non-action is primarily a complete denial of the Confucian 
method of governing.  As Liu Xiaogan rightly points out, “non-action is a set of 
methodological principles contrary to consensus and conventions.” 270    For 
                                                 
270 Liu Xiaogan 劉笑敢,  “Naturalness (ziran) and Non-action (wuwei): Their Ancient 
Meaning and Significance Today” 老子之自然與無爲——古典意含與現代意義, in Zhongguo 
wenzheyanjiu jikan中國文哲研究集刊, 10 (March 1997): 39. 
 181
example, non-action means not to esteem benevolence and righteousness and not 
to encourage people to become virtuous.  
Wang Bi basically followed this approach in his interpretation of non-
action.  Furthermore, he traced non-action to Nonbeing, the ontological reality that 
engenders and sustains the universe.  This provides the metaphysical basis for 
non-action. 
Non-action, in Wang Bi’s view, never refers to an absolutely static state, 
meaning to do nothing at all.  Rather, it is a fundamental government principle that 
the ruler should observe.  It involves pragmatic guidelines as to what the ruler 
should and should not do.  In a positive sense non-action requires that the ruler 
follows (yin因), yields to (shun順), or accords with (fa法) the nature of things.  
In a negative sense non-action refutes common knowledge and conventions, 
Confucian rites, in particular.  For example, if a person would like others to know 
his accomplishment, normally he is supposed to advertise it.  But the sage never 
claimed credit for himself and he attributed the success to the myriad things 
themselves.  The common people value the strong and powerful, but the sage held 
on to the gentle and weak.   
Although non-action, in Wang Bi’s interpretation, is basically a governing 
principle, in some cases it also pertains to the ruler’s mental state.  For example, 
the ruler should do things with no partiality (wusi無私), no preference (wuqing無
情), and no intention (wuyi無意).  To do things purposively or deliberately runs 
counter to non-action.  Non-action also refers to the ruler’s self-effacing modesty.  
He is neither aggressive nor assertive.   
Though Guo Xiang followed the understanding of non-action as an 
administrative policy in some cases, most distinctively, he interpreted non-action 
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as referring to a mindset of freedom and spontaneity.  Like Wang Bi, who aimed 
to uncover the ancient wisdom in the Laozi, Guo Xiang sought to reveal the 
insights underlying the Zhuangzi, which is, in his words, the way of “inner 
sageliness and outward kingliness (neisheng waiwang 內聖外王).271  Evidently,           
Guo Xiang attempted to reconcile inner enlightenment, which is normally 
considered to be the ideal of Daoism, and worldly achievement, for example, the 
Confucian goal of social peace.  If non-action is understood as a set of behavioral 
codes, it will be hard for a person to meet both Confucian and Daoist standards.  
Guo Xiang brought out his solution.  Non-action pertains to a mindset of freedom 
and spontaneity.  The person attaining this mindset can be said to be at one with 
the Dao. 
Two quotations from Guo Xiang’s commentary are enough to make this 
point clear.  
Non-action is not folding one’s arms and keeping silent; beyond the 
mundane does not mean that one lives in the mountains and forests 
in seclusion. 
所謂無爲之業， 非拱默而已；所謂塵垢之外，非伏于山林也。272 
Although the sage might be found at the imperial court, his mind 
feels no different from what he feels in the midst of mountains and 
forests.  How could ordinary people realize this?   Merely seeing 
that the sage has a yellow carriage canopy over his head and has a 
jade seal hung at his belt, they conclude that this is enough to 
disturb his mind; seeing that the sage crosses the mountains and 
                                                 
271 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 1. 
 
272 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 34. 
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rivers and is engaged with mundane affairs as others, they assert 
that this is enough to wear out his spirit.  How could they know that 




Non-action does not point to the external behaviors of Daoists, for 
example, in retreating from society and living in seclusion, in contrast with the 
Confucian engagement with worldly affairs.  To distinguish Daoists from 
Confucians in terms of external behavior is entirely misleading, for it directs 
one’s attention to traces (ji 迹) rather than what leaves the traces (suoyiji 所以迹).  
Non-action refers to the mindset of a person, who has comprehended and is at one 
with the Dao.  He understands the principle of self-transformation, follows 
whatever he meets with, and does whatever is assigned to him.  He does not have 
any desire, plan, intention, or purpose.  What is normally agreed to be either 
Daoist or Confucian behavior is simply what this person happens to do 
spontaneously in a given context, which forms his traces (ji 迹).  His mindset is 
what leaves those traces (suoyiji 所以迹).  In a sense, both Confucian and Daoist 
doctrines are only traces.  It is meaningless to concern oneself with the distinction 
between the two, in particular, their different external behaviors.  The key is to 
see whether a person has attained the mindset of non-action.  If he does, even if he 
is busily engaged with mundane fairs, he remains wuwei (non-action).  If he does 
not, even if he lives in the mountains as a recluse, he cannot be said to be wuwei.  
                                                 
273 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 5; cf. Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation.  
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Worse, in the latter case, as the person tries to show his aloofness deliberately, he 
is actually, to use Guo Xiang’s words, a member of the mundane world (suzhong 
zhi yiwu 俗中之一物).274  Guo Xiang reconciled Confucianism with Daoism by 
his idea of non-action.  A person can easily commute between the field of nature 
(ziran 自然) and that of the rites (mingjiao 名教), if he or she achieves the 
mindset of non-action.    
(2) Whether Guo Xiang is an anarchist 
As one may notice, although a consciousness of the limits of nature makes 
possible the policy of non-action, it may also lead to anarchism.  If each person 
focuses on his or her work and the giant machine of society works naturally and 
perfectly, in the same way as each organ functions well and the body is healthy, is 
it necessary to have a ruler?  Is Guo Xiang an anarchist?275 
Related discussions of the question of anarchism were found towards the 
end of the Han dynasty.  Renowned Han thinkers, such as Zhongchang Tong 仲長
統  (A.D. 180-220), called the legitimacy of the ruler and government into 
question.276  They criticized the ruler and government as selfish and as causing 
suffering to the people.  This critical view was inherited by some Wei-Jin thinkers, 
who clearly stated their anarchistic positions.  For example, Ruan Ji 阮籍 claimed 
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275 On this problem I benefited from the research of the following scholars: Tang Yijie湯
一介，Guo Xiang yu Wei-Jin xuanxue 郭象與魏晉玄學, 168-170；Zhuang Yaolang 莊耀郎，
Guo Xiang xuanxue 郭象玄學, 223-234; and Ames, Roger T,  “Is Political Taoism Anarchism?” 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 10.1 (1983): 27-47. 
 
276 Zhong Changtong仲長統, Changyan 昌言, in Yan Kejun嚴可均，Quanhouhan wen
全後汗文, vol. 88: 949。 
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that without the ruler and officials the myriad things will be in order.277  Bao 
Jingyan 鮑敬言 attacked the detrimental monarch and expressed his admiration 
for the anarchistic community in the remote past.278  These suggest that anarchism 
gained considerable popularity during the Han-Wei period. 
However, Guo Xiang did not subscribe to this view.  Firstly, as my earlier 
argument indicates, he defended the existing social hierarchy.  In his view, the 
social hierarchy is self-so and thus reasonable, for each person’s place in it is 
determined by his/her nature and fate.  As he put it, the ruler and the subject, the 
superior and the inferior, and relatives and strangers, all these are self-so by the 
principle of Heaven.279  People should not disrupt this order but thrive in their 
allotted place in society.  
Guo Xiang also clearly stated that a ruler is definitely necessary.  He says, 
When thousands of people gather, without one person being the 
ruler the gathering either will be in disorder or will disperse.  
Therefore, though a nation may have many worthies, it cannot have 
many rulers; a nation may have no worthies, but it must have a 




                                                 
277 Chen Bojun 陳伯君, Ruan Ji ji jiaozhu 阮籍集校注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 北京:中
華書局, 1987), 170.  Donald Holzman, Poetry and Politics, The Life and Works of Juan Chi, A.D. 
210-263 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 195-196. 
 
278 Ge Hong葛洪，Paopuzi 抱樸子, vol. 4: 190-192. 
 
279 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 9. 
  
280 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 21. 
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A ruler is needed for implementing the policy of non-action.  Since non-
action does not equate with total inactivity, the question that arises is what is the 
role of the ruler?  I take a passage from Guo Xiang to explain. 
A worker employs non-purposeful action in cutting wood, and 
employs purposeful action in using his axe; a ruler employs non-
purposeful action in dealing with state affairs himself, and employs 
purposeful action in appointing a minister.  A minister deals with 
things and a ruler makes use of the minister; this is like an axe can 
be used to cut wood and a worker uses his axe.  Each one utilizes 
one’s capacity, which is naturally-so by the way of Heaven and is 
not deliberate.  If a ruler does the job of a minister, he cannot be 
said to be a ruler; if a minister plays the role of a ruler, he cannot be 
said to be a minister.  Each carries out his own duty, then both the 
superior and the inferior accomplish their task.  Consequently, the 





It is clear from the above quotation that by non-action Guo Xiang means 
appropriate action, i.e., one performs one’s duty as required by one’s position.  So 
far as the ruler is concerned, his duty is to appoint officials and to oversee the 
implementation of the policy of non-action.  Thus the non-action of the ruler 
                                                 
281 Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象<莊子>注, 57; cf. Lynn, Zhuangzi: A 
New Translation.   
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should be understood in the sense that he does not take part in the routine work of 
daily government; rather, he is concerned with the more important matters such as 
the appointment of officials and formulating state policies that affect the well 
being of the nation as a whole.  
I have examined Guo Xiang’s view of human nature and its socio-political 
implications in this chapter.  In summary, Guo Xiang rejected an ontological 
reality as the metaphysical reason for the existence of human beings.  The nature 
of human beings forms naturally when human beings come into being.  Guo Xiang 
inherited the insight of previous thinkers and arrived at a comprehensive view of 
human nature.  He took human nature to refer to concrete human phenomena: life, 
physical features, capacity, and feeling, including the natural feelings of 
benevolence and righteousness.  The nature of each human being has its limits; 
one should maintain within one’s limits.  The desire for things beyond one’s limits 
is the root cause of one’s bitterness.  As such, the most important thing is to 
develop a consciousness of one’s limits.  It is a positive affirmation of who one is 
and a clear knowledge of one’s strengths and weaknesses, which can be achieved 
through one’s life experiences and comprehension of Daoist wisdom.  This raises 
the question whether Guo Xiang is a fatalist.  The answer depends on the sense in 
which the concept of fatalism is used.  It is my submission that Guo Xiang is a 
fatalist objectively.  But subjectively, he does not fall into this category, for self-
knowledge, in his view, is a positive affirmation of who one is and happiness is 
not based on external conditions but on one’s inner mindset.  When developing 
self-knowledge, a person retains his or her distinctiveness and enjoys self-
sufficiency and freedom; consequently, society enjoys stability.  Society 
conceived in this way makes possible the implementation of the policy of non-
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action.  However, non-action should not be understood as a set of behavior codes; 
it pertains primarily to the sage ruler’s mindset of freedom and spontaneity.  The 
sage ruler is necessary in that he is not only the shining example for the people but 
also the guarantee that the policy of non-action would be perfectly implemented. 
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Chapter 4 Wang Bi and Guo Xiang Compared: Inheriting from and 
Going beyond Han Confucianism 
 
 
 Learning of the Profound in the Wei-Jin period is a direct response to the 
failure of Han Confucianism.282  As argued in this thesis, it shows an apparent 
shift from Han Confucianism in both research interest and method of 
interpretation.  Scholars have pointed out that Learning of the Profound is notably 
this-worldly in orientation.  Wang Baoxuan, for example, interprets Zhengshi 
xuanxue (正始玄學)283 as a theoretical justification of the political reform in the 
Zhengshi era (正始 A.D. 240-249).284  My previous discussions of Wang Bi and 
                                                 
282 In his pioneering research on Wei-Jin philosophy, Tang Yongtong proposes that Wang 
Bi was influenced by the Jingzhou (荊州) school.  Jingzhou (now Xiangyang襄陽, Hubei province) 
replaced Luoyang (洛陽) as the cultural center towards the end of the Han dynasty.  Under the 
support of the governor Liu Biao (劉表 A.D. 142-208), many renowned scholars gathered in 
Jingzhou, including Song Zhong (宋衷 2nd-3rd century), Wang Can (王粲 A.D. 177-217), and 
Wang Su (王肅 A.D.195-256).  They interpreted the classics in a new way, i.e., emphasizing to 
uncover the fundamental meaning and principle of the texts rather than confining rigidly to the 
textual words.  Wang Bi may be inspired by this innovative method of interpretation, as his clan 
has a close relationship with the scholars of the Jingzhou school.  Some scholars maintain that the 
seeds of Learning of the Profound were planted even earlier, by Han Philosophers such as Yan Zun 
(嚴遵 B.C. 59-24), Yang Xiong (楊雄 B.C. 53-18), and Wang Chong (王充 27-79), for they 
refuted a personified Heaven, with which Han Confucianism is notably associated, and highlighted 
the natural order of the Dao. See Tang Yongtong, “Wang Bi zhi Zhouyi Lunyu xinyi” 王弼之周易
論語新義 , in Wei Jin xuanxue lungao, 76-79; Walter Liebenthal, trans. “Wang Bi’s New 
Interpretation of the I Ching and Lun-yu,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 10 (1947): 124-130; 
Charles Holcombe, In the Shadow of the Han, 88-89. 
 
283 Tang Yongtong thinks that the development of Wei-Jin thought consists of four stages: 
Zhengshi (正始), Yuankang (元康 275-299), Yongjia (永嘉 307-312), and Dong Jin (東晉 317-
420).  Zhengshi thought is mainly built on the commentaries on the Zhouyi and the Laozi, whose 
representatives are He Yan (何晏 ca 190-249) and Wang Bi.  Yuankang thought is influenced by 
the Zhuangzi and advocated by Ji Kang and Ruan Ji.  Yongjia thought is also based on the 
commentary on the Zhuangzi, but is characterized by an attempt to reconcile Daoism with 
Confucianism.  Its major figures are Xiang Xiu and Guo Xiang.  In the last stage of the Dong Jin 
period, Buddhism thrived and largely influenced xuanxue.  Tang’s view has been widely accepted. 
See Tang Yongtong, “Wei-Jin sixiang de fazhan” 魏晉思想的發展, in Wei Jin xuanxue lungao, 
120. 
 
284 A series of political reforms was carried out in the Zhengshi era by the Wei minister 
Cao Shuang (曹爽 178-249).  The enthusiastic proponents included He Yan, Xiahou Xuan (夏侯玄
209-254), and Deng Yang (鄧颺?-249). The reform centered on changing the system of official 
appointment and reducing the swollen administrative structure.  In the spring of A.D. 249, Sima Yi 
(司馬懿 179-251), the political rival of Cao Shuang, staged a coup d’état that led to the death of 
Cao Shuang, He Yan, and other major participants.   This signifies not only the end of the reform 
but also the end of the dominance of the Cao family.  The Sima family took control and eventually 
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Guo Xiang also demonstrate their practical concern.  Given this, it is reasonable to 
assume that when Wei-Jin philosophers turned to the Daoist classics, they were 
not for purely philosophical exploration.  Deeply concerned with social instability, 
they believed that the Daoist texts convey the ancient wisdom that would enable 
them to solve present problems. Both Wang Bi and Guo Xiang clearly stated that 
there is something “fundamental” (ben 本) communicated in the Laozi and the 
Zhuangzi.   
However, to appeal to the Daoist classics does not mean a complete break 
with Han Confucianism.  In other words, Learning of the Profound should not be 
understood simply as a revival of Daoism, as the translation “Neo-Daoism” in 
some Western sources indicates.  As shown in the previous chapters, the topics of 
Learning of the Profound are not confined to Daoism.  They are broad including, 
for example, the social role of music, the relationship between Names and Actuality 
(mingshi 名實), and legal issues.  Considering this, it may be misleading to 
construe Learning of the Profound as a Daoist movement.   
Although I agree that Learning of the Profound “represents a broad 
philosophical front,” 285  I would consider it to represent an unparalleled 
development of the “Confucian” tradition that took shape in the Warring States 
period and developed in the Han dynasty.  However, due to the social and political 
crisis towards the end of the Han dynasty, the tradition was called into sharp 
                                                                                                                                      
established the Jin dynasty in A.D. 265.  For detailed discussions of the Zhengshi reform, see 
Wang Baoxuan 王葆玹, Zhengshi xuanxue 正始玄學, 87-106; Wang Xiaoyi 王曉毅, Zhongguo 
wenhua de qingliu 中國文化的清流, 54-77. 
 
285 Alan K.L. Chan, “Zhong Hui’s Laozi Commentary and the Debate on Capacity and 
Nature in Third-Century China,” 102. 
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question.286  As we will see later, Wei-Jin philosophers also penetrated the serious 
problems of Han Confucianism.  As heirs of the tradition, they utilized all the 
available resources to correct what they thought to be the corruption of the 
tradition and in so doing developed the tradition in a new way.  Learning of the 
Profound represents an evident shift in the development of the tradition.  It is 
distinct from Han Confucianism in both research interest and perspective of 
interpretation.  This also shows that the tradition has a capacity for self-
examination and self-adjustment.  
 In this chapter, I situate Wang Bi and Guo Xiang in this philosophical 
tradition, and examine what the two thinkers inherited from and the innovation 
they brought to this tradition.  Especially of interest to me, it is not clear how 
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang were both influenced by and reacted against Han 
Confucianism, since Learning of the Profound is generally considered to be a 
direct response to the failure of Han Confucianism.  Based on the analysis in the 
previous chapters, the first two parts of this chapter offer a comparison between 
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.  The third part formulates an account for their 
similarities and differences in understanding human nature, which I propose are 
both influenced by and arising from interrogating the Han Confucian tradition.  
Specifically, the Han nutrients that Wang Bi and Guo Xiang absorbed account for 
their similarity, while their efforts to surpass Han Confucianism resulted in their 
different views of human nature.  Both views reflect an attempt to balance 
Confucian rites (mingjiao 名教 ), which had deteriorated into formalities and 
                                                 
286  The most fierce criticism may come from Wang Chong, who investigated Han 
Confucianism, as both philosophical thought and social rites, in his skeptic composition Lunheng 
(論衡).  He refuted a teleological understanding of Heaven, which was notably associated with 
Dong Zhongshu, and interpreted Heaven from a naturalistic or materialistic perspective.  He also 
criticized the formalities and extravagance of Confucian mourning rites.  For more details, see 
Huang Hui 黃暉，Lunheng jiaoshi論衡校釋; Alfred Forke, Lun-hêng: Miscellaneous Essays of 
Wang Ch’ung (New York, Paragon Book Galary, 1962). 
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means of attaining profit towards the end of Han, with the Dao as naturalness.  
They reinterpreted mingjiao by tracing it either to the objective principle of the 
Dao, or to the subjective mindset that is seen to be identical with the Dao.  
4.1. Similarities between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang 
 The basic similarity between the two Wei-Jin philosophers arises from 
their effort to solve the problem of the origin of goodness and evil, to which Han 
Confucians, in their views, failed to produce a convincing explanation.  The 
distinctive Han Confucian theory of human nature defines human nature in terms 
of qi endowment.  However, as argued earlier, the problems concerning the theory 
are: (1) its argument is rather circular, in that qi is understood morally so that a 
person endowed with benevolent qi is good and one with deviant qi bad.  And (2) 
evil has its origin in human nature, as human nature is a mixture of good and bad.  
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang refuted this view.  They believed that human nature is 
simply natural good.  Evil is not an innate flaw in human beings, but induced by 
external things, the Confucian rites in particular.  Wang Bi and Guo Xiang shared 
this strong belief in the natural goodness of human nature, from which other 
similarities between them that will be discussed below stem. 
4.1.1. The relationship between nature and capacity and whether sagehood is 
achievable 
 The relationship between nature and capacity attracted a great deal of 
philosophical attention in the Wei-Jin period.  Zhong Hui collected and classified 
the various views of this topic into 4 kinds: nature is identical (tong 同) or 
coincides (he合) with capacity; and nature is different (yi異) or apart from (li離) 
capacity.  Although neither Wang Bi nor Guo Xiang addressed this topic directly, 
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their discussions of other relevant topics did imply their possible views of it.  Both 
would hold that nature is identical or coincides with capacity. 
 In Wang Bi’s interpretation, human nature consists of two parts, natureDao 
and natureqi.  NatureDao is the share of the Dao in human beings, and it is the 
metaphysical reason for the existence of human beings.  Since the Dao is an 
ontological reality devoid of any physical properties, it is simply unthinkable that 
natureDao would be different from one person to another.  It is natureqi that 
accounts for the differences among human beings in moral assets, physical 
features, and capacity.  Or to be direct, one’s natureqi determines one’s capacity.  
Guo Xiang’s view is more clear-cut.  As shown in chapter 3, qi is the substance 
making human nature and life; capacity is one constituent of human nature.   
 Also, both Wang Bi and Guo Xiang agreed that capacity is unchangeable, 
a view that stems from the theory of qi endowment.  This theory holds that one’s 
qi endowment is pre-determined; so one’s capacity as decided by it is 
unchangeable.  Although the concept of qi is not prominently featured in Wang Bi 
and Guo Xiang’s thought, it plays an important role in accounting for the 
differences of human beings.  The sage is endowed with special refined qi, which 
distinguishes him from the common people.  The sage’s qi determines his 
extraordinary capacity, which Wang Bi termed as spirituality (shenming 神明).  
Spirituality refers to the sage’s special capacity of comprehending the Dao and 
embodying Nonbeing.  According to Guo Xiang, one can improve one’s capacity 
in degree through practice, but cannot change one’s capacity in kind.  Each person 
has his/her limits, and this decides what he/she can and cannot do.  Trying to do 
what one cannot do is transgressing one’s limits.  Only the sage is endowed with a 
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special capacity of being at one with the Dao and implementing the policy of non-
action. 
It is noteworthy that in both interpretations, the sage represents the highest 
level of human capacity.  This is apparently different from the Confucian vision of 
sagehood, i.e., the sage is esteemed as the shining example of moral cultivation.  
Since this capacity is decided by a special qi endowment, which is unchangeable, 
the common people have no promise to become sages through effort.    
4.1.2. The relationship between nature and feeling 
 Regarding the relationship between nature and feeling, Wang Bi and Guo 
Xiang shared the view that nature guides feeling.  Both Wang Bi’s concept of 
natureDao and Guo Xiang’s concept of xingfen (the limits of nature 性分) set 
restriction on feeling. 
 For Wang Bi, the relationship between nature and feeling is that between 
natureDao and natureqi, as feeling generates from the contact of natureqi with things.  
While natureDao is tranquil, natureqi moves incessantly and tends towards contact 
with things, which often results in excessive feelings, i.e., desires.  That is why 
natureDao is necessary.  As the differentiation of the Dao in human beings, 
natureDao is the principle guiding natureqi.  Whether feeling is good or not depends 
on whether the response of natureqi to things is under the influence of natureDao.   
 In Wang Bi’s view, the sage does have the same feelings as ordinary 
people, but the former is not bound by things while the latter chase after things.  
The difference between the two may result again from qi endowment.  Qi with 
which ordinary people are endowed may be thin and coarse, so it is prone to 
drifting with things; the sage is endowed with a special thick and refined qi, which 
shows a natural affinity to the Dao.  The sage also has a high degree of 
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intelligence, which enables him to follow the Dao in his entire mode of being.  
This guarantees that the sage’s natureqi is always close to his natureDao, which 
means that his feeling is always proper. 
Turning to Guo Xiang, one’s xingfen (the limits of nature) decides whether 
one’s feeling is proper or improper.  One’s natural feelings, for example, one’s 
natural affection for one’s parents, fall within the limits of one’s nature.  They are 
opposite to artificial feelings, which are informed by moral norms, renyi for 
example, and induced by the promise of rewards.  The artificial feelings transgress 
one’s limits and also name desires, which are the root cause for one’s unhappiness.  
One’s xingfen sets limits on one’s feeling; one should express one’s feeling within 
these limits.   
To summarize the similarity between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, on the 
relationship between nature and capacity, both thinkers thought that the two are 
identical or coincide with each other.  One’s qi endowment decides one’s capacity.  
The sage is endowed with a special qi and he therefore has a special capacity.  
Since both one’s qi endowment and capacity cannot change in kind, sagehood is 
unattainable through effort.  As for the relationship between nature and feeling, 
both philosophers showed their trust in nature, in its natural goodness that should 
be distinguished from the moral vision of human nature in Confucianism.  
Although they acknowledged natural feelings, they were cautious with feeling.  
Since feeling is prone to drifting with things and degenerating into desire, it 
should be guided by nature. 
4.2. Differences between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang 
 This part examines the differences between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.  I 
propose that Wang Bi understood natureDao as principle and Guo Xiang as 
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substance.  Consequently, Wang Bi’s view focuses on the commonality of human 
beings while Guo Xiang’s on the diversity of human beings.  Both differences 
stem from a different understanding of the origin of nature.  Wang Bi thought that 
human nature has its origin in the Dao, while Guo Xiang held that no 
metaphysical ontology engenders human beings and human nature forms of itself 
naturally.  
4.2.1. Nature originating in the Dao vs. Nature devoid of any metaphysical 
reason 
 Wang Bi and Guo Xiang held different views as to the generation of the 
cosmos.  While the former formulated that Nonbeing engenders and sustains the 
myriad things, the latter refuted the existence of any absolute ontology and 
stressed that things simply come into being by themselves naturally. 
 This leads to the fundamental difference between the two thinkers in 
viewing human nature.  Wang Bi traced the origin of human nature to the Dao.  
The share of the Dao forms what is “authentic” in human beings.  Although 
human nature is materially made from qi, natureDao is the decisive part.  It defines 
human beings in the same way that morality defines human beings in 
Confucianism.   
 As for Guo Xiang, when things come into being by themselves, their 
natures form concurrently.  Human nature conceived in this way is devoid of any 
metaphysical reason.    However, this does not mean that the Dao is neglected in 
Guo Xiang’s thought.  It remains crucial.  But unlike Wang Bi, who upheld the 
Dao as principle, Guo Xiang construed the Dao as a kind of mindset, the key to 
living a happy life.  I will return to this point later. 
4.2.2. Principle vs. Substance  
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 As pointed out in chapter 1, there is a contrast between the views of human 
nature in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi.  The former focuses on the metaphysical 
reason for human nature, while the latter offers a much more substantive account, 
referring human nature to a life of health and longevity.  Now that Wang Bi and 
Guo Xiang are primarily commentators who largely confined themselves to the 
texts, it is not surprising that this contrast becomes sharper in their respective 
elaborations. 
 Wang Bi formulated an understanding of human nature as principle.  The 
Dao is both formless and nameless; so it is hard to conceive of the Dao as 
anything concrete but an absolute principle.  The Dao is a principle in that it 
engenders and sustains the cosmos.  Consequently, natureDao, the share of the Dao 
in human beings, should also be understood in a metaphysical way.  The terms 
Wang Bi used to interpret human nature, for example, “authenticity,” “the One,” 
and “emptiness and stillness,” indicate the relation between the Dao and human 
nature.  It is unthinkable that human nature would convey concrete references.  As 
Wang Bi explicitly claimed, because natureDao is the principle and is still, it is able 
to regulate qing.  
Wang Bi developed an interpreting methodology which aims to rediscover 
the fundamental meaning and principle (yili義理) of the classics, as opposed to 
the Han exegesis that focuses on the sentences and words (zhangju 章句) of the 
classics.  As Wang Bi was largely concerned with the metaphysical basis of 
human nature, it is hard to find any concrete references in his interpretation of 
human nature.287  Consequently, although one gets to know that human nature has 
                                                 
287  Whether Learning of the Profound is a pure metaphysical study or has practical 
concerns has been debated from the end of the Wei-Jin period onward.  Many Chinese 
philosophers, Ge Hong, for example, held Learning of the Profound responsible for the division 
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its basis in the Dao, or it is the share of the Dao in human beings, one is left 
wondering what human nature is concretely, especially when the Dao is conceived 
as formless and nameless Nonbeing.  This is further accentuated when one 
compares Wang Bi with Guo Xiang who referred human nature to substantive 
things. 
 Guo Xiang’s explanations of human nature are quite substantive.  Qi is the 
material from which human beings are made.  Life, physical features, capacity and 
feeling are constituents of human nature.  These are concrete, tangible things.  
Guo Xiang often combined the characters 性 (nature) and 命 (life) to indicate that 
                                                                                                                                      
and disorder of China during and after the Wei-Jin period, for it only focused on the discussions of 
the empty issues and paid no attention to the practical issues.  This position had not been 
questioned until the Qing dynasty.  Qing scholars proposed that Learning of the Profound is 
practically oriented and its discussion includes many political, legal, ethical, and ritual topics.  
 
Turning to Wang Bi, the question comes to be whether he is only interested in 
metaphysical explorations or has practical concerns too.  Wagner and Lynn would go as far as to 
say that Wang Bi intended his commentary for the ruler, in order to effect political change.   My 
proposal is that the philosophy of Wang Bi is practically or politically oriented; however, its 
methodology looks much more metaphysical.  In his commentary on the Laozi, Wang Bi 
frequently mentioned “the ruler”, “the management of the nation”, and “the way of managing”, etc.  
This might be one reason that Wagner and Lynn interpret Wang Bi as a prospective advisor of the 
ruler.   
 
The historical context also indicates Wang Bi’s political intention.  Wang Bi lived in a 
period of division.   The intellectuals of the period sought effective ways to restore the order of the 
Dao.  He Yan, for example, was an eminent minister who made great achievements in both 
political and philosophical fields.  Wang Bi often took part in the discussions organized by He Yan.  
The historical files show that the topics involve both philosophical and political issues.  Wang Bi 
once requested an interview with the Wei General Cao Shuang, the de facto ruler of the Wei 
dynasty and a pure politician.  Although what Wang Bi talked about during the interview is not 
recorded, it is reasonable to assume that he intended to contribute his solutions to the political 
problems facing the Wei dynasty.   
 
However, in his commentary on the Laozi, Wang Bi saved most of his passages for the 
profound concept of the Dao, Nonbeing, and Being, which might give one an impression that 
Wang Bi was only concerned with metaphysical issues.  However, it is also evident that Wang Bi 
highlighted the Dao, because it is the order underlying the universe.  The only and most effective 
solution to the chaos is to return to the Dao.  The intention of Wang Bi was evident.  He hoped, 
through his interpretation, people, especially the ruler, would come to realize the absolutely 
significance the Dao, and follow the Dao.  As a result, the world would restore order.  So far as 
human nature is concerned, since it has its base in the Dao, it is originally perfect.  Therefore, the 
ruler should not confuse and mislead the common people by norms.  At this point, the policy of 
non-action prevails.  The Dao is the most fundamental principle of the universe; comprehending it 
one is able to solve any problems and difficulties.  This is Wang Bi’s methodology of holding the 
One to manage the many (zhiyi tongzhong 執一統衆).  By this methodology Wang Bi was able to 
commute freely between the Dao and the myriad things, between the metaphysical world and the 
physical (political) world. 
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nature is not an essence independent of the human body.  Rather, nature can never 
be separated from physical life.  Only through the physical existence of life can 
nature be realized. 
 Besides, one’s figure, height, hair color, and other features all belong to the 
realm of nature.  One’s special capacity of doing something is also a part of one’s 
nature.  Whereas Wang Bi drew a line between nature and feeling and 
subordinated the latter to the former, Guo Xiang put nature and feeling on the 
same level.  The two are inseparable in the same way as nature and life are.  
Feelings are expressions of the corporeal life and nature. 
4.2.3. Commonality vs. Diversity 
A contrast between commonality and individuality, which is similar to that 
between commonality and diversity, has been mentioned in 3.3.1.  What I have 
discussed about the former contrast is also applicable to the latter.  The concepts 
of commonality and diversity are usually associated with Confucian and Daoist 
views of human nature respectively.288  However, as pointed out in 3.3.1, this 
association is too general to reflect the complexity of Daoist thought in its long 
course of development. 
 The review of the ideas of human nature in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi in 
chapter 1 has revealed a contrast between commonality and diversity.  Wang Bi 
and Guo Xiang made this contrast more evident through their respective 
interpretations of the two Daoist classics.  Wang Bi traced all beings, despite their 
physical diversity, to one absolute principle.   
                                                 




 Besides, the Dao has no physical features and cannot be measured by any 
normal standards, thus it is impossible that one receives more of the Dao or holds 
a larger share of the Dao than others.  In this regard, human beings are again the 
same.  To emphasize the commonality of human beings, Wang Bi employed the 
term “One” (yi一), the opposite of many.  Besides the meaning of being singular 
in number, the character 一 also means that various things have something in 
common or they are the same in one respect.  To summarize, in view of natureDao, 
people are the same; but with respect to natureqi, they are different.  Given that 
natureDao is the decisive part of human nature and determines the authenticity of 
human beings, people are alike in that their commonality is major while their 
difference is minor.289   
 Turning to Guo Xiang, he was fully concerned with the diversity of human 
nature.  A brief summary of his thought of nature is, “each thing has its own 
nature; the nature of each thing has its own limits (wugeyouxing 物各有性 , 
xinggeyouji 性各有極).”  It is evident that human beings are different in life, 
physical features, capacity and the expressions of feelings.  All these differences 
are self-so.  In Wang Bi’s view, by nature one person is united with all others and 
human beings are united with all other creatures.  However, according to Guo 
Xiang, nature is what differentiates one person or thing from another. 
                                                 
289  Mencius is also concerned with the commonality of human beings.  In my 
understanding, Wang Bi differs from Mencius in at least two respects.  First, Wang Bi bases the 
commonality of human beings on the Dao, the metaphysical reason for human beings.  In contrast, 
Mencius’ view is much more concrete.  The similarity of human beings pertains to substantive 
things, for example, benevolent feelings, that the common people experience in everyday life.  
Mencius may further trace these experiences or phenomena to Heaven (tian 天) or the Dao of 
Heaven (tiandao 天道), the absolute moral principle penetrating the cosmos.  But, evidently, his 
vision of the Dao is different from Wang Bi’s, which is devoid of any moral meanings.  Second, 
for Mencius the moral nature is what separates human beings from animals and inanimate things.  
However, Wang Bi did not draw a sharp line between the two.  Rather, it seems that nature unites 
human beings with all other creatures, for both groups have their natures based on the Dao.  This 
agrees the observation that Daoism opposes the human-centered philosophies popular in history 
and today.   This is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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While Wang Bi addressed the issue of nature in terms of its relation to the 
Dao, Guo Xiang addressed it in terms of its relation to life.  Within expectation, if 
nature is interpreted as having its base in the Dao, it must be the common side of 
nature being highlighted.  In contrast, since life consists of concrete contents and 
obviously diverges in physical appearance, nature, in Guo Xiang’s interpretation, 
cannot but be diverse.   
4.3. Inheritance from and Development to Han Confucianism 
 I have shown the similarities and differences between Wang Bi and Guo 
Xiang in interpreting human nature.  Now the question is how to understand these 
similarities and differences?  I propose that the answer lies in the Han Confucian 
tradition that Wang Bi and Guo Xiang inherited and sought to change.  Wang Bi 
and Guo Xiang were both influenced by and tried to go beyond Han Confucianism, 
from which the similarities and differences between them become understandable. 
4.3.1. Inheritance from Han Confucianism 
Learning of the Profound in the Wei-Jin period is said to be a denial of 
Han Confucianism and a revival of Daoism.  However, as the examination of 
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang shows, the traces of Han Confucianism in both thinkers 
are evident.  Clearly, although Wei-Jin intellectuals felt disappointed at Han 
Confucianism, they were not completely free of the influence of the latter. 
Confucianism had formed an entrenched part of the tradition with the 
support of the Han court.  Its influence did not end with the decline of the Han 
dynasty but pervaded the following dynasties.  For example, the position of 
Confucius was hardly challenged during the Wei-Jin period.  Of importance is that 
the Confucian classics remained required reading for the children of the noble 
clans in the Wei-Jin period.  With this family education, quite a number of noble 
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descendants turned out to be renowned intellectuals well versed in both Daoist and 
Confucian texts.  Considering this, it is understandable that Wang Bi and Guo 
Xiang were able to integrate Confucian ideas into their commentaries on the 
Daoist texts. 
The similarities between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang suggest their inheritance 
from Han Confucianism.  Of significance is the theory of qi endowment.  The 
concept of qi is not the invention of Han Confucians, but Han Confucians 
developed a theory of qi endowment that accounts for the formation of human 
beings and all differences of human beings.  It is with Han Confucianism that qi 
endowment came to be a very influential theory in the history of Chinese 
philosophy.   
It is evident that both Wang Bi and Guo Xiang were influenced by the 
theory of qi endowment.  They followed their Han predecessors in maintaining 
that qi is the substance from which the human being is made.  Another important 
idea they inherited is that qi endowment accounts for the differences of human 
beings.  This idea directly explains their agreement that capacity is unchangeable.  
It was generally accepted in the Han dynasty that qi endowment decides the 
differences of human beings in moral cultivation, intelligence, health, and fate, etc.  
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang followed this view in indicating that qi endowment 
decides what capacity one has.  As one’s qi endowment is pre-determined, one can 
improve one’s capacity through practice but cannot change it in kind.  Due to his 
special endowment of qi, the sage has a special capacity, which indicates that 
sagehood cannot be attained through effort. 
The Confucian vision of sagehood defined sagehood as a result of 
continued moral cultivation, so even a common person can become a sage through 
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learning and effort.  This partly explains the emphasis that Han Confucians 
attached to education.  But the question is that they attributed sagehood to the 
special endowment of qi.  Here the contradictoriness is evident, as my 
examination of Wang Chong shows in chapter 1.  Wang Bi and Guo Xiang 
criticized that Confucian education distorts the true nature of human beings.  They 
interpreted sagehood in terms of qi endowment and capacity, both of which are 
natural and pre-determined.  In so doing, they cut off the possibility of a common 
person becoming a sage. 
 Wang Bi and Guo Xiang’s views of sagehood may also be influenced by 
the theory of the three grades of human beings (nature) predominant in the Han 
dynasty.  The theory classifies human beings into three groups: the upper, the 
representative of which is the sage, the lower, for example, the wicked kings Jie 
and Zhou, and the middle or average, which consists of the common people.  The 
upper is completely good and the lower, completely bad; they remain respectively 
good and bad permanently.  The nature of the common people is changeable.  
Although a common person can become good through education, it is not clear 
whether this person can become as good as the sage.  Wei-Jin thinkers borrowed 
the structure of the three grades from Han Confucianism, but reclassified human 
beings into the sage, the gentleman, and the common people in terms of capacity 
and feeling instead of morality.  As both capacity and feeling are made from qi, 
the gaps between the sage, the gentlemen and the common people cannot be 
bridged.  
 The similarity between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang in understanding the 
relationship between nature and feeling also reflects their indebtedness to Han 
Confucians.  As argued in chapter 1, the distinction between nature and feeling did 
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not become evident until the Han dynasty.  Dong Zhongshu and Liu Xiang made 
clear distinctions between nature and feeling.  Based on their contribution, Wang 
Bi and Guo Xiang were able to elaborate on the relationship between nature and 
feeling.   
 Wang Bi and Guo Xiang did not reject feeling as a whole.  For them, some 
feelings are good and some should be suppressed.  This is parallel to Liu Xiang’s 
view that nature and feeling correspond to each other; since nature is a mixture of 
good and evil, feeling cannot be said to be completely bad.  The question that Liu 
Xiang did not address is how to decide which feeling is good or bad.  Wang Bi put 
forth the answer by his discussion of the relationship between natureDao and 
natureqi.  Guo Xiang’s answer lies in the concept of xingfen.  Only feelings 
informed by natureDao or within the limits of nature are reasonable.  Feelings 
resulting from insatiable demands for external things are deviant.  Although Wang 
Bi and Guo Xiang did not disparage feeling as a whole, as Dong Zhushu did, they 
were cautious with it, for feeling is prone to drifting with things and becoming 
uncontrollable. 
 The relationship between nature and feeling involves a relationship 
between human nature and renyi (benevolence and righteousness).  Wang Bi and 
Guo Xiang produced similar explanations on this issue.  When renyi refers to 
natural feelings, for example, one’s natural affection for others, it is a part of 
human nature.  But when renyi refers to artificial expressions induced by 
Confucian rites, it is alien to human nature.  Wang Bi’s and Guo Xiang’s 
clarifications of renyi indicate the enduring influence of the Confucian view of 
human nature.  It also reflects their attempt to surpass the dichotomy between 
Confucianism and Daoism by reconciling the two. 
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4.3.2. Development to Han Confucianism 
 Although Wei-Jin thinkers absorbed nutrients from Han Confucianism, 
they also realized the serious problems of the latter, i.e., its failure to restore order 
in society.  They tried to surpass Han Confucianism by exploring more effective 
ways of reestablishing social peace, which results in their respective contribution 
to the tradition.  
 In this part I examine the innovations that Wang Bi and Guo Xiang 
brought to the tradition, Han Confucianism in particular.  I propose that the 
differences between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang in understanding human nature arise 
from their interrogation of Han Confucianism.  To be specific, both Wang Bi’s 
and Guo Xiang’s views of human nature reflect an attempt to balance mingjiao 
(Confucian rites 名教) with the Dao as naturalness.  To save mingjiao from 
deteriorating into formalities and being abused for selfish interest, Wang Bi and 
Guo Xiang reinterpreted mingjiao by tracing it either to the objective principle of 
the Dao, or the subjective mindset of being at one with the Dao. 
(1) A clarification of mingjiao (名教)  
Mingjiao (名教 ) literally translates as “Teaching of Names” and is 
generally used in the Wei-Jin period to characterize the Confucian rites.290  The 
term ming 名 conveys meanings similar to that of “Rectifying Names (zhengming 
正名)” in the Analects and in the Xunzi, which is to make distinctions among 
various Names, to make clear the respective requirements of various Names, and 
to check whether a person under a certain Name meets its requirement.  Generally 
                                                 
 290 Mingjiao (名教) has various English translations.  For example, Richard B. Mather 
translates it as “conformity”; Brook Ziporyn as “the teaching of names.”  See Richard B. Mather, 
“The Controversy over Conformity and Naturalness during the Six Dynasties,” 160; Brook 
Ziporyn, The Penumbra Unbound, 23. 
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speaking, mingjiao is a comprehensive concept, referring to the institutionalized 
Confucian doctrines. 
The relationship between mingjiao and ziran attracted a great deal of 
philosophical attention in the Wei-Jin period.  Many prominent philosophers of 
the period produced arguments on this topic.  However, because of the 
comprehensiveness of mingjiao, it is necessary to clarify how many constituents 
or aspects mingjiao encompasses.  This clarification is helpful to give a clear sense 
of the problems of mingjiao and the solutions that Wei-Jin philosophers proposed. 
Mingjiao consists of three aspects: (1) moral cultivation, which highlights 
the development of virtues derived from moral feeling or moral consciousness; (2) 
social and moral norms as to what each individual should do in accordance with 
his or her position; (3) social institutions, for example, the hierarchical structure of 
government and the system of appointing officials. 
Ideally, aspect (1) is the basis of aspects (2) and (3).  As Mencius 
suggested, to be virtuous is a human being’s self-requirement, because he or she 
already has a kind of intrinsic moral seeds.  Thus, one’s behavior of renyi 
(benevolence and righteousness) is a natural flow of one’s nature of renyi.  Then, 
moral norms are established as an external reflection of moral cultivation.  I admit 
that moral norms are not entirely based on moral cultivation.  In some cases they 
are compulsory impositions on people.  But in the sense that moral norms need 
each individual’s moral cultivation to be buttressed, they have their basis in the 
latter.  Then social institutions are developed to reward the good and punish the 
bad.  It was common practice in the Han dynasty that a virtuous person had the 
chance to work in government and to be promoted to higher positions. 
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However, mingjiao became artificial and false towards the end of Han.  
The aspect (1) of moral cultivation of mingjiao was neglected, whereas the 
normative and institutional aspects (2) and (3) were immensely emphasized.  A 
man would waste no time on moral cultivation.  He simply conducted himself 
intentionally to show his accordance with moral conventions.  This would win him 
good reputation faster than moral cultivation.  He devoted his time and effort to 
making friends with famous characterologists, which proved to be an effective 
way to expand one’s reputation and bring one profit.  It was common at the end of 
Han that a person’s name or reputation (ming 名) did not match his actuality (shi 
實) at all.  A famous filial son was found to live separately from his father; an 
official said to be of complete integrity was in fact corrupt.291  Without moral 
cultivation, mingjiao deteriorated into formalities and a means of obtaining 
reputation and profit.  Realizing the seriousness of the problem, Wei-Jin thinkers 
began to explore their respective solutions. 
(2) Two understandings of ziran (naturalness自然): objective principle vs. 
subjective mindset 292  
 Both Wang Bi and Guo Xiang realized that the overwhelming emphasis on 
mingjiao resulted in the collapse of the Han court.  When its regulative and 
institutional aspects overshadowed moral cultivation, mingjiao would distort the 
true nature of human beings and corrupt social relations.  To quote Wang Bi,   
The virtues of simplicity and sincerity are not admired, but the 
exquisiteness of reputation and conducts are appreciated.  People 
                                                 
291 Ge Hong 葛洪, Baopuzi 抱樸子, 3:509. 
 
292 I thank Professor Alan Chan and my classmates on this issue.  The discussions in his 
lecture on Wei-Jin philosophy inspired the present section. 
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make effort to do what is commonly desirable and look forward to 
reputations; they cultivate themselves according to what is publicly 
praised and look forward to profit.  Looking forward to reputation 
and profit, they do things more sedulously.  The more splendid 
their reputations are, the further they are from sincerity.  The more 
profit they achieve, the more competitive they become.  The father 
and the son, the elder brother and the younger brother, each harbors 
selfish intention and thus loses frankness.  Filial piety does not 
come out of sincerity; kindness does not come out of cordiality.  
All these result from upholding reputation and (artificial) moral 
conduct.  Worrying that customs have become corrupt and (the 
desire for) reputation soared, a ruler esteems benevolence and 
righteousness.  Even though he is intelligent and skillful, he causes 
artificiality.  Needless to say, those inferior to him will cause more 
falseness.  Therefore, to repudiate benevolence and to discard 
righteousness, one can rediscover filial piety and kindness.  But this 






                                                 




 As clearly expressed in the above passage, when inner self-cultivation was 
neglected, mingjiao became baseless and its collapse was within expectation.  
Penetrating this serious problem, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang tried to relay a solid 
foundation for mingjiao.  Of course they did not re-base mingjiao on moral 
cultivation but on the Dao, i.e., ziran (naturalness).  
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang put forth two different understandings of the Dao, 
from which all their differences in understanding human nature stem.  Wang Bi 
interpreted the Dao as an objective principle, while Guo Xiang conceived of it as a 
subjective mindset. 
 Before exploring Wang Bi’s understanding of the Dao, I need to briefly 
address the idea of the Dao in the Laozi.  It remains controversial whether the Dao 
in the Laozi is an existing thing or existence itself.  Although far more passages in 
the Laozi are devoted to the transcendence of the Dao, some passages indicate that 
the Dao is a thing.  Of them chapter 21 is most frequently cited:  
As a thing the Dao is so dim and faint.  Being dim and faint, there 
is some image within.  Being faint and dim, there is some thing 
within. 
道之爲物，惟恍惟惚。惚兮恍兮，其中有象。恍兮惚兮，其中有物。  
A reader may conclude from this passage that the Dao indeed exists as a 
thing, though this thing is too dim to be felt through the sense organs and too 
profound to be comprehended through human knowledge.   
If it remains controversial whether the Dao is an existing thing or existence 
itself in the Laozi, it is certainly a purely metaphysical existence in Wang Bi’s 
interpretation.  Nonbeing is the key concept that Wang Bi employed to interpret 
the Dao.  He stressed that Nonbeing is formless and nameless.  Being formless the 
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Dao cannot be felt by the sense organs; being nameless the Dao is beyond the 
scope of human language and knowledge.  As Wang Bi was largely concerned 
with the transcendence of the Dao and its power, his hermeneutic strategy was to 
make lengthy comments on the textual passages concerning the metaphysical side 
of the Dao.  As for passages that may suggest a more this-worldly understanding 
of the Dao, he either left them uncommented or interpreted them in such a way 
that they all turned out to be backed by the metaphysical Dao.  With this strategy, 
Wang Bi would not bother to clarify whether the Dao is a thing or not.  He left the 
textual words daozhiweiwu 道之爲物 uncommented, and focused instead on the 
characters huang (dim 恍) and hu (faint 惚).  According to him, the two characters 
are used to describe the profound process of creation.  Because the Dao is 
formless and nameless, the myriad things are unclear (huang 恍, hu 惚) how they 
come into being (萬物以始以成，而不知其所以然).294  In other words, their 
memory of birth is very dim and faint (huang 恍, hu 惚), which in turn testifies to 
the miraculous yet modest Dao.   
The Dao is not a physical thing, but a principle of ziran (naturalness 自然) 
engendering and sustaining the cosmos.  To live a proper life, each thing needs to 
accord with this principle.  As each thing has the share of the Dao in its nature, 
what it needs to do is to follow (yin因), to abide by (ren任), or to yield to (shun
順) its Daoist nature.  Since each thing can live a proper life without external aid, 
the principle of the Dao also translates as the principle of non-action.  The socio-
political application of non-action, i.e., a pragmatic administrative policy, is 
highlighted in Wang Bi’s commentary.  It stresses that a ruler is obliged to 
                                                 
294 Wang Bi jijiaoshi王弼集校釋, 52; cf. Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue, 86. 
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establish circumstances favorable for the natural flow of people’s nature rather 
than govern them with artificial statecraft, for example, to inculcate into them the 
moral doctrine of benevolence and righteousness.  When the principle of ziran 
prevails, order in human society and the cosmos will be restored.    
This principle is objective for two reasons.  First, it is independent of 
human beings.  The principle of the Dao exists before human beings and will last 
forever.  It is not dependent on human beings, but human beings rely entirely on it 
to live a proper life.  Second, it is a universal principle applicable to both human 
beings and other animate creatures and inanimate objects. 
While Wang Bi was largely faithful to the Laozi text in his interpretation 
of the Dao, Guo Xiang went far beyond the Zhuangzi text.  As pointed out in 
chapter 1, the Dao in the Zhuangzi refers to a universal principle of transformation.  
Once people comprehend and follow this principle, they are able to live a life free 
of anxiety and bitterness.  Guo Xiang was also concerned with the question of 
how people can live a happy life.  For him, the key is to attain the mindset of the 
Dao as a result of fully utilizing one’s nature.   
Utilizing one’s nature involves developing a mode of self-knowledge, i.e., 
a consciousness of one’s xingfen.  Having a clear knowledge of one’s strengths 
and weaknesses, one devotes oneself to do what one is good at and does not 
admire or envy others.  As such, one is free from the disturbance of desire, which 
is the root cause of one’s unhappiness.  
The Daoist mindset is not only a positive affirmation of who one is and the 
limits of one’s nature, but also a way of viewing the differences between oneself 
and others.  Evidently, people are different in many aspects.  The key is how to 
view these differences; people also vary in this respect.  In the absence of a Daoist 
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mindset, one may be disturbed so much by the differences between oneself and 
others that one makes every effort to eliminate them.  However, a person, who has 
attained the Daoist mindset, is able to penetrate these surface differences and 
realize that all human beings are actually equal with each other.  Each person has 
his or her limits; if he or she fully utilizes his or her nature, he or she obtains a 
sense of self-sufficiency similar to all others.  Consequently, one is free from the 
disturbance of comparing oneself with others.   
The Daoist mindset also involves a deep understanding of the principle of 
self-transformation.  As the cosmos is in constant change and each thing is 
transient, one need not concern oneself too much with external situation.  One 
accepts whatever happens to one’s life, good or bad, as simply natural, and tries to 
comprehend the Dao through whatever one experiences.  To take the example of 
the farmer again, once he attains the Daoist mindset, he will not insist on 
becoming a minister.  He feels comfortable with the farming life that he happens 
to lead and concentrates on comprehending the Dao through his current work.  He 
remains a farmer; nothing changes in his life substantively.  But his mindset 
changes; previously he was a miserable farmer who always complained bitterly 
about his misfortune, now he is a happy farmer enjoying his life. 
The sage is someone who has attained the Daoist mindset.  With it, the 
sage did not make any calculation and discrimination and simply did everything 
spontaneously and properly.  It is a mindset of spontaneity and freedom, an ideal 
that looks similar to what Confucius achieved in his seventies when he was able to 
follow what his heart desired without transgressing the limits.295 This mindset is 
independent of any external circumstances.  Guo Xiang made a well-known 
                                                 
295 The Analects 2:4; A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 22. 
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elaboration of this point, as shown in chapter 3 (p.183).  With the mindset of the 
Dao the sage is able to meet, effortlessly, whatever the contexts require.  The 
environment can never affect him.  If the sage happens to be a ruler, he devotes 
himself to what a ruler should do.  Because he fulfills the obligations of a ruler out 
of spontaneity, he always feels as free as wandering randomly in the mountains 
and forests.  In contrast, if a man thinks that in order to achieve the Dao, he needs 
to retreat from the secular world and shuts himself in a cave in the mountains, he 
already runs counter to the spirit of the Dao, for he is doing things deliberately 
and purposively.  Consequently, even if he lives in the wilderness, he is less free 
than the sage who is fully occupied with state affairs.  The man has become a 
prisoner of his own unnatural mind.  So it does not matter where a person is or 
what kind of life he is living.  It is his mindset that counts.  A person who 
comprehends the Dao will find his current life completely different from his 
previous life, though there is no substantive change on the surface.   
  Since the Dao refers to a state of mind completely independent of any 
external things, one need not retreat from society to pursue the Dao.  In arguing 
this, Guo Xiang competently proved that the sage, who was usually laughed at by 
Daoists for his worldly engagement, had achieved the Dao and was in the same 
superior sphere with those exemplary Daoists described variously as the authentic 
person, the ultimate person and the spiritual person.  This shows again Guo 
Xiang’s attempt to reconcile Confucianism with Daoism. 
 A few words need to be said about the subjectivity of the mindset of the 
Dao.  Firstly, the Dao conceived in this way refers to the human mind.  It is 
independent of the objective conditions of human beings, for example, occupation, 
position, and family background.  Secondly, the achievement of the mindset of the 
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Dao differs from one person to another.  That is, although both a farmer and a 
minister are enlightened by the Dao, the external reflections of their inner 
mindsets are substantively different from each other.   
(3) Reinterpretations of mingjiao in terms of ziran  
 The overwhelming emphasis of the normative and institutional aspects of 
mingjiao turns mingjiao baseless.  Wang Bi and Guo Xiang tried to re-base 
mingjiao on the Dao, either as an objective principle or a subjective mindset. 
 In Wang Bi’s view, mingjiao comes from ziran.  Since the Dao is the 
principle creating and sustaining the myriad things, mingjiao has its origin in the 
Dao.  The relationship between the Dao and mingjiao is metaphorized as that 
between the roots and the branches, or that between the mother and the children.  
Wang Bi stressed that the theme of the Laozi is to esteem the roots and rest the 
branches (崇本息末), to preserve the mother and maintain the children (守母存
子).  If the roots and the mother are carefully attended to, they will be strong 
enough to support the branches and the children.  It is devastating that emphasis is 
attached only to the branches and the children.  They may die young for lacking 
continuous support.  Mingjiao is the product of the Dao, thus its existence should 
be acknowledged.  However, mingjiao is the branches dependent on the root Dao; 
so it should not be upheld apart from the Dao.  Otherwise, it would degenerate 
into formalities and statecraft.  In contrast, with the significance of the Dao being 
highlighted, mingjiao could be used properly as an effective method of restoring 
social order. 
 According to Guo Xiang, mingjiao are “traces” (ji 迹 ), while ziran 
(naturalness), which refers to the mindset of the sage, is what leaves those traces 
(suoyiji 所以迹).  In this regard, as in Wang Bi’s case, people should not fasten to 
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mingjiao, for it is subject to change.  They should penetrate the phenomenon of 
mingjiao and try to catch the wisdom of the Dao, which is embodied by the sage.  
On the other hand, however, once a person attains a deep comprehension of Daoist 
wisdom, the conventional distinction between mingjiao and ziran, i.e., that 
between Confucian behaviors and Daoist behaviors will not hold true any longer.  
The person feels comfortable with whatever he meets with, i.e., he accepts 
whatever allotted to him happily and concentrates on comprehending the Dao 
through whatever he experiences.  If he happens to be a minister, he simply 
engages busily in dealing with state affairs; if he happens to be a farmer, he goes 
out to farm at sunrise and comes back to rest at sunset happily.   
It does not matter whether he is a minister or a farmer, whether he is living 
a Confucian or a Daoist life, or how others may view him; the key is that he has 
attained the mindset of the Dao.  This mindset allows him to conduct himself 
properly in each specific context.  Insofar as the Confucian engagement with 
secular affairs is a natural flow of one’s mindset of ziran, mingjiao can be said to 
be ziran.  Also, given that the distinction between mingjiao and ziran does not 
hold true for a person who attains the mindset of the Dao, mingjiao can be said to 
be identical with ziran.  Guo Xiang urged people to develop a mindset of the Dao 
and in so doing he was able to base mingjiao on a deep comprehension of the Dao.  
Without understanding the Dao, both the Confucian and Daoist way of life, as 
they are distinguished normally, are simply artificial.  Worse, an overemphasis on 
external behavior misleads people to focus on conducting themselves intentionally, 
as Wang Bi also maintains, and consequently they may neglect to pursue an inner 
understanding of the Dao. 
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 To summarize, the most fundamental difference between Wang Bi and 
Guo Xiang lies in that the former understood the Dao as an objective principle and 
the latter as a subjective mindset, from which all their differences on human nature 
stem.  This difference arises from their interrogation of Han Confucianism and 
their attempt to balance mingjiao with the Dao.  In so doing, while they inherited 
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